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1 Introduction 
The economic transformation of East Asia has been one of the eye-catching events 
of the second half of the twentieth century. The manufacturing export-led growth of 
Japan, followed by that of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong was both 
extraordinarily rapid and unexpected, turning East Asia from a poor underdeveloped 
region into a major economic force. In retrospect one may say that this rapid economic 
development caught observers off guard. In the 1950s and '60s a volatile domestic 
political situation appeared to spell a bleak future for Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Singapore. Moreover, the development trajectories followed by these countries did not 
sit well with the mood of export pessimism pervading the development debate. They 
ran counter to the inward-looking industrial policies pursued by many would-be 
industrializers. It was on the likes of China, India, Brazil and other inward-looking 
countries that many observers were pinning their hopes (Lai 1988; Wade 1992). 
This was why the transformation of what came to be called Newly Industrializing 
Countries was well underway by the time development observers began focusing their 
telescopes on the region. When the Asian manufacturing successes came to occupy 
center stage in the development debate around 1980 they already had their industrial 
infrastructure in place. What had happened in these countries was clear. How it all 
happened less so. The industrial transformation had been captured in government time 
series data and surveys. But these data, although valuable, had many gaps. Moreover, 
they only provided a birdseye view of industrial change. Much of the microlevel 
dynamics of entrepreneurial decisionmaking had been captured in a piecemeal and 
scattered fashion only.' 
New opportunities for a first-hand observation of business behaviour under 
industrial expansion presented themselves when a succession of investment booms hit a 
second tier of Asian countries in the 1980s. First Thailand and Malaysia, then 
Indonesia, and lately the southern coastal region of China have experienced such 
catalytic processes. This study reports on a field investigation of business behaviour in 
one of these industrial hot spots, documenting the recent emergence of textile 
equipment making in Indonesia. Indonesia's textile equipment industry started to 
develop in the 1970s out of machinery supply and repair activities geared to an 
expanding domestic textile spinning and weaving industry. Its growth gained 
momentum in the 1980s, at the end of which decade the nascent textile equipment 
industry was expanding by leaps and bounds in the wake of a booming textile export 
market. 
The study endeavours to trace the evolution of this new branch of manufacturing to 
the interplay of macrolevel policymaking and industrial change and microlevel business 
behaviour. In terms of research method it couples an industry focus to a combination of 
1
 Some of the field level survey work on production, marketing and investment 
behaviour is reported in Amsden (1977, 1989); Fransman (1982); Dahlman & Westphal (1981); 
Wortzel & Wortzel (1981). 
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top-down and bottom-up research, relying both on aggregate manufacturing statistics 
and detailed microevidence on entrepreneurial decisionmaking. Such an approach can 
provide rich insights in industrialization processes. It also has practical uses. The 
governments of most developing countries are engaged in what seems like a fruitless 
struggle to make industrial growth happen within their borders. The process is 
controllable only to a certain degree. To be sure, granting an industry infant status and 
cutting off imports will catalyze a process of import substitution. But why only some of 
these seedbeds produce the desired healthy export-competitive manufacturing clusters 
whereas other protégés remain perennial infants remains much of a mystery. All the 
more perplexing is the fact that on many occasions new industries have sprung up 
overnight where no-one, least of all industrial planners, expected them to appear. 
Detailed empirical research can lay bare the intended and unintended effects of 
government interventions on the business decisionmakers operating in the economic 
arena. After all, how these actors, in the aggregate, react or fail to react to changes in 
the business environment to a large extent determines whether the much-desired 
industrial development materializes. 
The following chapters will explore the complex interaction of macrolevel 
economic developments and policy interventions and microlevel business behaviour that 
led to the emergence of the Indonesian textile equipment industry. The purpose of the 
present chapter is threefold. First, it introduces structural characteristics of the textile 
equipment industry, emphasizing the textile equipment industry's potential for 
spontaneous, i.e. nongovernment sponsored, import substitution. Second, the chapter 
presents the framework of the study. It introduces the three leading themes of the study, 
that is, the regulatory context of business behaviour, demand for local-made textile 
equipment and related services, and supply conditions, and explains how and where 
these will be treated in subsequent chapters. Third, the chapter provides a discussion of 
research methodology and the setting of the fieldwork. 
Defining the Textile Equipment Industry 
The textile equipment industry is a branch of specialized plant equipment 
manufacturing, and as such is part of the diverse producer goods or capital goods 
sector. As used here the term textile equipment industry refers to the production of 
ready-made parts and assemblies, of custom-made parts and assemblies, as well as to a 
range of services, that is, textile machinery maintenance, repair, customizing and 
reconditioning. For practical purposes, the textile equipment industry may be divided 
into four clusters: 
i) the repairing, servicing, and overhauling of equipment installed in textile 
factories; 
ii) the production of machine parts for textile equipment. This category extends 
both to custom-built one-off machinery parts and to batch-produced standard 
parts; 
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iii) the construction of 'noncore' textile equipment. Noncore machinery comprises a 
group of assemblies that perform an assisting function in the interstices of major 
processing phases. Often, its functioning does not have a vital impact on product 
quality. The category includes water pretreatment units, fabric inspecting tables, 
fabric folding, rolling, and measuring machines, winding and setting machines, 
dryers, causticizers, and the like; 
iv) the production of 'core' machinery for spinning, weaving, knitting, or dyeing 
and finishing. This usually involves the design of one or more complex 
machines, standard units of which are then produced in large number with 
varying features. The functioning of core machinery is vital to the quality of the 
yam, cloth, and knitwear produced. It is to this group of machines that the term 
textile industry commonly refers. 
Textile Equipment Manufacturing as a Satellite Industry 
The recent emergence of textile equipment making in Indonesia provides yet 
another example of the industry's potential for spontaneous import substitution. By the 
latter term I mean a process of domestic manufacturing growth that occurs even when 
governments do not intervene in the domestic textile equipment market with the usual 
battery of import substitution-promoting interventions (import tariffs, import 
restrictions, subsidies). A number of historical country experiences bear witness to such 
a process of spontaneous development: early examples are provided by the rise of the 
Swiss, German, and French machinery industries out of textile equipment repair and 
servicing activities in the nineteenth century.2 Twentieth century instances include the 
rapid rise of textile equipment-making in Japan (Rouland 1991) and somewhat later in 
Shanghai, China, (Rawski 1980) and the emergence on the world market of Hong 
Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan as textile machinery exporters in the 1970s (UNCTAD 
1981).3 
This spontaneous growth potential is a consequence of the textile equipment 
industry's 'satellite' character (cf. Hollander 1967:32). First and foremost, the emergence 
of textile equipment making is a straightforward case of backward linkage formation. 
Many developing country governments have singled out the textile industry as a main 
target for import substitution programs. The demand for textile machinery and related 
2
 On Switzerland see Bodmer (1960:328,329); on the French Loire region see Gras 
(1908); on Germany Benad-Wagenhoff (1991:286). Compare the discussion in Landes (1969), 
p. 184. 
3
 This is not to argue that textile equipment-making has always evolved without 
government support. The post-World War II development of textile machinery-making in India 
and South Korea, for example, was clearly based on import substitution policies. My point is 
merely that infant industry protection is no necessary condition for the emergence of a textile 
equipment industry. 
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services is a derived demand, stemming from the growth of a sizeable domestic textile 
manufacturing sector. By spurring the expansion of domestic textile manufacturing, 
industrial planners in developing countries, with or without intention, create and 
augment a potential demand for textile equipment and related services. 
A second facilitating factor is the decisive advantage of proximity to domestic 
textile plants that metalworking service firms enjoy in their home markets. Being 
physically close to the textile industry is a distinct advantage for such enterprises. 
Textile factories need to have many unstandardized machinery construction, adaptation, 
and repair jobs performed. Small metalworking firms or 'jobshops' come into existence 
that cater to this demand. A factory may, for example, want to increase the capacity of 
a certain piece of machinery by retooling, it may require a new cooling system that 
somehow must be fit into the present layout, it may want to link up two units that 
cannot be easily fitted together, or its machinery may be in need of a complicated 
overhauling job for which it lacks in-house capacity. Such job-order tasks require tailor-
made solutions to idiosyncratic problems. The need for intense communication and 
cooperation between factory and jobshop makes proximity a cost-reducing factor. 
A third conducive factor is the extensive use of second-hand and, by industrialized 
country management standards, obsolete equipment in developing country plants.4 For 
one, the price/quality spectrum of services offered by developing country jobbing firms 
may be more compatible with choice of technique and machinery maintenance regimes 
prevalent in the textile industry than those of foreign suppliers of similar services. 
Textile factories postponing machinery replacement and practising breakdown 
machinery maintenance will be more inclined to outcontract servicing and maintenance 
to a cheap local shop than to an expensive overseas supplier. For another, factory 
maintenance managers may find it difficult to obtain original spare parts for old 
equipment and therefore be forced to rely on local parts suppliers. 
In the fourth place, as noted above, an important share of the heterogeneous textile 
equipment market comprises of products and services that are unstandardized. 
Consumers, moreover, may be ignorant of the full range of available alternatives. This 
applies not only to custom job markets but even to markets for core machinery.5 When 
grading systems are nonexistent and information costly to acquire, textile equipment 
buyers will have difficulties in comparing the price-quality ratio's of alternative bids. 
Their ignorance may be of benefit to inexperienced local shops trying to break into the 
market with products that do not match the price/quality standards of overseas 
4
 See e.g., Strassmann (1968). 
5
 In a study of choice of technique in 16 developing country textile plants Amsalem 
found that '... the prime factor that was found to have influenced the choice of technology by 
the firms in this study was the lack of information about certain existing technological 
alternatives' (1983:89). 
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competitors.6 
Fifth, newcomers in textile machinery and parts production can profit from 
relatively low technological barriers. The jobbing market enables newcomers to enter 
the textile machinery market and set foot on a trajectory leading from basic repairwork 
and simple construction jobs via batch production of more sophisticated machinery 
parts to the eventual assembly and construction of complex machines.7 
Sixth, many researchers have noted the absence of scale economies and 
indivisibilities in many branches of the metalworking industries. This circumstance 
creates relatively favourable entry conditions for small newcomers.8 
Seventh, because of the fact that, in theory at least, any machine shop equipped 
with a set of basic metal and woodworking cutting and forming tools is capable of 
producing anything from a fence to a crude powerloom, such establishments can 
survive and often thrive under a great variety of market configurations. Below I will 
further elucidate the important locational and entry characteristics. 
Locational Advantages 
Jobshops located in a center of textile manufacturing activity in a developing 
country have one crucial advantage over their foreign competitors: they are within easy 
reach of prospective customers. Nearly all textile factories rely on independent 
specialized jobshops to carry out part of their recurrent repair and maintenance work. 
Pecuniary considerations underlie factory management decisions to outcontract repair 
6
 In Indonesia these informational frictions lent the textile equipment market a 
'customer market' character. Buyers and sellers confronted one another in discrete bargaining 
sessions and transactions were concluded in private. The price or terms of a contract concluded 
in such private sessions was not divulged to outsiders. Textile factory maintenance personnel 
and jobbeis were often engaged in enduring customer relationships. Such longterm relationships 
prevail in many fields of business (cf. Braadbaart 1994a, Plattner 1989). In the field of 
organizational sociology this phenomenon is known as interfirm linkage (Scott 1987). 
Economists refer to it as relational contracting (Williamson 1985). 
7
 Rosenberg uses the term technological convergence to denote this feature: 'The central 
role ... of the application of decentralized power sources in the working of metals has meant the 
employment of similar skills, techniques, and facilities at some of the "higher" stages of 
production for a wide range of final products' (1963:15). On this point compare Fransman 
(1985:604). 
8
 The observations of Staley and Morse are pertinent: 'The prevalence of small plants in 
these industries is explained largely by the high degree of specialization and division of labor 
that is a feature of the precision metalworking industries. Modem machine tools attain high 
volume production through the repetitive performance of standardized operations. The 
specialization and division of tasks creates the need for movement of the work-in-process and 
its setup for the ensuing task, and also the need for special tools, dies, jigs, or fixtures to 
perform or hold the work. The division of tasks thereby opens the way for either the integration 
of tasks within a single plant, or their separate performance in more than one plant' (1965:115-
116). 
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and maintenance work. Complete or near-complete self-sufficiency will cause 
machinery and manpower underutilization in all but the largest textile mills. Therefore 
many textile factories maintain only so much repair capacity as can be kept busy with 
routine repairwork. 
Outcontracted work includes regular machinery maintenance work such as machine 
adjustment or the replacement of bearings and other wom-out parts, although such tasks 
may also be performed by textile plant maintenance crews. Local jobshops are 
frequently contracted to perform various specialist tasks. Whereas expensive 'core' 
machinery is usually installed by its manufacturer, local jobbing firms often install the 
accompanying infrastructure such as ventilators, pumps, and air and water ducts. Local 
shops also win contracts for the construction of simple but bulky or heavy equipment 
that would be expensive to import: storage containers, machine frames, and so on. As 
well, local jobshops are called upon to customize installed equipment, that is, to link up 
one machine to another piece of machinery or to expand the capacity of installed 
machinery. Finally, they may be asked to produce nonstandard machinery parts like 
pulleys and gears, or repair or reproduce a crucial machine part not locally available. 
Ease of communication between textile factory and jobshop is an important cost-
and time-saving factor in regard to the services listed above (Estall & Buchanan 
1973:35; Staley & Morse 1965:117). The execution of tailor-made tasks requires close 
coordination and intense communication between contracting parties. Personal contact 
and repeated Field visits are necessary to ascertain that the design does fit into the 
premises and that problems and bottlenecks are detected early on. Unless a foreign 
machinery maker decides to establish an overseas branch office, local shops hold a 
clear advantage in this line of work which may serve as a springboard and launch them 
into machinery construction. 
The Advantage of Low Entry Barriers 
Many observers have noted that the metalworking sector is a fertile seedbed for 
small newly-founded firms (e.g., Staley & Morse 1965). A combination of factors 
allows metalworking firms to expand through the size scale in incremental, stepwise 
fashion. No stage requires lumpy investments, that is, risky discrete jumps in 
investment that pose major hurdles to aspiring entrepreneurs. What factors make the 
metalworking industry so congenial to incremental growth? First, a machine shop 
outfitted with a basic set of general-purpose machine tools —lathes, milling machines, 
column drills, welding equipment, and bending and punching equipment- and 
employing a dozen skilled operators is capable of producing an endless diversity of 
metal parts and machinery (Rosenberg 1976). The machine shop is highly versatile and 
can compete for orders in a wide variety of markets. Under less favourable 
circumstances it can subsist on general repair and maintenance work for the local 
industry and services sector, but it can also respond quickly to market expansion by 
specializing. A shop may then start producing parts in batches as subcontractee of a 
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machinery building firm, or even build up the technological expertise to design and 
build its own machinery. Even so, when the need arises the shop can survive an 
unexpected market downturn by falling back on repairwork or simple construction jobs. 
Second, although this situation may change in the near future with the further 
spread of numerical controlled machine tools, scale economies do not play an important 
role in many segments of the metalworking industries.' Machinery producers are 
typically of small or medium size in comparison to the manufacturing sector average 
(Staley & Morse 1965). Among other things, this fact is indicated by the oftnoted 
prevalence of subcontracting relationships in the machinery-building industry 
(Watanabe 1983). 
Versatility makes the metalworking industry a hotbed for small firms. There is 
wide cross-country documentation on small repair shops evolving into small parts-
making and eventually becoming machinery producers. A survey of 52 medium-size 
engineering firms (employing 50 to 250 personnel) undertaken in South India in the 
1950s brought to light that 
... 29 grew to medium scale by small steps from their average initial work force of 19 and 
investment of $13,000. ... Of the other 23, ... 18 had started as repair shops with still lower 
average investment and employment. (Staley & Moïse 1965:172-173) 
Comparable patterns emerge from contemporary field studies conducted in Colombia 
(Cortes, Berry & Ishaq 1987), Taiwan (Amsden 1977) and other countries, as well as 
from various historical studies (Landes 1969; Rosenberg 1976). In sum, entrants in the 
metalworking industry set foot upon an evolutionary path that is relatively free of major 
hurdles investment-wise. A newly established small firm may obtain entry via the 
market for repair and maintenance market, building on its locational advantage. Having 
built up a reputation, a customer network, and sufficient skills, it can then decide to 
specialize. Jobbing firms tend to bear the brunt of market downturns, because when a 
slump arrives manufacturers will cut back on subcontracted work. They are the first to 
experience shrinking revenues and the last to recover from a slump. However, because 
they are so versatile, machine shops are highly resilient and often able to survive under 
adverse conditions by falling back on general repairwork. 
Framework of the Study 
Having listed these structural characteristics conducive to spontaneous import 
substitution processes in the textile equipment industry, I tum to the Indonesian case. 
The task of the following chapters will be to examine how the rapid development of 
Indonesian textile equipment making could happen. Its emergence raises a number of 
questions. How, in the unprotected Indonesian market for textile equipment, could 
' See Pack (1981a). On the impact of the micro-electronics revolution on the machine 
tool industry see O'Brien (1989) and Edquist, Jacobsson & Jethanandani (1985). For its impact 
on developing country manufacturing in general see James (1991). 
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inexperienced local equipment makers capture a substantial share in a home market for 
spinning and weaving machinery parts dominated by reputed foreign competitors? Why 
were textile factories prepared to buy local machinery parts arid assemblies of 
unreliable quality? What machinery maintenance regimes were pursued in textile 
plants? Furthermore, what were the origins of the textile equipment makers? From what 
sectors were human resources and financial assets transferred into the nascent industry? 
And why did some textile equipment making firms grow much faster than others? 
These questions lead one straight into the behavioural dynamics of industrial change. I 
have compressed them into three main issues: 
a) the regulatory context of business, 
b) the behavioural dimensions of demand formation in the textile equipment 
market, 
c) the entrepreneurial supply response. 
In the first place, the study investigates the regulatory context of entrepreneurial 
behaviour: the effect that industrial planning and monetary policies in Indonesia had on 
the aggregated business decisionmaking sequences which led to the founding of the 
industry. In the second place, it examines the emergence of local demand for textile 
equipment and machine repairing and reconditioning. At the macrolevel, this demand 
was governed by a government-induced rapid expansion of the Indonesian textile 
industry from 1968 onward. At the microlevel it was determined, on the one hand, by 
plant equipment investment and replacement decisions of textile factory managers. And 
on the other hand, by machinery maintenance regimes pursued in textile factories. The 
third main issue to be examined is that of competitive behaviour of local suppliers of 
textile equipment and related services. I will focus on the historical origins of textile 
equipment makers; on the nature of price and quality competition between firms in the 
industry; and on the managerial side of business behaviour, that is, financial 
management and the effect of management style on the speed of business expansion. 
The Regulatory Context of Business Behaviour 
The regulatory environment of business behaviour comprises a wide range of 
interventions affecting investment and production decisions of private entrepreneurs. 
The term 'industrial planning' covers a range of interventions designed to influence 
the domestic investment climate. On the one hand, governments make direct 
investments in manufacturing. On the other hand, they make use of various instruments 
that act as incentives and penalties on private investment behaviour. These include 
import or export bans and quota, import and export tariffs or subsidies, subsidized 
investment loans, and tax concessions.10 Important instruments used, among other 
things, to regulate the spatial pattern of manufacturing activities are process and 
10
 Impon and export duties belong both to the fiscal policymaking field (as indirect 
taxes) and to the industrial planning field (because they distort price signals). 
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location permits. 
The role of industrial planning in the emergence of textile equipment making in 
Indonesia will be the central concern of the next three chapters. Chapter 2 sketches the 
industrial transformation that Indonesia underwent in the New Order period (1966-
1991), and recounts how industrial policies shaped the expanding manufacturing sector. 
Chapter 3 narrows the focus down to the engineering industries. It summarizes patterns 
of change in this group of industries as reflected in national manufacturing statistics 
and discusses the role of planning. In particular, it investigates the non-electrical 
machinery-producing industries of which the textile equipment industry forms a part. 
Chapter 4 highlights the indirect effects of industrial planning on the textile equipment 
industry. It examines how New Order steel and textile import substitution policies 
affected the competitive position of local textile equipment makers vis-a-vis overseas 
competitors by creating an unprotected market for textile equipment; by forcing steel 
consumers to rely on local-made structural steels; and by stimulating a tremendous 
expansion of capacity in the textile industry. 
Monetary policymaking exerts an indirect influence on business behaviour through 
exchange rate, interest rate and money supply controls. These affect the availability and 
cost of capital and thereby investment decisions and amortization costs. Private business 
is also affected by the varying success of policymakers' attempts to control inflationary 
and deflationary tendencies. The latter part of chapter 10, dealing with investment and 
disinvestment in jobbing firms in 1990-1992, illustrates the impact of monetary policies 
on investment behaviour. It details the disastrous effects that credit rationing policies 
initiated in Indonesia in 1990 had on a number of firms. 
Demand: Choice of Technique and Machinery Maintenance in the Textile Industry 
The change in demand for local textile equipment and services during the New 
Order period was governed, at the macrolevel, by the pace of increase of capacity in 
the textile industry. At the microlevel of the firm it was determined by textile factory 
managers' decisions to invest and replace or maintain plant equipment as well as by the 
machinery maintenance regimes that were practised. 
Choice of technique was a key issue. Demand for local-made weaving machinery 
parts was largely restricted to vintage shuttle techniques. Every investment decision that 
replaced an obsolete powerloom with a modem shuttleless loom therefore destroyed 
part of the market for local-made spare parts. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on choice of 
technique and maintenance, showing how machinery buying and maintenance in 
Indonesian textile plants were conducive to a continued expansion of local spare parts-
making. Chapter 5 discusses choice of technique in the weaving industry. The latter 
part of the chapter discusses changes in the composition of the Indonesian spinning and 
weaving machinery park in the 1980s. On basis of import statistics it establishes that 
vintage weaving techniques were only slowly giving way to modem shuttleless 
techniques. Chapter 6 presents the findings of a survey on textile machinery 
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maintenance in a sample of 24 textile factories that I earned out in 1992. This survey 
evidenced how a combination of reliance on breakdown maintenance strategies, the fact 
that Indonesian textile plants did not maintain direct contacts with foreign parts 
suppliers, and the customer character of the spare parts market created a demand for 
local-made parts. 
The Textile Equipment Industry 
The main part of the study, comprising chapters 7 to 12, is devoted to a detailed 
investigation of the Indonesian textile equipment industry itself. The discussion 
presented in these chapters relies on evidence compiled in interviews with managers of 
70 Indonesian jobbing and equipment-making firms, a majority of which were machine 
shops, that is, equipped with machine tools and specialized primarily in metalworking. 
Of these, 49 establishments specialized in textile equipment making at the time of 
survey." Main issues examined are: a) the historical origins of textile equipment 
makers; b) price and quality competition and the impact of factor and product market 
imperfections on capital intensity and size of firm; c) financial management; d) 
ethnicity, familism and divergent firm size. 
Origins of the Industry 
Chapter 7 identifies the trajectories along which entrepreneurs were propelled into 
the nascent textile equipment industry, mostly from 1975 onward. The chapter 
introduces the Bandung industrial region harbouring the Indonesian textile equipment 
industry and it sketches the historical development of engineering in this region. The 
main part of the chapter is concerned with an investigation of the antecedents of textile 
equipment makers. This new branch of manufacturing emerged out of intersectoral 
transfers of human resources and capital. My data pinpoint the metal services industry 
and the textile equipment trade business as the two main sources of entrepreneurial 
resources and capital. By contrast, the textile and advanced engineering industries 
played a negligible role in the development of domestic textile equipment-making. 
Competition, Capital Intensity, and Firm Size 
Chapter 8 introduces the industry. This chapter provides an estimate of the 
1991/1992 employment and output size on the textile equipment industry as well as a 
description of its main characteristics. Chapter 9 tackles the question how factor market 
(labour and capital) and product market imperfections were related to the fact that large 
11
 See Appendix A for details. 
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shops were more capital-intensive than small enterprises. A basic distinction used in the 
chapter is that between competition on basis of price, determined in market exchange, 
and competition on a quality basis, determined in the process of production (McNulty 
1968). Large shops in the textile equipment industry tended to rely on product 
differentiation strategies, specializing in knowledge and capital-intensive niche markets 
that were inaccessible to smaller competitors. Small shops, operating in markets 
surrounded by low entry barriers, tended to rely on price undercutting strategies. 
Shop Management and Shop Size 
Chapters 10, 11 and 12 are concerned with the relationship between shop 
management practices and the size and speed of expansion of shops. Chapter 10 
discusses pricing methods and financial record-keeping in the jobbing industry. A moot 
issue is whether and how a lack of Financial recording systems constrained the 
development of small firms in the industry. The failure of a pilot project intended to 
introduce double entry accounting in a number of small shops suggests that financial 
record-keeping was a luxury that small shop owner/managers found it hard to afford, 
given the limited time at their disposal. 
Chapter 11 examines the role of ethnicity and familism in shop expansion. An 
extensive literature has documented the commercial successes of overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia. The phenomenon of Chinese business success is 
variously attributed to the historical circumstances under which Chinese migrants were 
assimilated in the various host countries and the ethnic entrepreneurial strategies that 
evolved in the foreign setting, or to a set of primordial Chinese values conducive to 
business success. Comparing the speed of growth, profitability, and management styles 
practised in 21 Chinese-owned and 33 non-Chinese-owned shops, I found that larger 
shops were predominantly Chinese-owned. Two facts offered a partial explanation of 
Chinese dominance in the jobbing industry. First, the fact that Chinese shops had been 
founded earlier than non-Chinese shops and therefore enjoyed a headstart. Second, the 
fact that most Chinese shops were family-managed. Family management teams were 
much less susceptible to the agency problems experienced by single owner/managers 
who had to delegate supervising and sales tasks to non-relatives. 
Chapter 12 is an attempt to bring together the various economic (profitability, 
productivity, capital intensity, employment size, revenue size), managerial (market 
strategy, financial record-keeping) and sociological (commercial background and ethnic 
identity of management, presence/absence of familism, age of firm, speed of growth) 
variables presented in previous chapters in a single analytical framework. A factor 
analysis is carried out with data on 59 firms. 
Chapter 13, finally, summarizes and discusses main conclusions of the study, 
considers the emergence of the Indonesian textile equipment industry as an instance of 
technology mastery, and examines practical implications. 
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Fieldwork Design 
Data were compiled in a fieldwork period lasting, with brief interruptions, from 
April 1991 to July 1992. In the initial phase of the research the lack of useful data on 
the textile equipment industry was a major constraint. Official manufacturing statistics, 
as will be seen in chapter 3, have failed to capture the industry. Not only are textile 
equipment makers scattered over various industry categories, the majority of smaller 
shops does not figure in the national accounting statistics at all. A survey of a number 
of textile equipment shops had been carried out for the Industry Department in 1989, 
but, except for employment figures, this source was of limited value. The study 
therefore relies heavily on recall data collected from shop owner/managers and other 
informants and backward extrapolation for a construction of the evolution of the 
industry. 
During the first phase of the research, from April 1991 to March 1992, 70 shops 
were visited, 49 of which specialized in textile equipment-making. Shops covered by 
the survey were located via a network of informants that expanded as the fieldwork 
proceeded. In every establishment I conducted one or more interviews with 
management, the duration of which varied from 30 minutes to several hours. The 
interviews were open in nature, but I worked through a fixed repertoire of questions in 
all cases. These comprised: history of the firm, management composition, current size 
of the workforce, specialization (market strategy), and problems experienced in 
marketing, production, and raw materials procurement. In addition, a number of topics 
brought up by interviewees would be discussed. 
In addition to the above information I compiled a complete 1991 financial profile 
for a sub-sample of 32 establishments. This proved to be a frustrating and time-
consuming work. Owners of smaller shops often had no idea about the magnitude of 
financial flows, which had to be pieced together from various bits of information. Other 
owners were unwilling to divulge sensitive financial information. Often, lengthy 
interviews or two or more visits were necessary to obtain the required information. 
Finally, I spent longer periods, between two and five days, closely observing daily 
goings-on in six of the surveyed firms. 
In a second phase of the fieldwork, from April to August 1992,1 concentrated on 
textile equipment importing firms, on traders in special steels, as well as on textile 
factories. My attempt to gather comparative data on local-made and imported spare part 
prices was largely unsuccessful, as will be reported in chapter 6. Furthermore, I visited 
a number of special steel importing firms to assess the availability and prices of this 
key input for the textile equipment industry (see chapter 4). Finally, I conducted a 
survey of machinery maintenance regimes and spare part procurement in 24 textile 
plants. 
As the study proceeded it became clear that weaving and, to a lesser degree, 
spinning plants were the major customers of textile equipment makers. The 
maintenance outlays of textile dyeing and finishing plants were much smaller than 
those of the spinning and weaving sectors. I collected no information on the Indonesian 
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knitting industry, which, is much smaller than the spinning and weaving industries. For 
this reason only occasional reference will be made to the knitting, dyeing and finishing 
sectors. Garment-making, lastly, falls completely outside of the scope of the study. The 
manufacture and repair of sewing machines was a specialized activity with no 
connections to the textile equipment industry. 
The majority (63 out of 70) of firms investigated in the course of fieldwork was 
located in the Bandung industrial region in the central highlands of West Java province. 
The remainder (a few importer firms, two large machinery shops, and a powerloom 
manufacturer) were located in Jakarta. The Bandung region has traditionally been a 
stronghold of textile production, foremostly weaving and finishing, and it was here that 
textile equipment manufacturing first developed in the 1950s. Additional information on 
the Bandung region will be introduced in the following chapters when required. 
Outline 
To recapitulate, chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide the macrolevel and planning backdrop 
to the study. The first chapter provides a general overview of the New Order business 
climate and industrial planning, chapter 3 focuses on the engineering industries, and 
chapter 4 looks at the textile equipment industry's primary input and output markets: 
the steel market and the textile market. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the microlevel 
demand situation. Chapter 5 looks into choice of technique in the Indonesian weaving 
industry and chapter 6 examines machinery maintenance regimes in Indonesian 
spinning and weaving plants. 
Chapters 7 to 12 are concerned with the entrepreneurial origins of the textile 
equipment industry (chapter 7), employment size and size structure of the industry in 
1991/1992 (chapter 8), price and quality competition (chapter 9), financial management, 
that is, price fixing, financial record-keeping and investment decisionmaking (chapter 
10), the role of ethnicity and familism in growth performance (chapter 11), and the 
economic, managerial, and historical-sociological sources of firm growth (chapter 12). 
The final chapter (chapter 13) sums up and discusses findings and implications of the 
study. 
2 Industrial Change and Industrial Planning 
in New Order Indonesia, 1966-1991 
When an aborted military coup ushered in president Suharto's New Order regime in 
late 1965, Indonesia's economy was in chaos. From 1955 onward, policymaking had 
become increasingly subordinated to the internal struggles that eventually overturned 
the uneasy political alliance led by president Soekamo. Economic mismanagement had 
caused endemic budget deficits, runaway inflation, and huge current account deficits. A 
mounting tide of xenophobia, leading to the nationalisation of Dutch businesses in 
1957, had driven away most foreign investors. Domestic manufacturers who remained 
in business were handicapped by inflation, severe infrastructural problems, and chronic 
shortages of raw materials.' 
Twenty-five years later, a dramatic reversal had taken place. Indonesia was widely 
acclaimed for its economic achievements. From 1968 onward, a five percent-plus GDP 
growth had been registered in all but three years. Substantial achievements had been 
made in poverty reduction. And a veritable industrial transformation had taken place in 
manufacturing (Booth 1992). Although not quite a Newly Industrializing Country by 
income and output standards, many observers were inclined to add Indonesia to the list 
of Asian 'miracle economies' (e.g., World Bank 1993). 
What had brought about this radical transformation? This chapter provides an 
overview of industrial development under the New Order. It discusses the important 
features of industrial planning and the changes in policy climate that shaped the 
expanding manufacturing sector. The first section describes broad growth trends. The 
following sections provide an overview of industrial planning during the early years of 
the New Order period, the import substitution policies pursued during the oil boom 
years 1973 to 1982, and the structural readjustments that followed in the mid-80s. Then 
follows a brief account of the main features of industrial planning in the late 1980s -
the manufactures export boom and the partial dismantling of tariff and nontariff 
barriers- and a description of industry structure in 1986, the legacy of the first two 
decades of New Order planning. Three final sections discuss the sensitive issue of 
industrial ownership, industrial size distribution, and the geographical distribution of 
manufacturing activities. 
Economic Growth Under the New Order 
Indonesia's impressive growth record is illustrated by Table 2-1, presenting yearly 
GDP growth for the periods 1967 to 1986. Except for a temporary slowdown in the 
first half of the 1980s, the process of growth has been both strong and consistent. It 
should be added that the benefits of this growth have been distributed unevenly. Rural-
1
 For a description of this period see Glassbumer (1971). 
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urban income disparities have sharpened and income gaps between different socio­
economic strata widened. On the other hand, the beneficial effects of accelerated 
growth on poverty reduction are undisputed (Asra 1989; Booth 1992). 
Table 2-1 Annual GDP growth by sector, 1967-1986 
Agriculture 
Industry 
mining 
manufacturing 
utilities 
construction 
Services 
GDP 
1967-73' 
4 1 
-
18 1 
9 6 
10 9 
24 2 
12 
Annual Growth Rates 
1973-81' 
36 
9 8 
32 
14 2 
14 5 
13 5 
95 
11 
1981-86* 
28 
13 
-2 3 
152 
119 
06 
4 6 
29 
* 1973 constant pnces, ь 1983 constant tmces 
Sources Booth (1992), ρ 2, and Hill (1987), ρ 3 
The Table also shows that the manufacturing sector expanded strongly. According 
to Hill, during the period 1970 to 1989 'all but five years registered a double-digit 
expansion in real industrial output' (1992a:207). The share of manufacturing in GDP 
increased from 8.4 percent in 1960, via 8.8 percent in 1971 to 11.9 percent in 1977, 
and stood at 18.5 percent in 1988. This expansion was impressive even if one allows 
for the fact that a major share of manufacturing output growth was taken by oil and 
LNG processing activities. 
The Policy Environment of Rapid Industrial Change 
State intervention in the form of direct industrial investments and a wide range of 
incentives, penalties, and bans was a key force shaping the expanding manufacturing 
sector during the New Order period. Three successive industrial policy regimes may be 
distinguished. A first and relatively brief period of stabilization and reconstruction 
lasted from 1966 to 1972, during the latter part of which the foundations of an import 
substitution policy regime were laid. The import substitution regime was intensified 
during the subsequent oil boom period 1973 to 1982, when the government made 
massive investments in various manufacturing activities funded out of oil export 
revenues. Also a number of infant industry schemes for private investors were initiated. 
In the third period, starting in 1983 and lasting into the early 1990s, the Indonesian 
government dismantled part of the import substitution structure under pressure of 
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declining oil tax revenues, a high international debt burden, and a slowing down of 
economic growth. The financial setbacks of the early 1980s forced the government to 
adopt a restructuring program. An unexpected boon of the 1980s, on the other hand, 
was the surge of manufactures exports led by private entrepreneurs in the textile, 
garments, and footwear industries. 
The Importance of Oil Export Revenues for Industrial Planning 
Before I turn to discuss the content of New Order industrial planning it is 
necessary to underscore the key role that financial constraints, that is, oil export 
revenues, have played in industrial policymaking. In retrospect one can see how the 
shifting back and forth between an inward-looking and strongly interventionist attitude 
and a more outward-looking and market-based approach to industrial planning 
coincided with the rise and fall of international crude oil prices. Table 2-2 captures this 
trend. It shows main sources of government revenue at five year intervals between 1969 
and 1990. Figures under the heading 'Non-oil domestic revenue' include income, 
property, value added and luxury goods tax, and import duties and export tax plus a 
number of smaller miscellaneous levies. The corporate oil tax is mentioned separately 
under the heading 'Oil revenues'. 
Table 2-2 Sources of government revenue, 1969/70-1990/91 (current Rp. billion) 
Non-oil domes»IL Oil revenues Aid Total 
1969/70 
1974/75 
1979/80 
1984/85 
1989/90 
amount 
178 
797 
2,436 
5,476 
17,488 
share 
(53 1) 
(40 1) 
(30 2) 
(28 3) 
(45 8) 
amount 
66 
957 
4,260 
10,430 
11,252 
share 
(19 7) 
(48 3) 
(52 7) 
(53 8) 
(29 5) 
amount 
91 
232 
1,381 
3,469 
9,429 
share 
(27 2) 
(Π6) 
(17 1) 
(17 9) 
(24 7) 
m 
1.978 
8.077 
19.375 
38.169 
Source adapted from Nasution (1991), ρ 17 
It can be seen that in 1969/70, at the end of the open door period, the share of 
foreign aid exceeded that of oil export revenues. The oil price hikes of 1973 caused a 
reversal of this situation. At the height of the import substitution period, in the fiscal 
period 1979/1980, over half of the state budget was supplied by corporate oil tax 
revenues.
2
 Oil revenues retained their dominance until 1986/87 when they dropped to 
2
 The actual importance of oil revenues was probably greater than indicated here Asher 
and Booth note that '(certainly in the oil boom period there can be Unie doubt that the 
government understated oil tax revenues in the budget' (1992 63). 
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28.9 percent. Their share stood at 37.3 in the following period, at 28.9 in 1988/89, and 
at 29.5 percent in 1989/90. 
The Table clearly indicates the inverse relationship between oil revenues and 
foreign aid. These trends suggest that industrial planning has not been so much the 
outcome of an ideological struggle between proponents of a more market-oriented 
outward-looking policy outlook (often referred to as 'technocrats') and economic 
nationalists favouring protection of domestic industry at heavy cost, as is sometimes 
suggested. Rather, this implies that economic nationalism has been the dominant 
undercurrent throughout the New Order period. Only at times when policymakers were 
strongly dependent on foreign aid was the say of aid donors in domestic policymaking 
increased, and consequently the voice of those advocating restraint in economic 
nationalism in the national policy arena amplified.3 The spectre of a much-resented 
foreign domination of domestic policymaking through the aid connection may well 
have inspired the government's attempt to raise non-oil domestic revenues with a series 
of tax reforms that were announced after the oil revenue decline (Asher & Booth 1992). 
From Open-Door Policies to Import Substitution: 1966-1972 
During the first years of the New Order period, from 1966 to 1968, a new 
Indonesian government, in which Western-trained technocrats played an important role, 
resumed contact with its many foreign creditors, negotiated a debt moratorium, and 
managed to regain the confidence of foreign investors. Open-door policies unleashed a 
flood of manufactures imports and foreign aid followed by investors in search of 
investment opportunities (Palmer 1978). 
This period saw the enactment of an important law regulating foreign investment in 
1967 and a counterpart law on domestic investment in 1968. Incentives such as import 
duty exemptions and tax holidays built into these laws were designed to attract foreign 
and domestic capital into domestic manufacturing ventures. Along with this carrot, the 
stick of trade and non-trade barriers was wielded to stimulate the expansion of 
manufacturing activities. A first infant industry scheme was started in 1968 with a 
number of protective measures taken for the textile industry, to be discussed in chapter 
4. Furthermore, the government assumed the role of investor in various sectors, e.g., the 
spinning industry, and set up state-owned plants to catalyze the import substitution 
process. 
The first Five Year Plan, Repelita I, presented by the National Planning Board in 
1969, carried clear signs of the impending shift toward an inward-looking and 
protectionist trade regime. The plan stressed import substitution in consumer goods 
3
 In this context, Indonesia's foreign debt should not be forgotten. The external debt 
increased from $21 billion in 1980 to almost $53 billion in 1987 (Asher & Booth 1992:66). 
Asher and Booth note that, by 1987, '(t)otal foreign debt service payments accounted for a third 
of exports of goods and services and almost 10 percent of GNP1 (ibid. p.64). This gave foreign 
aid dispensers additional leverage in domestic policy making. 
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industries (mainly textiles) and in the production of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, 
pesticides). It also excluded new foreign investments in a number of light 
manufacturing activities. 
The Oil Boom and Economic Nationalism: 1973-1982 
Under the Second and Third Five Year Plans, covering the period 1974 to 1984, 
import substitution became the leading theme in industrial planning. The resurgence of 
economic nationalism was intimately tied to the substantial financial leverage and 
economic independence enjoyed by Indonesian policymakers in the oil boom years 
1973 to 1982. The pattern of industrial regulation set in the preceding period now came 
to full development. On the one hand, the state made direct investments in upstream 
basic and intermediate industries. On the other hand, tariff and nontariff barriers were 
erected to incite private investors to engage in domestic production of downstream 
consumer goods (Thee & Yoshihara 1987). 
Direct state investments, often through joint ventures with foreign suppliers of 
technical knowledge and special plant equipment, concentrated on a number of prestige 
projects: manufacture of cement and fertilizer, steel-making, aluminium-smelting, oil 
refining, and various ventures in the engineering field (see Table 2-5 below). Private 
investments were stimulated through infant industry schemes initiated, among others, 
for the textile spinning and weaving industries, the automotive industry, plywood, and 
the electrical equipment industries. 
The Structure of Manufacturing Sector Protection 
A major feature of industrial policymaking in this period was the increasingly 
dense web of rules and regulations that came to govern entry in markets for an ever 
greater number of manufactures. Eventually hundreds of commodities were subject to a 
complex system of tariffs, import quota and bans, and licensing schemes, the latter 
reserving the import of a certain product or product class for a Sole Agent or a select 
group of Importer Producers, Producer Importers, or Registered Importers. 
The fact that nontariff barriers rather than import tariffs were the favoured 
regulatory instrument makes it difficult to measure the true extent of protection offered. 
An empirical investigation by Wymenga (1991) provides some insights. He found that 
manufacturing was protected at the expense of agriculture. That import-competing 
sectors were granted much more protection than export-competing sectors. And that the 
amount of protection offered to manufactures varied markedly, with Effective Rates of 
Protection'1 ranging from negative values for some industries to positive values in the 
4
 This measures the extent to which actual value added exceeds value added under free-
trade conditions. 
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hundreds for others. Extremely high ERP (200 percent and over) protected the 
following sectors: 11 important products in the food, beverages and tobacco industry; 
the textile weaving and footwear industries; the wooden building materials and furniture 
industries; the cosmetics industry; consumer-oriented rubber, plastics, and ceramics 
industries; and the electrical machinery, household electrical goods, battery, and motor 
vehicle industries. On the positive side, these interventions had led to the establishment 
of a number of new manufacturing activities. On the negative side, the opaque web of 
nontariff barriers created ample opportunities for entrepreneurs endowed with the 
proper political connections to create captured markets (Robison 1986). Moreover, 
Indonesian producers in a number of the infant industries could only survive under 
continued protection. 
Structural Readjustment and Export Orientation: the 1980s 
Repelita IV, the fourth Five Year Plan (1984/85-1988/89), gives an idea of what 
industrial planning might have looked like in the absence of the oil price decline. 
Repelita IVs key concept was that of linkages', the main idea being that the time had 
come to link the by now well-developed state-dominated upstream basic industry sector 
to the private-owned downstream consumer goods industries. Accordingly, the 
expansion of capital goods production (industrial and agricultural machinery and 
transport equipment) and the production of intermediate goods for downstream 
industries were emphasized. 
However, most of these ambitious plans had to be postponed when the expected 
large oil revenues failed to materialize. The drop in oil prices from 1982 onward had 
important consequences for Indonesia. They led to a temporary slowdown in economic 
growth in the early 1980s, which lent a sense of urgency to the call for regulatory 
reforms made by those criticizing government policies. Eventually, the decrease in oil 
revenues led to a turnaround in industrial policymaking. The oil revenue crisis, in 
combination with a substantial international debt burden, forced the government to seek 
help from international aid dispensers. Under financial strain, the Indonesian 
government abrogated part of the complex system of protective measures in a series of 
deregulatory packages implemented from 1983 onward. These opened up a succession 
of heavily regulated markets in finance and manufacturing (GATT 1991; Sjahrir 1990). 
The Export Boom 
A notable development of the late 1980s was an unexpected surge of non-oil 
manufactures exports, with Indonesia's labour-intensive textile, garments, and footwear 
industries for the first time playing a prominent role alongside resource-based mainstays 
such as plywood (see Table 2-3). The share of five labour-intensive products (clothing 
and fabrics, footwear, furniture and electronics) dropped from 48.4 to 32.3 percent 
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between 1980 and 1985, mainly because of the prominent role that plywood exports 
assumed in this period. By 1990, however, these five products had recovered most of 
their lost share. Exports of footwear, negligible in 1980, approached the $1 billion 
mark. This rapid expansion of labour-intensive exports was grist on the mill of those 
criticizing Indonesia's inward-looking industrial policies. It also gave rise to 
speculations that Indonesia, with this surge of labour-intensive manufactured exports, 
had finally set foot on the Asian industrial growth path. 
Table 2-3 Trends in exports of manufactures, 1980-1991 (current US$ million) 
1980 1985 1991 
Clothing 
Fabrics 
Footwear 
Electronics 
Furniture 
Plywood 
Steel products 
SITC 5-8 minus 68 
98 
43 
1 
97 
3 
68 
8 
501 
*' 
19 6 
86 
02 
194 
06 
13 6 
16 
339 
227 
8 
81 
7 
941 
28 
2,044 
% 
166 
11.1 
0 4 
39 
3 
46 0 
1.4 
2,265 
1,552 
994 
403 
385 
3,034 
249 
11,816 
% 
19 2 
13 1 
84 
34 
33 
25 7 
2 1 
' Share of total export value SITC codes 5 to 8 less SITC 68 
Source adapted from Hill (1992b), ρ 107 
Manufacturing Output and Employment Structure in the mid-1980s 
What changes in the structure of manufacturing occurred under the New Order? 
Table 2-4 (below) highlights two aspects. It compares the structure of manufacturing 
valued added and employment in the final years of the Old Order with that in 1975 and 
1986. As can be seen, a number of manufacturing sectors that were practically 
nonexistent in the 1960s had come to full development twenty years later. By 1986, the 
technologically uncomplicated agro-processing activities (ISIC 31) that took over half 
of manufacturing value added in 1963 had lost a substantial part of their share to a 
range of activities that were nonexistent or of little importance before 1965: wood 
products (ISIC 331), basic metals (37), and the engineering sector in which the 
production of transport and electrical equipment (384 and 383) had a prominent role. 
The Politics of Industrial Ownership 
Industrial ownership has been a politically touchy issue in Indonesia ever since 
independence. Industrial planners make a primary distinction between four categories of 
industrial asset owners: the Indonesian state itself, foreign private investors, and 
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Table 2-4 Change in manufacturing value added and employment structure', 1963-
1986 
ISIC 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Textiles, garments, footwear 
Wood and products 
Paper and products 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metals and machinery 
Value added share 
1963 
53 0 
9 3 
2 2 
35 
20 7 
4.5 
na 
58 
1975 
410 
12 7 
36 
33 
20 9 
39 
03 
14 2 
1986 
30 3 
13.2 
106 
36 
14 1 
55 
78 
139 
Employment share 
1963 
44 1 
28 6 
33 
36 
10 2 
37 
na 
56 
1975 
42 7 
19.8 
62 
2 8 
130 
6 4 
02 
83 
1986 
34 3 
210 
118 
34 
10 9 
7 6 
07 
9 0 
1
 Includes firms with workforce of five or more employees, oil and gas processing excluded 
Source adapted from Hul (1990a), ρ 87 
indigenous private investors, the latter in tum being subdivided into pribumi 
('indigenous') domestic industrialists and Indonesian Chinese industrialists. Table 2-5 
(below) presents the 1985 ownership distribution of selected TSIC three-digit industries 
on the basis of value added share. The top six industries comprise light manufacturing 
activities and were predominantly owned by private domestic or foreign companies. 
The next three industries (ISIC 35 and 37) are basic manufacturing activities and 
consequently state ownership is a prominent feature. The bottom four industries offer a 
mixed picture. State involvement, through joint ventures with foreign partners, is 
pronounced in ISIC 382, non-electric machinery, probably due to the inclusion of three 
giant state engineering enterprises in this category. 
Indonesian Chinese vs. Pribumi Entrepreneurs 
Ethnic Chinese comprise no more than three percent of the Indonesian population 
yet they play a prominent role in the Indonesian economy, both in terms of their 
prominence in a range of economic sectors and as an important target for nationalist 
extremism (cf. Mackie 1975; Robison 1986). Anti-Chinese sentiments are a legacy of 
the colonial period. From the 17th century onward Chinese immigrants came to occupy 
an intermediate position in between of the Dutch and the indigenous population. Their 
prominent position in the non-Westem finance and trade sector gave Chinese 
entrepreneurs an important advantage after independence, when they assumed a leading 
role in the growing manufacturing sector. Under the New Order, large and medium-
scale enterprises have been predominantly Chinese-owned. 
Since the 1950s successive governments have tried to redress this felt imbalance by 
fortifying the position of pribumi, or indigenous, entrepreneurs. In the 1950s, import 
22 Textile Equipment Manufacturing 
licences were reserved for indigenous importers in the so-called Benteng program. The 
notorious PP10 regulation of 1959 made retail trade at the village level off-limits to 
Indonesian Chinese (Robison 1986:44,86). 
Table 2-5 Share of foreign, state, private domestic ownership in selected 
industries, 1985 (in percentage of total industry value added) 
S1TC 
321 
322 
324 
331 
355 
356 
351 
353/4 
37 
381 
382 
383 
384 
Industry 
Textiles 
Garments 
Footwear 
Wood products 
Rubber products 
Plastics 
Basic chemicals 
Oil & gas processing 
Basic metals 
Metal products 
Non-electric machinery 
Electrical equipment 
Transport equipment 
Private 
610 
97 7 
59 3 
73 7 
83 0 
43 4 
144 
-
91 
66 8 
29 4 
45 2 
68 7 
Government 
0 8 
01 
-
05 
2 1 
-
0 4 
43 5 
-
0 2 
02 
-
-
Foreign 
28 6 
1 1 
40 7 
12 1 
71 
56 5 
89 
-
14 
210 
18 9 
39 8 
16 6 
Gov JV 
104 
1 1 
-
13 7 
7.8 
01 
76 3 
56 5 
89 6 
12 0 
515 
15 0 
14 6 
Source Hill (1990b), ρ 79 
On many occasions, especially in the early 1960s, Chinese became the target of 
violent protests. Anti-Chinese sentiments resurfaced under the New Order when, during 
a 1974 visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, riots broke out directed against foreign and 
Chinese businesses. In their aftermath, a number of new investment and credit policies 
were hastily publicized. Among other things these stipulated that new joint ventures 
could only be undertaken with the government or with pribumi counterparts; and that 
investment credits by state banks were to be allocated only to indigenous investors 
(ibid. 167). A variety of credit and training programs, with the overt aim of supporting 
small, that is, indigenous, enterprise, were subsequently implemented. 
The highly politicized nature of industry regulation is plainly evident if one looks 
at how the supervision of various manufacturing subsectors is allocated among and 
within different public agencies. An examination of jurisdictional boundaries reveals 
that these have been drawn with the political issue of ownership in mind rather than 
according to economic (competition and substitution-based) or engineering (raw 
material and process-based) standards. 
The four industrial ownership categories defined above can be found under the 
following agencies. First, foreign industrial investors are supervised by the Investment 
Board, created concomitantly with the 1960s Investment Laws. The Investment Board, 
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claiming to be a red tape-cutting 'One-stop agency for foreign investors', processes 
permits for foreign investors with the consent of the Industry Department, the latter 
being formally authorized to handle all industrial permits. State enterprises are 
supervised by provincial governments and various ministries. 
Domestic private manufacturing businesses, categories three and four, are handled 
directly by the Industry Department. A very interesting division of labour exists in this 
department. The Industry Department has allotted supervisory tasks among four 
principal Directorate General departments. Two of these, the Directorate General of 
Machinery Industry, Basic Metals and Electronics and that of Basic Chemicals, 
administer the affairs of industry sub-sectors in which the government is heavily 
involved: the upstream basic metal and chemical industries as well as the engineering 
and electronics industries. A third directorate concerns itself exclusively with small 
industry. A fourth directorate, carrying the peculiar name 'Directorate General of 
Miscellaneous Industries', looks after the affairs of the remainder. 
The classification used by the Industry Department, here relying on size, there on 
processing characteristics, and elsewhere on no apparent production characteristic 
whatsoever, makes no sense from an economic or engineering point of view. It does, 
however, make sense from an ownership point of view: the first two directorates attend 
to the needs of the state-owned basic and engineering enterprises; the small industry 
directorate concerns itself with pribumi manufacturers; and the miscellaneous industries 
directorate regulates the predominantly Chinese-owned downstream light manufacturing 
industries. 
Size Distribution 
How were manufacturing enterprises of different size affected by the changes that 
took place under the New Order? The unknown extent of underrecording in small 
industry and especially the cottage industry sector poses a main problem in the 
interpretation of Indonesian industry statistics. The most reliable employment estimates 
were prepared by Hal Hill on basis of a combination of Industrial Census and 
Population Survey data. His calculations are reproduced in Table 2-6 below. 
Importantly, the Table shows that employment growth between 1975 and 1986 was 
equally distributed over the three size categories used here. In other words, the strong 
expansion of the manufacturing sector did not entail a radical change in size structure 
at the highest level of aggregation. 
A notable feature of manufacturing size structure is its "hollow middle'. Table 2-6 
shows the small share taken by the intermediate small industry category as compared to 
firms located at the small and large-scale extremes of the employment continuum. A 
breakdown of the category of large firms for 1986 into a medium (50 to 199 
employees) and large (200+) category on basis of 1986 Industrial Census results reveals 
that the former's share was only 22 percent against a 78 percent share of the 200+ 
employment category (Cf. Hill 1990b:90). 
24 Textile Equipment Manufacturing 
Table 2-6 Employment size structure of the Indonesian manufacturing sector, 
1975 and 1986 
Si/c category 
Medium & large industry 
Small industry 
Cottage industry 
Total 
Empi 
size 
20+ 
5-19 
<5 
1975 
employment share 
(x 1000) (%) 
1,025 7 (30 4) 
442 8 (13 1) 
1,904 4 (56 6) 
3,372 9 (100 0) 
1986 
employment 
(x 1000) 
1,869 0 
840 5 
3,400 8 
6,110 3 
share (%) 
(30 6) 
(13 8) 
(55.7) 
(100 0) 
Annual 
Growth 
56 
60 
5.4 
56 
Source. Hill (1992), ρ 246 
If we make an alternative division of the 1986 data produced in Table 2-6, with large 
200+, medium 5-199, and cottage 1-4 employees, then the respective shares of these 
size categories are: 23.8 percent (1,458,400 aggregate employment), 20.5 percent 
(1,251,100), and 55.7 percent (3,400,800). 
Spatial Distribution 
A final issue rounding out this brief introduction is that of industrial location. 
Manufacturing activities have traditionally concentrated on the core island Java, and 
this tendency was strengthened rather than reversed during the past twenty five years. 
As of 1985, 74.4 percent of total manufacturing output was produced on Java and this 
island accommodated 78.8 percent of total manufacturing employment (Hill 
1990a: 104).5 A second notable fact is that West Java province has evolved into 
Indonesia's leading industrial region under the New Order. West Java's share, including 
the capital and special territory Jakarta, in national manufacturing output increased from 
38.5 to 44.7 percent between 1975 and 1985, and its employment share grew from 29.4 
in 1975 to 33.5 percent in 1985 (ibid.). With this strong expansion West Java has 
finally overtaken East Java, traditionally Indonesia's industrial heartland. Third and last, 
manufacturing activities have tended to concentrate strongly in and around a select 
number of metropolitan centers. Foremost of these is the capital Jakarta and 
surrounding regencies where a staggering 36.2 percent of the total output of large and 
medium firms was produced in 1985 (ibid. 107). Surabaya, on the East coast of Java, 
followed at some distance with an 11.1 percent share. Kediri, also in East Java 
province, and Bandung, in the heartland of West Java, occupied a shared third place 
with 6.7 percent. Other centers were of minor importance. 
5
 A large share even if one takes account of the fact that, according to the 1990 
population census, 107.6 million or 60 percent out of a total Indonesian population of 179.3 
million lived here. 
3 The Engineering Industries 
Having sketched the macrolevel background of New Order industrial development 
in the previous chapter, we now narrow our focus for a closer examination of the 
engineering industries, the broad cluster of metalworking and machine-making activities 
of which the textile equipment industry forms a part. This chapter opens with a brief 
account of the rise of engineering activities in Indonesia in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. Then it discusses the subsequent development of this sector under the Old 
Order. The main part of the chapter examines the development of the engineering 
subsector under the New Order. In the latter period various parts of the engineering 
subsector were afforded strong protection, whereas others were left to develop on their 
own accord. Somewhat simplifying one may say that three basic types of engineering 
firm evolved. State-owned engineering companies operating in a sheltered environment. 
Private engineering firms operating in markets protected against foreign competition by 
tariff barriers or import restrictions. And private engineering firms operating in open 
markets, including, among others, the market for textile machinery and parts.. 
At this point a number of descriptive terms used in this chapter should be clarified. 
The wide range of activities subsumed under International Standard Industrial 
Qassification Category 38 is commonly known as the engineering subsector. ISIC 38 
activities are clustered on basis of their use of metals as a primary input. ISIC 38 
comprises four subcategories. The manufacture and repair of metal hardware (ISIC 
381), of non-electrical machinery (382), of electrical equipment (383), of transport 
equipment (384), and of measuring equipment (385). However, metals can hardly be 
said to be the exclusive input of these industries, the importance of rubber, wood, 
paper, and man-made materials being obvious in many products. Neither can the 
engineering cluster be defined in terms of product end use. Its output is not restricted to 
capital or producer goods because engineering firms also turn out consumer durables 
such as washing machines and radio's. 
In the present context, the most important subcategory is that of non-electrical 
machinery (ISIC 382). This category comprises special plant machinery -including 
textile machinery- under sub-heading 3824, 'Manufacture of special industrial 
machinery and equipment except metal and woodworking machinery.' Below, we will 
see how conceptual difficulties persist at this lower level of aggregation. The 
conventional classification ISIC 38241, 'Manufacture of textile machineries', captures 
only part of the textile machinery market, that is, the production of what was defined as 
core and noncore machinery in the introductory chapter. Manufacture of machine spare 
parts, and machine servicing, reconditioning and customizing, on the other hand, are 
registered under different codes. 
Historical Background of Engineering in Indonesia 
A budding modem metalworking sector developed on Java in Surabaya from the 
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mid-1800s onward. Initially, European entrepreneurs founded metalworking firms in 
response to a growing demand for repair and servicing from the shipping industry. In 
the latter quarter of the 19th century this embryonic private metalworking industry 
expanded rapidly in the wake of a boom in cane-sugar cultivation. Government policies 
encouraging the substitution of water-power by steam-power as well as process 
considerations (a need for quick post-harvest processing of large quantities of 
sugarcane) stimulated the mechanization of the Javanese cane-sugar industry.' The 
complicated steampower-driven machinery created a demand for repair and 
maintenance activities to which the private sector quickly responded.2 
A similar process of demand-induced growth led to the subsequent spread of 
metalworking, casting, and machine making to Central and West Java and to parts of 
Sumatra in the early twentieth century. Private shops followed on the heels of an 
expanding estate economy in Central Java, which was mainly given to cane-sugar, in 
West Java, where the main products were tea and rubber, and also in Sumatra's 
expanding rubber economy. 
In the 1930s, at the close of the colonial era, the range of metalworking activities 
began to broaden. A number of firms engaged in the production of structural metal 
products for a growing consumer population (metal containers, furniture, kitchen 
utensils, and the like), and others began supplying services to an expanding non-
agriculture-based manufacturing sector. A 1940 industrial survey enumerated 61 
machinery-making enterprises employing 9,005 workers. Also, 213 repair shops were 
recorded with an employment size of 13,726 personnel (Segers 1988:104). By this time 
Chinese and to a lesser extent pribumi entrepreneurs had made their appearance in the 
industry, indicating that a process of technology transfer was underway. 
A state-owned engineering sector developed alongside the private engineering 
industries. Army and navy ordnance shops were founded in Surabaya in the early 
1900s. Employment in the Surabaya-based Marine Etablissement expanded from 1,200 
workers in 1850 to 3,800 in 1920 (van den Bovenkamp 1920:19). When in 1918 the 
Dutch government decided to move the army ordnance facilities, the Artillerie 
Constructie Winkel, from Surabaya to Bandung, this establishment had 1,500 
employees (de Fremery 1923). Lastly, repair and maintenance facilities also developed 
around the expanding railroad network, with six railroad shops on Java employing over 
1
 Between 1881 and 1892, the heating surface of stationary boilers in use in private-
owned sugar factories nearly doubled, increasing from 54,000 to 100,000 m2; it had doubled 
again by 1908, when a total heating surface of 198,000 m2 was recorded (Segeis 1988:46). 
2
 See de Boer 1927:105ff. The 1913 Koloniaal Verslag already mentions the existence 
of 18 machine factories employing 3,303 personnel and 44 repair shops employing 3,057 
personnel, and states that total employment in the Netherlands Indies metalworking industry is 
10,518 persons (Segers 1988:51). 
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7,000 workers in 1925 (Gedenkboek 1925:152). 
The Old Order Period: 1950-1965 
The Japanese occupation, ending in 1945, and ensuing Dutch-Indonesian military 
struggle, lasting to 1950, caused much damage to the Indonesian engineering industries. 
Their subsequent recovery was rapid, however. The 1963 Industrial Census put the total 
workforce in the Indonesian metalworking industry at just over 50,000 persons. From 
anecdotal evidence one gains the impression that, by the late 1950s, the industry was 
back at its pre-war level (Harahap 1952, Development Projects Consulting Service 
1963). 
The period 1957 to 1965, starting with the annexation of Dutch-owned businesses 
and ending in economic chaos and political violence, had an impact that was at the 
same time conducive and destructive to the expansion of engineering activities. A 
number of firms, notably those ostentatiously run by pribumi managers, profited from 
the fact that run-away inflation and a shortage of foreign exchange greatly reduced the 
volume of imported machinery and parts. In part, this shortage was made up for by 
smuggled imports, but to a large extent local metalworking firms were called upon to 
keep Indonesia's machinery park going. During this period, for example, a number of 
machinery shops based in Bandung took up the construction of powerlooms for local 
textile factories. Various small workshops turned out cheap powerlooms outfitted with 
wooden frames. A real success, however, were the cast-iron frame looms made by five 
larger workshops in Bandung that copied a popular powerloom model. These low-
quality powerlooms substituted for imported looms of European and Japanese origin 
during the greater part of the 1960s. 
The 1965 Turnaround 
The machinery trade regime shifted from virtual autarchy to free-trade after 1965. 
This sudden reversal led to the dissipation of much of Indonesia's technological 
capacities in the engineering field. The stabilization policies initially pursued by the 
New Order government opened the door to a flood of imports which washed away the 
captured home market enjoyed by engineering firms. Employment, capacity, and output 
dwindled. Among others, the nascent powerloom-building industry in Bandung was 
obliterated, a process that will be described in chapter 7. 
Many firms did not survive the 1965 turnaround. Those that did survive included a 
small number of engineering firms that had been the pride of the former Dutch 
metalworking sector. These had been nationalized in 1957 and, as state enterprises, 
were effectively insulated from market forces in these difficult years. A few private 
enterprises were able to secure government orders and in this manner were sheltered 
from foreign competition. Other private firms with a long-standing reputation in a 
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specialist field, e.g., in the construction of agro-processing machinery, managed to 
retain part of their market share. Still others found relatively sheltered niches in the 
production of low quality skill-intensive metal consumer goods. Finally, of course, a 
number of establishments managed to survive on maintenance and repair activities. 
The Engineering Industries Under the New Order 
The development of engineering activities in the New Order period can be pieced 
together from two main sources of information. From data collected in the national 
industry censuses. And from unpublished reports of field-level surveys of the 
engineering subsector conducted as part of consultancy missions, a series of which were 
commissioned by the Indonesian government from the late 1970s onward.3 
The key facts that emerge from these sources can be summed up as follows. In the 
first place, the engineering industries expanded along with the other branches of 
manufacturing in the New Order period. After 1975, however, when the import 
substitution boom set in earnest, the overall share of engineering value added in total 
manufacturing production dropped slightly. 
This relative stagnancy, in the second place, ran contrary to the plans of New 
Order industrial policymakers intent on promoting technology-intensive industries. At 
the turn of the 1980s a number of key policymakers felt that, due to the previous heavy 
emphasis on upstream (basic industries) and downstream (light manufacturing) import 
substitution, the intermediate engineering activities were lagging behind. This view was 
expressed, among other things, in the Fourth Five Year Plan of 1984/85-88/89 
mentioned in the previous chapter, with its emphasis on engineering and intermediate 
product linkages. It was also expressed in the 1982 Presidential State Address, in which 
a long list of ambitious and costly state engineering projects was announced (Gray 
1982). But the desired push into high-tech engineering activities was promoted most 
actively by Research and Technology Minister Habibie with the so-called Strategic 
Industries program. 
The third important observation is that foreign observers and advisors, while 
agreeing that the Indonesian engineering subsector did have an untapped growth 
potential, were virtually unanimous in criticizing the actual measures that the 
Indonesian government took to redress the perceived structural imbalance in 
manufacturing capacity. The gist of their critique was that policy interventions 
misdirected resources into complex capital and knowledge-intensive engineering 
products; that Indonesia lacked the technological capacities required to make these 
products; and that it suffered an almost unsurmountable comparative disadvantage vis-
1
 Consultancy surveys focusing on various parts of the Indonesian engineering subsector 
were carried out in 1977 to 1979, 1984, 1985 and again in 1989. 
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α-vis foreign producers in the particular industries targeted for import substitution. 
Existent infant industry schemes, instead of building up a much-needed basis of 
engineering capacity in upstream engineering industries supplying basic forms (casting 
and forging industries) and machine parts (machine shops, platework shops, heat 
treatment shops), promoted complex and technically demanding assemblies 
(automobiles, airplanes) that the Indonesian engineering subsector was simply incapable 
of producing.4 The straightforward assessment made in one consultancy report may 
illustrate the position taken: 
The engineering industries of Indonesia can be characterised as having a top heavy structure 
where resources are heavily concentrated in assembly operations and where upstream supply 
industries are poorly developed. Intermediate level products that should be more compatible 
with the country's production capacities and capabilities are not produced in any significant 
quantity. (IMG 1985:12) 
In the climate of deregulation of the 1980s two import substitution programs in 
particular came under fire: the automotive industry deletion program and the high 
technology drive led by Research and Technology Minister Habibie, on which more 
later. These programs were seen to epitomize the erroneous Indonesian strategy of 
developing its engineering subsector in reverse, i.e. by starting with massive 
investments in the manufacture of complex engineering products in the expectation that 
this demand pull would spontaneously generate the development of an upstream 
industry supplying basic parts, components and subassemblies.5 
Below I will first present evidence on the trends noted above and provide a sketch 
of the Strategic Industries program. Then I will tum to a closer examination of the 
effects of selective protection on the engineering industries in general, and the plant 
equipment industries in particular. 
Engineering Subsector: Expansion 
Evidence of employment expansion in the engineering subsector is provided by 
Table 3-1. The Table charts employment growth in the five principal subcategories of 
the engineering subsector between 1963 and 1986. Cottage industry (employment less 
than five workers) is excluded. It offers a picture of strong overall growth, with the 
expansion of employment in the electrical equipment segment above average 
throughout the period covered but especially before 1975, and the transport machinery 
segment growing strongly after 1975. The above-average expansion of the electrical 
4
 This critique can be found in IMG (1985) and World Bank (1989). 
5
 Both programs were formally initiated in 1976. Doner (1991) reviews the history of 
the automotive deletion program. McKendrick (1989) discusses the aerospace industry. 
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equipment industries was a reaction to infant industry schemes implemented by the 
government and extending to products such as dry cell batteries, lamps, tv sets, radio's 
and a variety of other consumer electronics products. The strong expansion of the 
transport equipment sector after 1975 was similarly catalyzed by infant industry 
schemes initiated for the motor vehicle and motor cycle industries as well as by direct 
government investments in the shipbuilding, aircraft, and railroad rolling stock 
industries. 
By contrast, employment in the non-electrical machinery category expanded below 
the engineering average throughout the period. Employment growth in the metal 
products industries fell back after 1975, presumably because opportunities for 'easy' 
import substitution (kitchenware, metal furniture, nails, screws, bolts, locks and fixtures, 
and the like) had become exhausted. 
Table 3-1 Change in employment in the engineering sector', 1963-1986 
ISIC 
381 
382 
383 
384 
385 
38 
Description 
Metal products 
Non-electrical 
Electrical equipment 
Transport equipment 
Professional eq 
All engineering 
Employment (x 1000) 
1963 1975 
225 
63 
27 
18 9 
na 
50 4 
543 
117 
20 6 
33 8 
15 
1219 
1986 
93 9 
215 
45 6 
77 9 
27 
2416 
Annual 
growth '63-
" 75 (%) 
118 
71 
55 2 
66 
-
118 
Annual 
growth 75-
'86 (%) 
66 
76 
110 
119 
-
89 
' Only firms with employment 5+ included 
Source adapted from НШ (1990a), ρ 87 
Figure 3-1 (below) shows why, around 1980, industrial planners began to worry 
about the engineering subsector. As a sign of the maturing of Indonesia's manufacturing 
structure, the share of engineering should have gone up instead it went down. 
Comparisons with other countries made by foreign advisors must have reinforced the 
feeling among industrial policymakers that something was wrong.6 The Figure records 
the changing share of engineering industries in total manufacturing value added during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Engineering share would almost certainly have increased after 
1980 had not the oil price decline necessitated a drastic realignment of policy priorities. 
6
 For example, the 1988 World Bank mission noted that. The relatively low share of 
machinery (28%) in the output of the Indonesian sector compares unfavourably with other 
successful economies in Asian such as the Republic of Korea (56%), Malaysia (75%) and India 
(58%)' (World Bank 1989:47). Similar remarks can be found in other reports. 
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When the oil price decline drastically cut back government spending power, however, 
most of the engineering projects announced by President Suharto in his 1982 Address 
were postponed, and a small number carried out in a scaled-down version. 
Figure 3-1 Share of engineering sub-sector in total manu­
facturing value added, large and medium firms 
(employment 20+), 1971-1990 
• J U E b a i t a l n c U n j 
Π JONaMbclrial 
И ЯІМаЫ 
Sources UNIDO (1984), Hill (1990а), Industrial Statistics (1990) 
Concentration of State Engineering Enterprises Under Strategic Industries in the 1980s 
After the 1982 policy reversal not all parts of the protective framework surrounding 
the manufacturing sector were dismantled. An important segment of state-owned 
prestige ventures managed to escape critical investigation and possible dismemberment 
by taking shelter under the Strategic Industries umbrella of Science and Technology 
Minister Habibie. Minister Habibie, a protégé of president Suharto, had been 
commissioned in 1977 to lead an Indonesian drive in the high-technology field. 
Because Habibie's projects enjoyed overt presidential support, they were immune from 
official criticism. Moreover, the bulk of the huge amounts of finance allocated to the 
high-technology venture carried out under his leadership was sent through a special 
extra-budgetary channel by direct orders from the president. Therefore those not 
directly involved could only guess at the true cost of the program. 
The Agency for Strategic Industries was established by presidential decree in 1989. 
It evolved from a coordinating body with the same name founded in 1983. The 1989 
decree transferred supervisory authority from the various agencies formerly in charge of 
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the strategic enterprises to the Research and Technology Minister who doubled as 
president of the agency. The ten strategic enterprises assembled under this umbrella are 
engaged in the fabrication of steel, aircraft, small arms, munitions and explosives, and 
railroad rolling stock, in shipbuilding, in the field of electronics and telecommunication, 
and in the production of industrial equipment, casting, structural steel products, plant 
maintenance, and diesel engine assembly (BPIS 1990). 
Internal Changes in the Subsector 
We will take a closer look at internal changes in the engineering subsector. Table 
3-2 charts changes in aggregate output and value added in large and medium 
engineering firms (employment 20+) at four year intervals between 1978 and 1990. 
Table 3-2 Change in engineering subsector (¡SIC 381-384) aggregate output and value 
added, 1978-1990 (in constant 1986 billion Rp.) 
Metal products 
Non-clectr. mach. 
Electrical mach. 
Transport cq. 
Total 
1978 
407 
109 
503 
488 
1,507 
I 
1982 
672 
182 
737 
1,080 
2,671 
Output 
1986 
1,214 
202 
917 
1,661 
3.994 
1990 
1,845 
680 
1,898 
3,532 
7,955 
1978 
109 
61 
175 
177 
522 
Value Added 
1982 
197 
77 
234 
328 
836 
1986 
336 
68 
252 
509 
1,165 
1990 
543 
230 
544 
1,399 
2,716 
Sources: World Bank (1989) and Industrial Statistics (1990) 
The Table above confirms the trend shown earlier by Table 3-1, i.e. one of strong 
growth. It also registers the temporary slowdown that occurred between 1982 and 1986 
as a result of the oil price decline: total annual output growth for the engineering 
subsector had been 19.3 percent up to 1982, but dropped to 12.4 during the subsequent 
period 1982 to 1986. From 1986 on, a period of exceptionally strong growth set in with 
an average yearly expansion of output of 24.8 percent. Why this growth occurred and 
what industries led this growth spurt I do not know, lacking sufficiently disaggregated 
data for the earlier period. 
Up to 1986, the growth performance of non-electrical machinery industries was 
under-average. The output share of non-electrical equipment makers dropped from 7.2 
percent in 1978 to 6.8 percent in 1982 and on to 5.1 percent in 1986. This segment 
managed to recover some of the lost terrain in the latter period, however, as in 1990 its 
share in total engineering subsector output had risen from 5.1 to 8.5 percent. 
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The Impact of Infant Industry Protection 
In order to examine the effects of infant industry protection on private industrial 
investments and production structure in the engineering industries, it is necessary to 
descend below the ISIC four-digit level to the 'product' level. Unfortunately, a 
comprehensive analysis of this matter is impossible because available published 
material on the structure of protection focuses on product groups at a three and four 
digit level of aggregation rather than on single products. 
Instead, Table 3-3 gives an impression of the impact of protection. It lists a number 
of engineering products protected either by very high import duties от by import bans 
(cf. GATT 1991; Wymenga 1991). The Table shows that most of the infant industries 
had a value added/output ratio below the engineering industry average, implicating a 
predominance of assembly rather than manufacturing activities proper. In Indonesian 
business and industrial policymaking circles such assembly operations were referred to 
as 'screwdriver companies'. A number of visits I made to assembly firms making 
machine tools and diesel engines showed this designation to be correct. Plant operations 
were restricted to the building up of imported assembly kits. In some cases plant 
management had the built-up product disassembled in its country of origin, at 
considerable cost, and imported in knocked-down condition in order to avoid a high 
import duty on Completely Built Up machinery. 
Table 3-3 Average value added/output ratio's and labour productivity in selected large 
and medium-scale (workforce 20+) infant engineering industries, 1990 
ISIC 
code 
38291 
38294 
38311 
38312 
38321 
38330 
38392 
38 
Description 
Sewing machines 
Airconditioners, refrigerators 
Electric generators 
Electric motore 
Radio, television, 
consumer electronics 
Electrical appliances 
and housewares 
Batteries 
Engineering subsector 
Output, 
(Rpbi)1 
10 6 
135 6 
19 1 
299 
8166 
27 2 
3199 
10.910 7 
Share m 
output 38 
01 
12 
0 2 
0 3 
75 
02 
2 9 
Value added 
/output 
17 
24 
44 
24 
21 
15 
22 
M 
Value added 
/worker 
19 
28 8 
42 7 
11 1 
10 0 
2 2 
13 1 
i l l 
' 1990 exchange rate Rp 1,805= $1 
Source Industrial Statistics (1990) 
The, admittedly impressionistic, data of Table 3-3 suggest a positive correlation 
between value added/output ratio's and labour productivity (value added/worker). This 
is a relationship one would expect, but a larger set of data would be needed to test such 
34 Textile Equipment Manufacturing 
a correlation. Furthermore, the enormous inter-industry variation in capital intensity (as 
measured by value added per worker) is striking. 
Lastly, the evidence lends support to the criticism that New Order interventions in 
the engineering subsector have been misdirected. The fact that value added/output 
ratio's in all but one of the infant industries listed here was below the engineering 
subsector average indicates that the infant industry programs overtaxed technological 
capacities of Indonesian producers. Engineering firms operating in the protected sectors, 
unable to comply with government local manufacture regulations, responded by 
resorting to cosmetic compliance, that is, engaged in assembly rather than 
manufacturing activities. 
Production of Non-electrical Machinery: ISIC 382 
It remains to examine the non-electrical machinery industries (ISIC 382) in more 
detail, and the textile machineries industry in particular. Like Table 3-3 above, Table 3-
4 is compiled from the 1990 large and medium manufacturing statistics, which are 
based on questionnaire data supplied by over 15,000 industrial firms with 20 or more 
employees. The Table shows main characteristics of ten industries classified under ISIC 
382: the four industries with the largest overall output share, the agricultural machinery 
industry, and five industries producing and servicing plant equipment. 
Table 3-4 Average output, employment, value added/output ratio's and labour 
productivity in various non-electrical machinery industries, 1990 
ISIC 
38212 
38243 
38292 
38294 
38221 
38231 
38241 
38245 
38246 
38247 
382 
Description 
Combustion engines 
Offshore constr.equipm. 
Lifting, hoisting machinery 
Airconditioners, refrigerators 
Agricultural machinery 
Metalworfcmg machinery 
Textile machineries 
Other industrial machinery 
Components & parts of. 
Alteration & repair of.. 
Non-electrical machinery 
Output (bi ftp.) 
182.8 
113.6 
178.4 
135.6 
63.4 
43.7 
12.7 
267 
51.5 
3.7 
928.9 
Share 
in 382 
19.7 
12.2 
192 
14.6 
68 
4.7 
1.4 
2.9 
5.5 
0.4 
100 
VA/ 
Output 
19 
.59 
.37 
.24 
.52 
.15 
.47 
.38 
.39 
.57 
M 
Employ-
ment 
1.981 
1,268 
2,375 
1,122 
2.298 
1,849 
736 
1,855 
3,867 
736 
30,487 
VA/ 
worker (mi.Rp ) 
17.7 
52 9 
27.8 
29.0 
14.4 
3.5 
8.1 
5.5 
5.2 
2.8 
10 3 
Source: Industrial Statistics (1990) 
The four categories with largest output comprise, first, the combustion engine 
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industry, a branch of the automotive industry. Its value added/output ratio indicates how 
much of an assembly industry this was in 1990. Second, the offshore construction 
equipment industry, an activity clearly related to the high investments undertaken by 
the government in oil and gas processing. Third, the category lifting and hoisting 
equipment comprising cranes, tractors, bulldozers, and the like. And fourth, 
airconditioners, refrigerators and other climate control devices. 
These industries apparently dominated in terms of output either because they were 
part of protected segments of the manufacturing sector (the automotive industry, the oil 
and gas processing industry), or because they did not depend upon manufacturing 
demand, refrigerators and airconditioners being consumer durables and hoisting 
equipment making being part of the construction industry. 
Two other industries listed in Table 3-4 have similar antecedents. The development 
of agricultural machinery making was spurred by the government as part of its efforts 
to make the country self-sufficient in rice production. The relatively large output of the 
metalworking machinery industries can be explained as a remainder of a failed attempt 
at import substitution initiated by the Industry Department in the early 1980s. The low 
value added/output ratio of the latter suggests that the latter was an assembly industry. 
Why No Protection Was Afforded to Plant Equipment Manufacturers 
One reason why the non-electrical machinery industries expanded slower than the 
other parts of the engineering subsector, at least until the late 1980s, is that it 
comprised a variety of relatively unprotected plant equipment manufacturing industries. 
According to the 1989 Customs Tariff regulations, machinery for important consumer 
goods producing industries such as the leather tanning, woodworking, plastic injection 
moulding, and textile industries was subject to modest import duties ranging from 5 to 
15 percent on top of which a Value Added Tax of 10 percent was charged.7 
The low level of protection granted to producers of this equipment is a 
consequence of a policy dilemma. Industrial planners could not assist producers of this 
equipment with protective measures without penalizing its consumers, the important 
downstream consumer goods industries. As one engineering sector consultancy report 
remarks: 
The on-going investment pattern in the capital goods area favors heavy industrial 
development led by shipbuilding and plant equipment manufacture, where the public sector 
enterprises have a dominant role. The light end of capital goods has largely been ignored, 
yet these are generally simpler to make and do not require a great deal of capital and 
technology. The landed price of imported capital goods is low under international 
7
 In Wymenga's study the non-electrical machinery cluster is given an aggregate 
Effective Rate of Protection of 138.4 (1991:152). Unfortunately, the study does not specify 
what protection was afforded to the various industries, nor does it provide information on how 
this figure was calculated. Cf. GATT (1991), p. 166. 
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competitive conditions, and unless the local goods can be produced at or near the 
international standards, important user industries will be penalized. The issue is how to 
balance the opposing interests of the producers and the users... (IMG 1985:12,13) 
Textile Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
The 1990 Manufacturing Census is an inadequate source of information for 
tracking the emergence of the Indonesian textile equipment industry. The Census data 
fail to capture this industry because of the use of a narrow definition of textile 
equipment making which excludes textile machinery repair, overhauling, and 
customizing as well as machinery spare parts manufacturing. In all probability, an 
important part of this broadly defined category is hidden under the rather nondescript 
labels 'Manufacture of components and parts of special industrial machineries' (ISIC 
38246) and 'Alteration and repair of special industrial machineries' (ISIC 38247). Only 
three textile machinery producers returned questionnaires to the Central Statistics 
Bureau. They are listed in Table 3-4 above under ISIC 38241. All three of these were 
private-owned, two having been established under Domestic Investment Law and one 
under Foreign Investment Law arrangements. Two of the firms were established 
between 1984 and 1988, the third in 1990. Average employment was 245 employees 
per establishment, and a relatively high value added/output share suggests that the 
textile machinery makers produced many of their parts in-house. Labour productivity, 
as shown by the value added/worker ratio, was below the non-electrical machinery 
industries average. 
The majority of firms supplying services to the textile factories were probably 
located in the catch-all categories ISIC 38246 ('Manufacture of components and parts of 
special industrial machineries') and 38247 ('Alteration and repair of special industrial 
machineries'). The first comprised 42 firms with 3,867 employees (average workforce 
per establishment 92); the second 13 firms with 736 employees (average 57). Average 
establishment size was substantially smaller than average for ISIC 382 as a whole (208 
firms with an average workforce of 147), as was labour productivity. The value 
added/output ratio, on the other hand, was substantially higher than the ISIC 382 
average (see Table 3-4). Finally, the Census provides a few clues as to ownership: only 
six out of fifty-five firms were government-owned, one was foreign-owned.and two 
were foreign joint ventures. A large majority, 46 firms, was owned by indigenous 
private entrepreneurs. 
Testing the Reliability of Indonesian Manufacturing Statistics 
How reliable are the official Indonesian manufacturing statistics? A comparison of 
the 1990 official data on large and medium firms in the ISIC categories 38246 and 
38247 with survey data I compiled on firms operating in this branch in 1991 and 1992 
allows us to test the quality of the data on manufacturing activities collected by the 
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Indonesian government. Table 3-5 offers a comparison of the two data bases. As can be 
seen there are some discrepancies between the two data sets. Firms returning their 
yearly questionnaires to the Central Statistics Bureau seem to have practised a certain 
amount of revenue underreporting, especially those in IS1C 38247, but this did not 
produce serious distortions in the important value added indicator. Moreover, at least 
Table 3-5 Comparison of key data on medium and large firms (employment 20+) in 
ISIC 38246 and 38247 as recorded in the official 1990 Industrial Statistics 
with author's survey findings 1991/1992 
Data source ISIC Average Average Revenue/ VA/ VA/ Ν 
category Revenue Workforce Worker Worker Revenue (Rp mi ) (Rp mi ) 
Industrial 
Statistics 
1990 
Author's 
Survey 1991 
38246 
38247 
38246+247 
38246+247 
1,226 2 
284 6 
1,003 6 
612 1 
92 
7 
84 
45 
13 3 
5 0 
12 0 
13 5 
52 
28 
4 6 
30 
39 
57 
40 
47 
42 
13 
55 
10 
Sources Industrial Statistics (1990) and primary data 
part of the discrepancies seem to be accounted for by different average size of sampled 
firms. When the two ISIC categories are combined and compared with my own 
findings, the match between the two data bases is surprisingly good. 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from this survey of the engineering 
industries. The diversity of the manufacturing activities under discussion, the difficulty 
of matching data-sets measuring protection with data-sets tracing output and 
employment trends, the large gap in official data concerning state engineering 
enterprises, and the sometimes awkward system of industry classification employed in 
the national manufacturing data sets, all these factors add to the problems of 
interpreting general patterns of change during the New Order period. 
The following list of conclusions is therefore a tentative one. First, the engineering 
industries were pulled along in the general climate of growth prevailing during this 
period. However, the share of engineering industry output and value added in total 
manufacturing did not increase from the second half of the 1970s onward as industrial 
planners hoped it would. 
Second, the tendency of industrial planners to launch ambitious import substitution 
campaigns for complex and technologically demanding products (automobiles, 
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aeroplanes, machine tools, and the like) overtaxed local capabilities and gave protected 
infant engineering industries an 'assembly' character. 
Third, at the beginning of the chapter a distinction was made between private and 
state-owned firms operating in sheltered markets on the one hand, and private firms 
operating in open, unprotected markets on the other hand. The expansion of non-
electrical machinery industries was seen to lag behind the other engineering industries. 
One reason is that this cluster of industries received less protection than the other 
segments. In particular, no protection was extended to plant equipment makers: in their 
case the interests of machine users, the important consumer goods industries, prevailed 
over those of machine makers. 
4 Steel and Textile Promotion: Impact on 
Local Textile Equipment Making 
The textile equipment industry is sandwiched in between of two industries: it 
derives a main input, steel, from the upstream basic metal industry. And it supplies its 
output to the textile industry located downstream. New Order industrial planners have 
pushed hard to achieve import substitution in steel and textiles. This, as will be seen, 
has had important repercussions on the textile equipment industry. Two central theses 
are advanced in this chapter: a) investment-stimulating interventions in the textile 
industry had the unintended side effect of creating an open market for textile 
equipment; and b) regulations administered in the market for structural and special 
steels were disadvantageous for local textile equipment makers as steel consumers. 
The main issue tackled here is whether the 'infant industry factor', that is, 
government protection, was responsible in any direct way for the rapid rise of textile 
equipment making under the New Order. This question can be answered with an 
unqualified no. On the positive side of the balance, however, textile import substitution 
policies, by stimulating a strong expansion of textile manufacturing, did create a 
significant potential demand for textile equipment production and servicing. In sum, the 
emergence of the Indonesian textile equipment industry was not brought about by 
policy design but by a process of unplanned and unforeseen market-led backward 
linkage formation from the expanding textile industry. 
Steel 
Steel, iron alloyed with small amounts of carbon to which a variety of other 
elements can be added, is a crucial input for the engineering industries. Technical 
limitations as well as dis-economies of scale have limited the Indonesian output of this 
product to basic structural steels in a variety of shapes such as used in the construction 
industry (rods for reinforcing concrete, nails and screws, steel sections for housing, 
sheets for corrugated roofing, wire mesh for fences), in shipbuilding, and metal sheet 
cut and bent to the required shape in the automotive (car bodies), furniture, and canning 
industries (cf. Krakatau Steel Group 1989). After 1978, when domestic steel production 
came onstream, the Indonesian government made extensive use of import bans and 
quota and other nontariff barriers to support this infant industry. 
In addition to structural steels, plant equipment makers use a variety of refined and 
alloyed steels with special properties such as high corrosion resistance, high tensile 
strength, wear resistance, and stability at high temperatures. So far, Indonesia has 
depended on imported alloyed and refined steels. With a few odd exceptions, such as 
stainless steel sheets, trade in special steels has been regulated by tariff barriers. Below, 
I will examine the effects of structural and special steel market regulation on consumers 
in the downstream engineering industries. 
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Import Substitution in Structural Steels: the Krakatau Steel Venture 
Indonesia's adventure in steel began in the 1950s when Soviet engineers started the 
construction of a steel works at Cilegon on the northern coastal plains of West Java. 
The site was evacuated uncompleted after the 1965 coup, but work was resumed after 
the arrival of the oil boom in 1974 by a number of German firms (Amdt 1975). 
Initially, this second attempt was funded and controlled largely by the state oil 
company Pertamina. When Pertamina foundered on huge debts in 1975 a special board 
was formed to which control was transferred (Robison 1986:153,223). 
Production came onstream in 1977. The plant's output comprises billet steel, from 
which steel sections, bars and wire are made. The wire is further processed into mesh, 
welding electrodes, nuts and bolts and nails. It also produces slab steel. Part of the slab 
steel is processed in-house: it is made into sheets, pipes and tubes, and sections. The 
remainder is supplied to private companies for further processing. In 1987, a cold 
rolling mill was added for the production of corrugated roofing, tin plate, and sheet 
metal for the automotive, and home and office appliance industries (Krakatau Steel 
Group 1989). 
Designated 'key strategic industry' with infant industry status, Krakatau Steel was 
accorded far-reaching control of the domestic structural steel market during the first 
decade of its existence. In line with the Indonesian preference for nontariff over tariff 
barriers, the company was given Sole Agent status, i.e. a trade monopoly, in numerous 
steel and iron products. How strong the hold of Krakatau Steel was can be judged from 
the company's own statement that in 1987 -when the move towards trade 
liberalization that had started in 1983 was already well underway- it controlled $400 
million worth or two-thirds of that year's total steel imports (Profil Krakatau Steel n.d.). 
Deregulatory measures taken in 1987 and 1988 reduced the number of CCCN 
system items subject to nontariff barriers from 100 to 89 (of which 74 constituted a 
Krakatau Steel monopoly), then to 56, and finally to 30 items (of which 16 fell under 
the Krakatau Steel monopoly). In 1989, 17 percent of total steel imports (valued at 
$100 million) was still regulated by Krakatau Steel (ibid.). Even at this stage its 
captured market still extended to virtually all flat-rolled iron and steel articles: sheets, 
plates, and coils of any diameter, alloy or non-alloy, hot- or cold-rolled, clad or coated 
or otherwise (Prasada 1989). 
Products protected by an Importer Producer1 designation included iron and 
non-alloy steel ingots, hot-rolled bars and rods of non-alloy steel and all varieties of 
tubes, pipes and hollow profiles of iron or steel (Customs Tariff 1989). Another 
important part of Krakatau Steel's protective barrier was dismantled in June 1991, when 
non-tariff barriers for cold-rolled steel sheets and tin-plated sheets were abrogated, 
leaving the company only a monopoly of hot-rolled steel sheets produced in its trouble-
1
 Importer Producers are producers licensed to import a barred article only as input for 
own production 
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plagued hot rolling mill.2 
The Effects of Protection 
In effect, then, during the period 1978-1988 Krakatau Steel controlled the 
Indonesian market for structural steels. What was the effect of Krakatau Steel's 
stranglehold on the price, quality, and local availability of structural steels? Official 
evidence on this issue is unavailable, as policy makers and interested parties have 
underplayed the cost of the steel import substitution project. In the absence of such 
evidence I rely mainly on information volunteered by steel consumers: metalworking 
firm managers, procurement staff in machinery plants, and steel traders. 
Four negative effects may be distinguished. In the first place, steel consumers were 
charged prices higher than those prevailing overseas. This was officially conceded by 
the government at a June 1991 press briefing, where Junior Industry Minister and 
Krakatau Steel chairman Tungky Ariwibowo stated that domestic cold-rolled steel 
sheets sold at approximately 1,200 Rp./kilo. He added that the import price for similar 
sheets was 1,140 Rp./kilo, but the latter were subject to a 22.5 import tax which raised 
their price to 1,400 Rp./kilo. The price differential between local-made and imported 
structural steel products may have been substantially higher in earlier years. However, I 
could not find concrete evidence on this issue. In the second place, steel consumers 
suffered from Krakatau Steel's uncertain supply schedules and long delivery periods. 
Machinery makers were accustomed to having to wait for weeks or even months for 
their orders to be delivered. As a precaution they had to maintain large stocks which 
pushed up inventory costs.3 In the third place, local-made steel was said to be of 
unreliable quality, i.e. metallurgical properties of articles delivered varied from one 
consignment to another. In the fourth place, machinery makers experienced difficulties 
in standardizing production processes because Krakatau Steel's output mix tended to 
fluctuate unpredictably: structural steel bars and sheets of given specifications tended to 
appear, disappear, and unexpectedly reappear on the market. Unavailability of a needed 
article forced steel consumers to make do with bars or sheets of the wrong dimensions 
which they then had to cut to size. 
Imported Special Steels 
Did Indonesian machinery makers suffer a competitive disadvantage because they 
had to pay a price in excess of world market prices for their imported special steels? 
My main evidence on this score is presented in Table 4-1, which compares estimates of 
2
 However, a 22.5 percent import duty still rests on imported cold rolled steel. 
3
 On this point see also Chapman (1992:74). 
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mark-ups for imported special steels in 1977 and 1992. 
Plenkers, my source for 1977, found that mark-ups added to CIF (Cost, Insurance, 
Freight) price in Southeast Asia ranged from a low 15 percent in Singapore to a high 
42 percent in the Philippines, with an average mark-up of about 25 percent. In stark 
contrast, mark-ups in Indonesia stood at a towering 85 percent due to a combination of 
high import tariffs and substantial handling costs, both legal and illegal. On basis of 
this evidence we may conclude that in 1977 Indonesian machinery makers suffered 
from import trade regulation. 
I replicated Plenkers' survey in 1992. My investigation of mark-ups showed that 
the situation had much improved. Due to a lower sales tax, a reduction of import duties 
to only five percent, as well as decreased handling costs, the mark-up had shrunk to 
under 36 percent of CIF price. The improvements had been introduced in 1985 when 
the Swiss surveillance company SGS was contracted to take care of clearing procedures 
in Jakarta. Jakarta's customs were notorious for delays and corruption, and the decision 
to out-contract freight handling was motivated by a desire to facilitate the in and 
outflow of goods. The import duty reductions were introduced in the same year as part 
of a package of deregulatory measures. 
Table 4-1 Comparison of retail price imported special steels as share of CIF price, 
1977 and 1992 
¡977 ¡992 
CIF price 100 0 100 0 
Bank charge 5 0 SO 
VAT 60 100 
Insurance 2 5 2 5 
Impon Duty 30.0 5 0 
Sales Tax 13.5 2 5 
Clearing Cost 10.0 5.0 
Transport 4 5 2 0 
Importer's Commission 2.5 3 7 
Bribes 100 00 
Total mark-up 85_0 35 7 
Consumer Price 185.0 135.7 
Source. Plenkers (1977) and primary data 
According to my informants, the average mark-up in other Southeast Asian 
countries still was much the same as Plenkers had reported 15 years earlier, that is, 
approximately 25 percent of CIF price. The trade reforms had therefore substantially 
reduced the Indonesian price gap. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this examination of steel regulation is that 
New Order interventions in the steel market inhibited the growth of domestic 
machinery making activities. For one, domestic machinery makers, as steel consumers, 
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were made to carry the burden of the Indonesian effort to produce structural steels. 
From 1978 onwards they suffered from uncertain supply schedules and long delivery 
periods. They were forced to work with structural steel of unreliable quality. They had 
to cope with a fluctuating supply situation. And they paid a price above the 
international competitive level. For another, up to the mid-1980s Indonesian consumers 
of special steels paid a price that was up to 50 percent higher than that prevailing in 
surrounding countries. This weakened their competitive position vis-a-vis overseas 
competitors. 
Downstream Import Substitution: Textiles4 
Mechanized textile manufacturing, budding in Indonesia in the late 1930s, entered 
a phase of rapid expansion only after 1968. The year 1968 marked the onset of New 
Order textile import substitution policies. Protection of the domestic textile industry was 
hoped to have positive effects on the Indonesian trade balance and stimulate industrial 
growth at the same time. Both nontariff and tariff barriers were set up around the 
industry: 
Ad valorum import duties for cotton and fabric were (set at) 0 percent and 100 percent, 
respectively, while imported garments were restricted by a specific tariff. ... A prohibition or 
a zero quota was imposed on imported sarongs, unbleached cotton, and several other items 
that were sufficiently produced domestically. (Wibisono 1987:87) 
From 1967 onwards various measures were taken to encourage private firms, both 
foreign and domestic, to undertake industrial projects in Indonesia. Under the Foreign 
Investment Law of 1967 and the Domestic Investment Law of 1968 private industrial 
investors came to enjoy various facilities: tax holidays for two years and more, 
accelerated depreciation of fixed assets, and, an important concession in the context of 
the present study, duty-free imports of plant machinery. 
Foreign investors were allowed exemption from 'Import duties at the time of entry 
into Indonesia of fixed assets such as machinery, tools or instruments needed for the 
operation of said enterprise', and the Domestic Investment Law similarly stated that 
The Import of capital goods (including both equipment and raw materials) ... may be 
offered relief of import duties.' From 1971 to 1974 textile industrialists were also 
allowed to import used spinning and weaving machinery under the condition that these 
machines were 10 years old or less (Wibisono 1987:90). 
These measures triggered a strong increase of private investments in mechanized 
weaving. Powerloom weaving now quickly supplanted the formerly dominant handloom 
production. Backward linkages from weaving coupled with direct government 
investments stimulated the upstream spinning industry, which expanded rapidly after 
1968. This was reflected in increasing output of the spinning and weaving sectors: 
4
 The following account relies heavily on Makarim Wibisono's excellent study of the 
politics of Indonesian textile manufacturing (1987). 
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between 1969 to 1980, annual output of the former grew by 18.6 percent and that of 
the latter by 14.7 percent (Hill 1991:93). 
Table 4-2 Expansion ofspindlage and homage in the Indonesian textile industry, 
1968-1991 
Year Spindlage Loomagc 
¡968 481,780 35,335 
1971/72 552,468 43,420 
1976 1,152,000 
1986/87 2,574,516 101,060 
1988 - 108,000 
1989 - 150,000 
1990 - 160,000 
1991 5,336,000 170,000 
Sources Wibisono (1987), Buku Petunjuk Industri Tekstil (1987), World Bank (1992) 
Table 4-2 shows the strong increase in spinning capacity of the 1970s. The total 
number of spindles installed in Indonesian mills increased from 482,000 in 1969, via 
870,000 in 1975 to 1,152,000 in 1976. Private-owned spinning mills, nonexistent in 
1968, by 1976 were utilizing two-third of total spindlage (Wibisono 1987:92). Up to the 
1980s, the increase in loomage was less marked. This is because the Table records 
increase in mechanical looms only. During the 1970s, the powerloom supplanted the 
handloom, which up to then had been the dominant technology (cf. Hill 1983). 
Policymakers stimulated rapid growth of manufacturing capacity in the weaving 
and spinning sectors in these years by promoting the use of imported inputs. Table 4-3 
shows the dependence of domestic textile industry on imported inputs in 1977, nine 
years after the establishment of the import substitution program. At that time, according 
to the Table, 99 percent of textile machinery and 90 percent of machinery parts were 
still being imported. This was a direct consequence of the import substitution program's 
active promotion of machinery imports via import duty exemption and accelerated 
write-off concessions to investors. These policies led to a surge of private investments 
in domestic spinning and weaving, but at the cost of a heavy dependence on imported 
inputs. 
A process slowly gaining motion during the 1970s was the reorientation of 
domestic textile industry to the export market. By the mid-70s, after a successful first 
stage of import substitution, the domestic market for textiles had become saturated. 
Simultaneously, the Indonesian government, seeking additional sources of foreign 
exchange after the débâcle of the state oil company Pertamina, focused on the export 
potential of the non-oil manufacturing sector (Robison 1986:153ff.). In 1976, it 
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Table 4-3 Dependence on imported inputs of domestic textile industry, 1977 
Input 
cotton 
synthetic fibre 
yam 
machinery 
spare parts 
chemicals 
99% 
100% 
50% 
99% 
90% 
95 % 
Source: Wibisono (1987), p.86 
established a customs duty drawback scheme to spur textile exports. Two years later 
this was replaced by a system of export certificates. Although it failed to stimulate 
export activities, this intervention provided yet another disincentive for investment in 
domestic production of textile machinery and machinery parts. In 1978 the Finance 
Minister issued a regulation exempting 'export industries, including textiles, from all 
import duties and taxes for spare parts, intermediate goods, and raw materials. Duties 
and taxes paid by exporters would be reimbursed by the government in the form of 
export certificates' (Wibisono 1987:95). 
Textile and Garments Export Promotion, 1982-1992 
From 1982 onwards, textile exports became increasingly important. The loss of 
revenue from oil exports compelled the state to cut back on these expenditures and 
relinquish its leading role in the manufacturing sector to private enterprise. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the new policy course manifested itself in a series of measures 
that loosened tight government controls on financial markets and abrogated and 
simplified the dense structure of regulations sustaining monopolistic and oligopolistic 
structures in many markets. Furthermore, with a deteriorating current account deficit, 
the building up non-oil and gas exports of manufactures gained a high priority. 
Accordingly, the scope of textile export incentives —the export certificate scheme and 
subsidized interest rates for export credit— was widened and, after many cases of 
manipulation were reported, control mechanisms improved. 
Along with plywood, textiles and garments now took the lead in exports of 
manufactures. As Indonesia forged ahead in the ranks of developing country textile 
exporters, however, foreign protests against government subsidization of Indonesian 
textile exports multiplied. The United States, for example, launched a strong protest 
against Indonesian subsidization in 1984 (Wibisono 1987:172). Threats of retaliation 
prompted the Indonesian government to abandon the export certificate scheme in 1986 
and revoke the subsidized export credit. Instead, the Customs Duty Drawback system 
was resumed. This system allowed textile producers exporting at least 85 percent of 
their output to 'import basic and intermediate materials without any restriction, if local 
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producers cannot offer competitive prices or those maximally similar to import prices' 
(ibid. 1987:180). Another export success-related problem, and one that may cause 
serious trouble in the future, was that, by 1986, Indonesian garment exports to its 
premier market, the United States, began reaching quota ceilings set by the Multi Fibre 
Arrangement (Hill 191:117). 
Textile producers ineligible for the drawback system still faced modest import 
duties for imported textile machinery and machinery parts. Table 4-4 lists import duties 
levied on various textile machineries and machinery parts as of 1989. Minor 
modifications in this list were introduced in 1991. All parts of sewing machines could 
from now on be imported duty-free, but import duties on sewing machines for other 
than household use were raised to 10 percent (Paket 3 Juni 1991). The Table shows 
that import duties ranged from 5 to 10 percent. 
Table 4-4 Import duties on textile machinery and parts, 1989 
Specification Import duty 
Spinning preparation (carding, combing, drawing, roving, and other machines) S % 
Spinning, doubling, twisting, and winding machines 5 % 
Looms, all types 10 % 
Knitting, stitch-bonding, and embroidery machines, all types 5 % 
Parts and accessories of spinning and preparation machinery S % 
Parts and accessories of weaving machinery 5 % 
Parts and accessories of knitting and embroidery machinery S % 
Source: Customs Tariff (1989) 
Finally, it should be noted that whereas the regulation allowing the import of used 
textile machinery was formally abrogated in 1974, textile producers apparently 
continued to import secondhand machinery after this date. Permits could be had upon 
special request to the Industry Department. Thus, late in 1990, an official of the 
Directorate General of Basic Metals and Machineries in the Industry Department stated 
during an interview that he found ' . . . two new requests for the import of second-hand 
textile machinery on my desk every day.' These requests were generally granted. 
Textile Exports and Rapid Growth of Indonesian Textile Equipment Imports 
Overall, it may be concluded that the New Order spinning and weaving import 
substitution regime and its subsequent abrogation induced a marked growth of capacity 
in the textile industry after 1968. Spinning and weaving capacity multiplied during the 
period 1968 to 1991. Between 1969 and 1988, the output of yam increased annually by 
a phenomenal 15.3 percent and the woven textiles output by 11.4 percent (Hill 
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1991:93). Ibis expansion emerges as Ъаск агсі leakage' in Indonesian machinery 
import statistics. Figure 4-1 traces textile equipment imports through the 1980s. It 
shows how, after a dip in the mid-1980s, the value of imported textile machinery and 
parts increased strongly as textile exports surged. During the export boom years 1989, 
1990, and 1991, the nominal value of imported textile machinery and parts leapt from 
$623 million, via $971 million, to $1,372 million. 
Figure 4-1 Value of aggregate Indonesian textile machinery and parts 
imports', 1980-1991 (in nominal million US$) 
1.400 
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1 Includes products subsumed under SITC codes 72441000 tu 72468900 
Source. BPS Import Statistics, various issues 
Some care should be taken in interpreting these data, however. The adoption of a new 
classificatory system in 1989 substantially enhanced the usefulness of Indonesian textile 
machinery import statistics, but the price of this improvement is that post-1988 data are 
imperfectly comparable with earlier data. Also, one should keep in mind that the 
figures understate the actual volume of textile equipment imports, these being distorted 
to an unknown extent by underreporting, mislabelling, and smuggle. 
New Order Steel and Textile Regulation and the Textile Equipment Industry 
In sum, New Order import substitution policies in the steel and textile sectors 
created an unfavourable climate for the development of domestic textile equipment 
making. First, no direct protection was extended to domestic textile equipment makers. 
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Second, the Krakatau Steel venture in structural steel production penalized downstream 
steel consumers, among others textile equipment makers. Third, a combination of high 
import duties and bureaucratic mismanagement raised local prices for imported special 
steels far beyond international price levels. Fourth, textile import substitution policies 
had a negative effect on the upstream engineering industry in that it promoted and 
facilitated the use of imported textile equipment, thus stimulating backward leakage of 
machinery demand instead of fostering backward linkages. There was also a beneficial 
side to textile import substitution, however: the expansion of the textile industry created 
a huge potential demand for machinery repair, servicing, and construction. 
The important conclusion of this chapter is that the 'infant industry factor* cannot 
account for the recent evolution of textile equipment making in Indonesia. The machine 
shops that, in the mid-1970s, began providing local-made machinery parts and noncore 
machinery to local textile factories could not avail of government subsidies or any form 
of protection against foreign competition. They entered what was virtually a free-trade 
environment. That a thriving Indonesian textile equipment industry could develop in 
this environment poses a puzzling question that the following chapters will attempt to 
solve. 
5 Investment Decisionmaking and Machinery 
Consumption in the Textile Industry 
The international textile equipment market is extremely heterogeneous. Textile 
machinery producers supply a wide range of alternative techniques in diverse quality, 
price, and feature combinations. In part this heterogeneity has evolved in response to a 
strong expansion of international demand for textile machinery since the 1940s as well 
as a differentiation of demand following the partial relocation of textile manufacturing 
to developing countries. To some extent it has also been a consequence of the imperfect 
overlap of vintage and new technologies. Furthermore, this heterogeneity mirrors 
international competition in the textile equipment industry: industry leaders in Europe, 
Japan, and the United States have been compelled to engage in continuous innovation 
to stay ahead of imitating newly developed (Taiwan, South Korea) and developing 
country (India, China) followers.1 
These supply-side processes underlie the current wide range of alternative 
techniques facing textile equipment consumers in Indonesia. The purpose of this chapter 
is threefold. First, I attempt to bring consumer decision making processes into 
perspective by examining choice of technique in Indonesian weaving plants. Second, 
cumulative machinery replacement and investment decisions by textile factory managers 
determine the composition of a country's machinery park. Indirectly, these decisions 
define domestic demand for textile equipment supply, repair and reconditioning. This 
chapter therefore provides a profile of the Indonesian textile machinery park. Third, the 
concluding section of the chapter draw out the implications of technical choice and 
machinery park profile for local textile equipment makers' market opportunities. 
The Technical Spectrum of Spinning and Weaving 
The Indonesian textile industry caters to multiple markets: spinning and weaving 
factories produce yam and cloth that will end up in a wide range of final products, 
from ready-made clothing in every conceivable shape and quality for both home and 
export markets, to bedsheets, curtains, furniture lining and covering, bags and sacks, 
carpets, bandages, and so on. Different spinning, weaving, and finishing techniques 
produce varying returns in different parts of the market spectrum. When textile 
producers must decide on what new machinery to buy, they face a range of partly 
overlapping options. Textile manufacturing processes are complex. The raw cotton 
entering a spinning mill undergoes a score of mechanical and chemical processes 
passing through a range of machines before finally leaving the weaving plant as a piece 
of cloth.2 To complicate matters, numerous machinery producers vying for customers 
1
 On the former points see UNCTAD (1981). On the latter, Kmgman (1979). 
2
 For an overview of these processes see Pickett & Robson 1987. 
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offer machinery of varying quality, price, and with varying features for every stage of 
the process. 
This makes choice of technique decisionmaking a complex issue. Even in cases 
where only two technologies are available in the market, say a 'vintage' and a 'state-of-
the-art' technique, factory managers contemplating the acquisition of new machinery 
face a wide range of options. Management may replace installed wom-out vintage 
machinery with new or second-hand vintage machines; or with state-of-the-art 
machines; it may choose to add vintage machinery (new or second-hand) or state-of-
the-art machines to the vintage machinery park. Or it may decide to pursue one or 
another combination of these strategies. 
Deciding on this issue is more difficult than many choice of technique studies 
suggest. For one, choice of technique investigations often assume that a plant will 
produce one product only. This assumption is not always realistic and the point made 
by Howard Pack is well taken: 
One problem easily overlooked in abstract discussion of choice of technique is the 
possibility of producing a range of products with any given set of machines ... most plants 
(and machines) produce a range of products, in each of which there may be a different 
relative intensity' (1985:171-173). 
For another, a business decision maker will mostly be uncertain about the range of 
products she will be producing two, three, or four years ahead. Because decisions to 
invest in a certain technology are based on market forecasts that are only partly 
reliable, the investor must strive for production cost minimalization for the planned 
range of articles and at the same retain enough flexibility to incorporate unforeseen 
changes in the production schedule. 
Weaving Techniques: Hand and Shuttle Looms 
The case of weaving will serve to illustrate these points. A basic observation is that 
no weaving technique is superior across the market spectrum. Rather, different 
techniques have varying quality and productivity implications. Major constraining 
factors in production and determinants of product quality and price in weaving include 
choice of fibre (cotton, wool, rayon, polyester, and so on), yam count (fineness), 
selvage (method of cloth edge tie-in), dimensions (diameter of weave), and design 
(plain cloth, patterned cloth, number and choice of colours). 
Indonesian textile factories use the following three principal weaving techniques: 
hand weaving, mechanized shuttle loom weaving (also called powerloom weaving), and 
mechanized shuttleless weaving. Hand-operated shuttle looms dominated the early 
growth phase of Indonesian textile industry, but rapidly lost ground from the 1970s 
onward when they were displaced by powerlooms with a higher product output and 
quality. Handlooms are still in use in rural areas, but have been pushed to the periphery 
of the textile market. They produce cheap and low-quality lining cloth, floor cloth, and 
towels, or contrariwise manufacture high-quality products for the handicrafts market 
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(Hardjono 1990; Hill 1991). 
Mechanized shuttle looms currently represent the dominant weaving technique in 
Indonesian factories. Part of the Indonesian shuttle loom stock consists of old 
machinery of foreign origin. European and Japanese textile machinery producers have 
all switched to more advanced techniques, so the shuttle loom stock is replenished by 
imports of new-made machinery from developing countries, notably China, South 
Korea, and India. Chinese powerlooms in particular, copies of Japanese models popular 
in the 1950s that sell for as little as $2,500 apiece, still appear to be popular, mainly in 
smaller weaving plants. Another important source of mechanized shuttle looms is the 
Asian trade in second-hand factory machinery. Many Indonesian textile factories are 
outfitted with second-hand capital stock imported from Asian countries where rising 
labour costs have made their operation unprofitable. 
Mechanized shuttle looms use boat-shaped shuttles to impel the weft across the 
loom. They come in three varieties: non-automatic shuttle looms lack both an automatic 
shuttle change feature and automatic machine stoppage when a warp break occurs. 
Semi-automatic looms feature automatic shuttle change but no automatic stoppage. 
Automatic looms feature both automatic stoppage and automatic shuttle change (Marks 
& Robinson 1976:8). Automatic shuttle looms are highly versatile. They can process a 
wide Tange of yarns into an unrivalled range of textures and patterns. On the other 
hand, shuttle looms possess unfavourable mechanical qualities. They can only operate 
at limited speeds, are given to violent vibrations, and produce a sharp clattering noise. 
Shuttleless Looms 
Indonesian industrialists are slowly shifting from shuttle looms to more advanced 
shuttleless techniques. They can choose among four main variants. The Sulzer projectile 
loom developed in the 1950s, the rapier or gripper loom developed in the 1960s, the 
water-jet loom launched on the market around 1970\ and the air-jet loom which 
entered the market in the early 1980s (Lord & Mohamed 1973; Marks & Robinson 
1976). 
The projectile loom was the first fast shuttleless alternative to the conventional 
shuttle loom. This occurred in the 1940s. Its early introduction notwithstanding, the 
projectile loom never succeeded in capturing a substantial share in the weaving 
machinery market. Its main drawbacks were the following. First, the projectile 
technique was a monopoly of the Swiss Sulzer company. Sulzer, maintaining high 
quality standards, produced a machine that carried a high price. Furthermore, the Sulzer 
company was slow to respond to customer demands and complaints, an attitude partly 
3
 We may discount water-jet weaving because it transmits yam across the loom by 
means of water. Cotton yam is prepared for weaving by 'sizing', coating it with a starchy 
substance. This lends strength and smoothness to the yam, making it better able to withstand 
the pulling and rubbing it is subjected to during weaving. As water affects the sizing of cotton 
yam, water-jet looms cannot be used for weaving cotton cloth. 
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explained by its monopoly position Second, an important drawback of the projectile 
loom was the lengthy and laborious process required for changing from one type of 
cloth to another This made it unsuited to faetones producing diverse products in short 
runs Third, long down time was required for repairing broken yam on the projectile 
loom This necessitated the use of high-quality yam and first rate yam preparation 
(Verstegen 1993) 
The gnpper loom, the second shuttleless technique, transmits the weft across the 
loom by means of a rapier-shaped device instead of by shuttle A single rapier may 
move back and forth across the loom Alternatively, a pair of rapiers pointing towards 
each other may pass on the weft near the center of the loom Gnpper looms compare 
favourably to shuttle looms in terms of mechanical qualities However, they present no 
speed advantage ra-a-vis shuttle looms for they are subject to weft insertion speed 
limitations comparable to that of the shuttle loom Moreover, they are much more 
expensive than conventional shuttle looms 
The air-jet loom, the third shuttleless technology, is the most recent technique to 
appear on the weavmg machinery market This loom impels yam across the loom by 
means of compressed air Until recently its main drawback was its limited width, but 
that problem has now been solved Like the other shuttleless looms, it is much more 
expensive than a conventional loom 
Shuttle and Air-jet Looms Compared 
The projectile loom, for reasons set out above, never succeeded m threatening the 
market leadership of the conventional shuttle loom The equally fast and much more 
versatile air-jet loom may, however, become the leading weaving technique For the 
moment the shuttle loom still dominates the Indonesian weaving industry, but it is not 
unlikely that this technique will be displaced by air-jet weaving in the near future. In 
assessing the likely outcome of this competition we need to consider the following 
factors production cost, machinery price, nsk and uncertainty, production cost, input 
quality requirements, market access, and the prestige factor 
Production cost A recent companson of shuttle and air-jet loom production costs 
in nine Indonesian weaving plants indicates that production costs per meter of plam 
cotton weaves for the home market were only marginally higher for air-jet looms 
(Ruwiel 1993)4 Thus, in terms of production cost neither technique appears to hold a 
decisive advantage It should be added that one should take care not to overestimate the 
importance of the cost factor m choice of technique decisionmaking Indonesian 
decisionmakers often cannot avail of reliable production cost figures because in many 
4
 Ruwiel calculated the following average production cost per meter plain cotton weave 
on basis of data collected in nine weaving plants Rp 700 (assuming financing via overseas 
loan at eight percent interest) to Rp 740 (local financing at 25 percent interest) for shuttle loom 
production, veisas Rp 757 (overseas loan) to Rp 851 (domestic bank loan) for air-jet 
production (1993 46) 
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factories cost monitoring systems are rudimentary or nonexistent. For this reason 
production cost may not figure prominently in buying decisions. 
Machinery price. The main reason why air-jet looms have been slow in gaining 
ground on shuttle looms is their high price. Indonesia is a high-risk business 
environment. An Indonesian textile industrialist pays about $300,000 for one hundred 
powerlooms, equivalent to only about 25 air-jet looms in terms of cloth produced per 
hour. He would, however, have to pay $1 million to acquire those 25 air-jet looms. 
Given low and stable interest rates, a dependable supply of high-quality yam, and a 
reliable export outlet for the high-quality cloth, the air-jet investment might pay off. In 
the uncertain Indonesian political and economic context, it is unlikely that these 
conditions will be met. 
Input quality requirements. Air-jet looms produce more cloth per hour only under 
stringent conditions. Only strong and smooth top-quality cotton yam, spun from long 
staple fibres on good equipment can withstand the high tensions necessary for attaining 
these speeds. To quote a weaving expert of Belgian air-jet loom maker Picanol: 
For air-jet weaving preparation must be perfect. Cotton and yam must by 100 percent. 
Cotton should be long fibre, the number of crossed threads in warping must be very small, 
and so on. In the end, you make a cheaper product, but only if your preparation has been 
optimal. This is why many Indonesian users of our machines choose to operate our 
machinery at 80 percent efficiency. 
Even when all these conditions are fulfilled, weaving speeds are constrained by the 
natural qualities of cotton which singes and bums when subject to high friction. 
Moreover, if intricate weaving patterns require the use of dobby or jacquard, air-jet 
weaving constitutes no special advantage as weaving speed must be reduced to 
conventional shuttle loom levels. 
Market access and prestige. The eventual dominance of air-jet weaving may well 
be due to non-cost factors. For one, shuttleless technologies may be required to gain 
access to export markets. Foreign buyers may not want to procure cloth from an 
Indonesian mill using conventional looms for fear of quality problems. Ruwiel reports, 
for example, that shuttleless production is a qualifying criterium for the European plain 
weave market (1993:52). For another, 'snob' and 'bandwagon' effects play an important 
role in choice of technique decisionmaking in Indonesian business. A decision to invest 
in expensive European weaving machines may convey a favourable image on a 
company, putting it among the trendsetters in the industry and giving it an aura of a 
being a quality-conscious producer. As more and more exporters and would-be 
exporters shift to the air-jet, a state-of-the-art machinery park may well become an 
entry condition for overseas markets, forcing laggards to replace their conventional 
looms. 
Age Profile of the Indonesian Textile Machinery Park 
Having sketched the basic parameters of choice of technique, I rum to an 
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examination of the Indonesian textile machinery park. The composition of the 
machinery park is a reflection of cumulative past buying decisions of factory 
managers. The age composition of capital stock is an important determinant of the 
market for 'satellite' service sector activities: machinery maintenance and repair, and the 
production and supply of spare machinery parts. Low machinery replacement rates 
mean that machines are kept running up to and beyond the point of obsolescence. 
Consequently, they need more frequent servicing and more spare parts. 
Table 5-1 presents an age profile of the Indonesian textile machinery park in 1987, 
that is, at the onset of the export boom. An important fact established by the Table is 
that over half the installed machinery was at least 12 years old, and that a substantial 
share in this category was over 17 years old. In particular, half of the spinning 
machinery and over two-third of the weaving machinery in use was over twelve years 
old. Given the conventional write-off period for plant machinery of ten to fifteen years, 
we may conclude that, by international standards, the bulk of Indonesia's installed 
textile machinery was obsolete and due for replacement. This age profile suggests, then, 
that a significant potential demand for machinery spare parts and repair and 
reconditioning existed. 
Table 5-1 Age composition of Indonesian textile machinery park,, 1986/1987 
Spinning 
False twisting 
Embroidery 
Weaving 
Knitting 
before 
1970 
215 
-
-
512 
15 0 
1970-
1975 
28 1 
55 6 
30 1 
213 
17 2 
1976-
1980 
18 1 
16 6 
39 0 
17 2 
33 3 
after 
1980 
22.3 
27 8 
309 
10 3 
24 5 
total 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
1000% 
Source adapted from ICN (1988), ρ 11,12 
Fragmentation of the Indonesian Textile Machinery Park 
The extent of machinery park homogeneity is another important determinant of 
demand for textile equipment-related services. The more homogeneous a developing 
country's textile machinery park, the easier a textile equipment importer will find it to 
carry a complete stock of imported spare parts. With increasing heterogeneity, 
contrariwise, an importer will find it difficult to keep a full range of required parts in 
stock. Under such circumstances textile factory maintenance managers will often find 
that the parts they require must be ordered abroad. Under such circumstances, as was 
noted in the introductory chapter, local spare parts makers have a distinct advantage 
because they can respond and deliver parts faster than their overseas competitors. 
Import statistics indicate that the Indonesian textile machinery park is very 
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heterogeneous. In the period 1980 to 1991, Indonesian textile industrialists sourced their 
machinery from 35 different countries. In many cases a single country was represented 
by more than one producer. Imports therefore comprised a large diversity of makes and 
models. If this inflow of new machinery is added to the diverse old machinery stock 
sitting in Indonesia's textile factories, a picture of strong fragmentation emerges. Below, 
I take a closer look at the composition of textile machinery imports from 1980 onward. 
Origin of Indonesian Spinning and Weaving Machinery 
Table 5-2 gives information on the origin of Indonesian spinning and weaving 
machinery. It records country import shares by value for the years 1981, 1988, and 
1991. A number of trends may be discerned. Japanese producers dominated the 
Indonesian textile machinery market, supplying about half of both the spinning 
(Toyoda, Howa) and weaving (Sakamoto, Tsudakoma, Howa) machinery. In spinning, 
German machinery producers (Schlafhorst, Zinser) held second place with a share 
varying between 15 and 18 percent. Apparently, Swiss machinery makers 
Table 5-2 Origin of Indonesian imported spinning, doubling, twisting, and weaving 
machinery, 1981, 1988, and 1991, by country share in value 
Spinning, doubling, twisting machines Shuttle and shuttleless looms 
country 
Japan 
Germany 
Switzerland 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
PR. China 
India 
Italy 
USA 
France 
1981 
47 
18 
14 
1 
2 
-
8 
1 
1 
2 
94% 
1988 
49 
18 
1 
3 
9 
9 
2 
5 
2 
-
98% 
1991 
63 
15 
1 
3 
1 
6 
1 
2 
3 
-
95% 
country 
Japan 
Germany 
Belgium 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
PR. China 
India 
Italy 
1981 
51 
2 
7 
-
18 
11 
4 
1 
94% 
1988 
37 
1 
19 
6 
18 
7 
-
4 
92% 
1991 
57 
1 
6 
5 
9 
5 
-
13 
96% 
Source: Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics, various issues 
(foremostly represented by Rieter) lost their previous substantial share in the spinning 
machinery market. Belgian Picanol maintained a significant share in weaving machinery 
imports. South Korea and Italy, two rising stars, were exporting a growing volume of 
weaving machinery to Indonesia. Contrariwise, India, after a period of export success in 
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the late 1970s, had lost much ground in the late 1980s/ P.R. China had taken over the 
role of India as Indonesia's supplier of 'new vintage technology' spinning machinery. 
The trends visible in Table 5-2 are substantiated if we focus on imports of looms 
for the period 1982 to 1991. Figure 5-1 records aggregate imports of looms between 
1982 and 1991. The Figure gives a good impression of the investment surge in textile 
equipment that was triggered by the export boom of the late 1980s. In 1986/87, the 
total number of looms in the Indonesian weaving industry was just over 100,000 
machines. In the following five years, loomage increased by 60 percent. 
Figure 5-1 Imports of looms, number ofunits imported, ¡982-1991 
1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1888 1880 1081 
Source Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics, various issues 
Capacity growth was even more impressive. Weaving capacity may easily have doubled 
as investors increasingly went for shuttleless technologies. Weaving machinery import 
data for the latter three years show a sudden surge of investment in newer technologies. 
The nominal value of imported shuttle looms increased from $33.52 million in 1989 to 
$71.33 million in 1990, decreasing slightly to $65.5 million in 1991. Corresponding 
figures for shuttleless looms were $65.9 mi. (1989), $146.14 mi. (1990), and a 
phenomenal $233.29 mi. in 1991. 
Figure 5-1 also records the performance of Indonesia's main trading partners. 
Among NIC and ASEAN suppliers, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea were most 
5
 On this issue see Lall (1987), p. 128. 
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important (cf. Table 5-2). The lion's share of looms under the heading 'P.R. China and 
India' was supplied by the former country. These figures illustrate the segmented nature 
of the weaving machinery market. The cumulative share of up-market producers of 
labour-saving looms in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States was 44 percent. 
The cumulative share of bottom-end Asian labour-intensive vintage loom producers 55 
percent. 
Table 5-3 offers a disaggregated look at loom imports, made possible by the 
detailed recording of import flows from 1989 onward6. It records the origin of capital-
saving vintage powerlooms and labour-saving shuttleless looms in number of items 
exported by main Asian trade partners. The data suggest that Taiwan and South Korea 
were moving up-market, making inroads on the Japan-dominated shuttleless loom 
segment. The strong ups and downs in the data for Hong Kong suggest that it may 
have been functioning as a regional entrepot for the Asian secondhand machinery trade. 
China was the main supplier of new vintage technology looms to Indonesia. 
Table 5-3 Choice of technique: number of powerlooms and shuttleless looms exported 
to Indonesia by important Asian trading partners, 1989 - 1991 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
P.R. China 
1989 
44 
150 
378 
42 
376 
powerlooms 
1990 
194 
3,389 
364 
599 
5,920 
1991 
670 
857 
888 
101 
6,491 
shuttleless looms 
1989 
1,513 
0 
0 
1,824 
2 
1990 
3,366 
0 
28 
373 
0 
1991 
3,948 
0 
91 
690 
0 
Source: Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics, various issues 
Table 5-4 (below), finally, provides information on price differences between 
looms exported by various countries in terms of value as well as in number of 
machines. The data show that prices for machines differed widely. The declared value 
of a Belgian shuttleless loom imported in 1991, to mention an extreme example, was 
more than 16 times higher on average than the reported value of a conventional shuttle 
loom imported from P.R. China. 
6
 The import statistics distinguish four classes of imported looms: i) 'machines for 
weaving fabric of a width not exceeding 30 cm'; ii) 'powerlooms'; iii) 'other weaving machines'; 
and iv) 'machines for weaving fabrics of a width 30 cm, shuttleless type'. The Table records 
only the second and fourth category. The first and third categories are omitted because data do 
not specify technique. The total number of narrow looms (up to 30 cm) imported was 1,000 
(1989), 1,074 (1990), and 2,467 (1991). Corresponding figures for the category of 'powerlooms' 
were 1,132, 11,082, and 9,340 units; for the unspecified category of 'other weaving machines' 
2,185, 5,814, and 3,855 units; and for broad shuttleless looms 3,848, 4,762, and 7,131 units. 
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Import/export Statistics: Bias 
A comment on these data is in place. In how far do the import statistics presented 
here capture real changes in the techniques employed in the textile industry? Several 
shortcomings may be noted. For one, the statistics record trade in money value as well 
as by weight and/or number of items. For purposes of comparability, most analyses use 
money values. This means they are biased in favour of more recent technologies, which 
carry a price-tag many times higher than that of labour-intensive vintage machinery 
embodying older techniques.7 For example, a reasonable assumption is that, under the 
Table 5-4 Country shares in value and number of looms (shuttle and shuttleless) 
imported and average value per loom by country of origin, 1991 
Value of Value share Number of Quantity Average loom 
Country imports (%) looms share pnce (US$) 
(mi US$) (%) 
Japan 
Germany 
Belgium 
Italy 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
PR China 
Total import 
170 34 
3 69 
18 26 
40 36 
14 05 
26 03 
14 93 
298 89 
57 
1 
6 
13 
5 
9 
5 
4,744 
161 
501 
1,796 
2,489 
2,658 
6.891 
22.793 
21 
1 
2 
8 
11 
12 
30 
35,910 
22,920 
36,450 
22,470 
5,640 
9.790 
2,170 
13.110 
Source Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics (1991) 
proper circumstances, Japanese shuttleless looms produce between three and four times 
as much cotton cloth per hour as Chinese shuttle looms. In terms of production capacity 
for a given period of time, then, one Japanese shuttleless loom is therefore roughly 
equal to four Chinese powerlooms. The average price of a Japanese loom, on the other 
hand, was 16 times higher than that of a Chinese loom. Table 5-4 shows that Japan, 
holding a value share of 57 percent, was responsible for only 21 percent of the quantity 
of looms imported in 1991. P.R. China, by contrast, held a quantity share of 30 percent, 
but it held a share in value of only 5 percent. Applying the crude four-to-one 
production capacity rule, we find that P.R. China exported the shuttleless loom 
equivalent of 1723 looms to Indonesia, or about one-third of the weaving capacity 
exported by Japan. In terms of value, however, Chinese exports amounted to less than a 
7
 A UNCTAD study of the textile machinery industry found that 'A universal feature of 
(these) innovations has been pnce increases Between 1965 and 1970, textile machinery pnces 
increased annually by 4 7 percent, in the subsequent five years, the rate almost trebled to 13 7 
percent For sophisticated machinery lines the rise has been even steeper' (1981 237) 
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tenth of Japanese exports. Even accounting for productivity differences, value measures 
can thus overstate the importance of Japanese as against Chinese loom imports. 
For another, country statistics do not capture unrecorded international trade in 
textile machinery. Smuggle, mislabelling of cargo, and value and quantity 
underreporting by importing firms are widespread in international trade (Bhagwati 
1974). Indonesian import statistics, for example, fail to capture a substantial illegal 
inflow of machinery. Indonesia is part of a lively Asian grey and black market trade in 
used textile machinery. Many Indonesian textile factories are outfitted with machinery 
imported from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other countries where rising labour costs have 
made their exploitation unremunerative. We do not know how much of this trade slips 
through the meshes of the data-compiling apparatus national statistics agencies maintain 
at ports of entry: the machinery may be imported as machine parts, as scrap metal or 
under a different label, or it may be smuggled into the country in various ways.8 
Finally, apart from these measurement difficulties, the impact of capital-intensive 
machinery imports on developing country industry structure remains a question mark so 
long as we do not know local replacement rates of used machinery. Because used 
textile machinery is likely to be productive for tens of years in developing country 
plants, it may take a long time for imports of state-of-the-art machinery to effect real 
change in industry structure there. 
Implications for Local Spare Parts Making 
This chapter has established that, first, in the late 1980s Indonesian textile 
machinery consumption increased strongly. Second, that hundreds of smaller and larger 
foreign firms from over 30 countries supplied the spinning and weaving equipment 
acquired by Indonesian factories. No single brand or model had established itself as 
market leader in any sector. Third, in the weaving sector modem shuttleless techniques 
were spreading slowly but appeared to complement rather than supplant conventional 
shuttle looms. Fourth, a 1987 survey found that most spinning and weaving equipment 
was, by international standards, obsolete. 
On basis of these trends I draw the conclusion that patterns of machine 
consumption and machinery park composition, both reflections of choice of technique 
decisions made by Indonesian textile factory managers, created favourable conditions 
for the expansion of a domestic textile equipment industry. In the first place, this 
chapter has shown that the Indonesian textile machinery park has expanded rapidly 
while maintaining its highly diverse structure. A high degree of fragmentation in terms 
of machine technology, make, model, and age has important implications for the local 
spare parts market. Inventory costs and turnover speed determined the amount of 
machinery spare parts importers could hold in stock. In the Indonesian case the range 
8
 In a survey of steel imports in Indonesia, Plenkers found that, on average, imported 
lots were under-invoiced by a margin of 30 percent in terms of quantity and price (1977:15). 
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of ready-stock brand- and model-specific machine spare parts was limited by the 
fragmentation of the machinery park. The costs of holding a stock of thousands of parts 
for the multitude of installed brands, models, and years were prohibitive. The various 
textile equipment importers I visited held a modest stock of spares consisting mostly of 
nonmachine-specific parts such as shuttles, flyers, and reeds. 
Machinery park fragmentation thus pushed up overhead costs beyond the point 
where a trader could profitably store a full stock of spare parts. An industrialist in need 
of machine-specific parts had to order these overseas via a local trader, a procedure that 
was both costly and time-consuming. Under these circumstances, local machinery spare 
parts makers found their being close to the consumer an important advantage. They 
could produce and deliver the required textile part within a matter of days as against 
the regular import channels where delivery time was measured in months. Lack of 
standardization, as it were, created opportunities for local parts manufacturing. 
In the second place, Indonesian parts makers profited from the continued use of 
vintage technology machinery in the textile industry. The market for vintage technology 
equipment was much more susceptible to price undercutting competition than the 
market for state-of-the-art machinery. Moreover, in the former basic metalworking 
skills and equipment enabled one to replicate many parts, whereas in the latter market 
these basic skills were insufficient. 
In the third place, the obsolescence of much installed textile equipment created 
opportunities for local parts makers. With increasing age a machine will become more 
susceptible to breakdown, hence opportunities for repair, reconditioning, and spare parts 
making increase. 
The above findings are intimately related to consumers' attitudes to machinery 
maintenance. Breakdown frequency and spare part sourcing strategies (make-buy 
decisions and import or local parts acquisition) are clearly dependent on in-factory 
maintenance regimes. Stated differently, consumer attitudes toward machinery 
maintenance determine the scope for local parts manufacturing activities. The following 
chapter, focusing on machinery maintenance regimes in textile plants, looks into these 
decisionmaking processes. 
6 Machinery Maintenance in Indonesian 
Spinning and Weaving Phnts 
Early 1992 I carried out a survey of machinery maintenance regimes in 24 
spinning, weaving, and finishing mills in the Bandung industrial region. The survey 
evidenced that spinning mills spent one fourth and weaving establishments about a third 
of their spare part budgets on local-made products. These figures somewhat understate 
the value of local-made products because they do not include the value of spare parts 
produced in-house by repairshops in a number of these factories. 
What makes this finding interesting is that textile machinery and parts traders and 
textile factory managers tended to complain strongly about the local textile spare part 
industry: not only was the quality of local-made products alleged to be unreliable and 
inferior to overseas parts, complaints were also directed at the lengthy delivery 
schedules of top-quality local shops. The strong import-bias evident in these statements 
would lead one to expect that local textile equipment shops were restricted to the 
market for custom-made machinery parts. However, a surprising finding of the textile 
factory survey was that local parts makers were also encroaching on import-dominated 
markets for standard machinery parts. 
This chapter attempts to explain why. It opens with a presentation of aggregate 
data on imports of textile machinery parts. Then it presents the findings of the 24 
factory-survey. I discuss evidence on textile factory spare parts consumption collected 
in the factory survey, and analyze textile factory spare part sourcing strategies. Finally, 
I attempt to compare price, quality, and performance of local and overseas parts. 
Defining Textile Machinery Parts 
In the following I will make a basic distinction between four categories of machine 
parts: 
i) mass-produced broad-spectrum parts used in a range of industries. Broad-
spectrum multi-industry parts are mass-produced by specialized manufacturers. 
To this category belong machine parts like nuts, bolts, screws, and washers, but 
also batteries, lamps, certain switches, parts of wiring, fan belts, bearings, and 
so on; 
ii) mass-produced parts the use of which is limited to one narrowly specified 
industry. In textile weaving an obvious example of such an industry-specific part 
would be the shuttle, in spinning the bobbin; 
iii) mass-produced parts that are machine-specific. The scope of this category is 
narrower still, concerning parts produced in smaller batches by or under license 
of a machine manufacturer for a certain machine or model series. These parts 
are not interchangeable between different models; 
iv) custom-made one-off parts. Custom-made parts, finally, are one-off jobs that 
provide solutions to unique production needs. For example, a special gear set 
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may be needed to connect two machine units that were not designed to fit 
together. In the Indonesian spinning industry an obvious example of the latter 
category are the special gears needed for different yam counts. 
The present discussion is limited to the second, third, and fourth spare part categories. 
The first category, that of multi-industry parts, falls outside of the scope of this study. 
Textile Machinery Parts Consumption 
Both spinning and weaving plants consumed spare parts in substantial quantities. 
According to import statistics the nominal dollar value of aggregate imported spinning 
and weaving machinery parts increased from $44.99 million in 1989 and $43.96 million 
in 1990 to $76.31 million in 1991. These figures understate the size of the domestic 
market for textile machinery spare parts. Actual spare part consumption was larger due 
to underreporting, because certain textile machinery parts were imported as general 
machinery parts, and because these figures fail to capture domestic production of spare 
parts on which no statistical data exist. 
Table 6-1 presents 1989 to 1991 machinery part import values in disaggregated 
fashion. A number of spinning and weaving parts have been categorized separately by 
the data compiling agency, presumably because these parts need frequent replacement. 
Table 6-1 Value of imported spinning and weaving machinery parts, 1989-1991, 
in million US$ 
1989 Ï99Ö 1991 
Spinning parís 
parts and ace. of preparing, spinning, doubling, 23 98 13 43 29 54 
twisting, winding, and reeling machinery 
parts and ace. of machines for preparing textile 3.52 5.31 13.84 
spindles, spindle flyers, spinning rings, ring 3.26 3.29 5.81 
Weaving parts 
shuttles 0.98 1.81 1.80 
reeds, healds, heald frames 0.90 1.67 4.07 
other parts and ace. of weaving machinery 12.35 18.45 21.25 
Total 44.99 43.96 76.31 
Source: Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics, various issues 
In these three years, spinning parts constituted 68, 50, and 64 percent, respectively, of 
the value of spinning and weaving parts imports. The large share of spinning parts as 
compared to weaving parts is partly a consequence of the fact that spinning parts tend 
to be more expensive (cf. Table 6-2). It should be noted that the data in Table 6-1 
Texúle Machinery Maintenance 63 
distort actual domestic spare parts consumption patterns to the extent that the spinning 
industry was more dependent on imported machinery parts than the weaving sector. 
Local weaving parts production, as will be seen below, was more developed than that 
of spinning parts. 
Price, Quality, and Reputation 
Table 6-2 provides information on the structure of the Indonesian textile spare parts 
market in 1991. It groups imported spinning and weaving parts on basis of area of 
origin. Spare part consumers used origin as a proxy for quality. Textile machinery parts 
imported from Japan, Western Europe, and the United States were considered to be of 
outstanding quality. Parts made in South Korea or Taiwan were considered to be of 
medium quality. Along with local-made parts, parts imported from P.R. China were 
ranked at the bottom end of the quality spectrum. Price ratio's for products from areas 
of bottom, lower middle, and top repute were roughly 1 : 2 : 8 f or weaving parts and 3 
: 4 : 9 for spinning parts. 
Table 6-2 Imported weaving' and spinning2 machinery parts: value, origin, 
and value by weight, 1991 
Country/ 
Area 
Japan 
Western Europe 
&USA 
Taiwan & South 
Korea 
PR China 
All countries 
Weaving machinery parts, 
value (mi US$) 
10 47 
7 69 
5 55 
188 
27 12 
share (%) 
39 
28 
20 
7 
value in 
US$per 
kilogram 
1644 
16 86 
4 40 
2 38 
Spinning machinery parts 
value (mi US$) 
19 68 
25 74 
061 
155 
51.72 
share value in (%) US$ per 
kilogram 
38 24 18 
50 29 48 
1 1070 
3 7 87 
SITC codes 72467100, 7200, and 7900 
SITC codes 72449200, 9310, 9320, and 9330 includine parts for carding, combing, roving, drawing, 
spinning, twisting, doubling, winding, and reeling machinery 
Source Indonesia Foreign Trade Statistics (1991) 
These ratio's confirm statements of Indonesian textile machinery parts traders that 
original parts tended to be about four times as expensive as cheap imitations. Pirated 
spare parts for popular European or Japanese weaving or spinning machinery that had 
been taken out of production, such as the vintage Picanol President loom or the 
Japanese Suzuki powerloom, had a wide local circulation. Price differences between 
original, Taiwan copy, and Indonesian copy versions were substantial. In conjunction, 
quality control problems and large price differences between substitute parts 
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presented a decision making dilemma to the maintenance managers in Indonesian 
textile plants responsible for parts replacement. 
The Bandung Spinning, Weaving, Dyeing and Finishing industry 
In 1990, the Indonesian textile industry consisted of 141 yam manufacturing 
establishments (spinning, thread and yarn finishing) with a total workforce of 101,500 
employees; 637 weaving plants with a workforce of 184,600; 405 printing, bleaching 
and dyeing plants with a workforce of 37,400; and 263 knitting plants with a workforce 
of 44,900 (World Bank 1992:5). About one-third of the spinning mills, half of the 
weaving plants, as well as a two-thirds of the printing, bleaching and dyeing 
establishments were concentrated in the Bandung region in central West Java. Textile 
mills in the Bandung region may be grouped in three categories, on basis of 
specialization, size, ownership structure, market orientation, and technology. The 
smaller textile mills (employment under 300) were invariably engaged in weaving or 
dyeing and finishing or a combination of these. They tended to be owner-managed 
family firms and usually produced low-quality cloth for the domestic market using old 
and often worn-down machinery. Managers in this segment tended to live by the 
principle of 'economize or perish' and this reflected on machinery maintenance regimes. 
More often than not, parts replacement was postponed to the extreme and cheap low-
quality or second-hand spares were used. 
Medium-size firms (300-1,000 employees) tended to specialize in spinning or in 
weaving plus dyeing and finishing. Many firms in these category were owned by 
Bandung-based industrialists of Chinese origin. In part these were owner-managed, but 
a number of plants were also run by salaried management. Firms in this category 
normally produced medium- to high-quality yarn or cloth for the domestic or export 
market. Management tended to be conservative, shunning heavy investments in new 
technology. 
Large mills (employment 1,000+), finally, were usually integrated, covering the full 
range of spinning, weaving, and dyeing and finishing. Large integrated mills might be 
part of a 'conglomerate'. The term conglomerate refers to a hundred-odd large 
Indonesian companies, each engaged in a diverse mix of manufacturing, building, trade 
and services activities, typically run by a clever and well-connected entrepreneur of 
Chinese extraction from a Jakarta headquarters. Large mills might also be established in 
foreign-domestic joint venture form. In such mills there would often be direct foreign 
involvement in management. In the course of the factory survey, for example, I 
interviewed three Indian managers and one Taiwanese maintenance manager. 
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Capital-Stretching and Maintenance Expenditures 
Visits to Indonesian manufacturing establishments give the term capital-stretching a 
new dimension. The textile industry is no exception. It is not unusual for textile 
producers to maintain a curious mixture of old-fashioned, modem, and state-of-the-art 
machinery. For example, one spinning mill operated 40,000 ring spindles 14 to 17 years 
old plus 17 brand-new rotor spinning machines. A weaving plant was outfitted with 190 
20-year old shuttle looms, 99 rapier looms of various stripe between two and five years 
old, as well as 112 state-of-the-art air-jet machines. 
This technical liberalism is a consequence of business decision making strongly 
oriented to business cycle fluctuation, a theme to which I will return in chapter 10. 
Apparently, during the market upswing of the late 1980s textile factory owners or 
managers made sudden decisions to replace a specific category of worn-out machinery 
or increase capacity by adding new shuttleless weaving machines to an existent stock of 
vintage shuttle looms. Setting up entirely new plants equipped with new or second-hand 
imported machinery was another commonly used method of capacity expansion. 
In no case, however, did a factory owner or management decide to replace all of 
its obsolete machinery with new capital stock. If a textile producer producing low-
quality products on obsolete machinery succeeded in penetrating the export market, for 
example, he would rather set up a new plant than reequip the existent facility. In other 
words, investment in new equipment was a matter of addition rather than replacement. 
Machinery Age and Maintenance Costs 
Other than expected, the textile survey data showed no positive correlation between 
machinery age and spare part expenditures. The concept of machine life measured in 
years is a function of (a) quality of machine design and material, (b) intensity of use, 
and (c) the maintenance regime it is subjected to. Other things being equal, one would 
expect maintenance costs to increase with machine age. My plotting of machinery age 
against spare part expenditure per loom for 15 weaving plants gave weak indications of 
expenditure decreasing with rising machine age. 
This, however, was caused by 'noise' generated by several intervening factors. For 
one, the sampled firms operated looms of different quality. For another, they operated 
in different quality niches of the textile market: the 'product niche' factor should be kept 
constant in a maintenance cost survey because different product quality requirements 
influence spare part consumption. Finally, the plants pursued divergent maintenance 
regimes. Plant maintenance regime is an important variable in a test of the maintenance 
cost and age relationship: heavier reliance on expensive imported parts or, alternatively, 
on cheaper local-made parts would make a large difference in maintenance expenditures 
as would the frequency and thoroughness of in-plant maintenance procedures. 
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Textile Machinery Parts Consumption in 24 Textile Mills 
Between May and July 1992 I conducted interviews with general managers, or, in 
larger mills, maintenance managers in 24 textile mills engaged in spinning, weaving, 
dyeing and finishing. The sample included six small, eight medium-size, and ten large 
textile manufacturing establishments. It soon became clear that the dyeing and finishing 
plants spent negligible sums on machinery maintenance: one large plant only spent an 
average $3,000 per month on dyeing and finishing parts as against $22,000 on weaving 
spare parts. For this reason I decided to concentrate on spinning and weaving 
machinery. 
Table 6-3 Yearly spare part consumption in seven spinning mills, Bandung, 1992 
Plant 
A 
В 
С 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Spindlage 
20,000 
20,000 
25,000 
15,000 
40,000 
40,000 
40,000 
Machinery age 
(years) 
0.5 
2-5, 14-19 
3,7 
10 
12-14 
0-2, 18 
14-17 
Total spare part consumption (US$/year) 
imponed local-made 
parts parts 
50,000 7,800 
58,000 42,000 
47,500 15,000 
48,000 72,000 
120,000 30.000 
294,000 126,000 
540,000 60,000 
Consumption 
per spinale 
US$/spindlc/ 
year 
2.89 
5.00 
2.50 
8.00 
3.75 
10.50 
15.00 
In-house 
workshop 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
DO 
yes 
Source: primary data 
Reliable data on spare part consumption were obtained from seven spinning mills. 
These are presented in Table 6-3, which shows marked differences in spare part 
expenditures at plant level. С factory reported that it spent only $2.50 per spindle per 
year on machinery parts. G factory reportedly disbursed six times this amount. On 
average the seven spinning factories spent $7.55 per spindle per year. Of their outlay, 
23 percent or $1.76 per spindle went to local-made parts and 77 percent or $5.79 per 
spindle was spent on imported parts. 
The figures in Table 6-3 exclude parts produced in-house by five out of seven 
spinning mills. Five mills had repairshops, manned by from three and up to 15 
operators and capable of handling emergency repairs or producing parts in small 
batches. I was unable to make even the roughest guesstimate of the output of these in-
house repair shops. 
Table 6-4 presents data on spare part consumption in 15 weaving establishments. 
The figures show that local parts producers had wrested a sizeable share of the weaving 
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parts market from their foreign competitors. The weaving establishments reportedly 
spent 700 dollar's worth of spare parts per loom per year. In financial terms, the market 
share of local parts makers was 36 percent ($255) as against 64 percent ($445) for 
overseas producers. As in the spinning mills, the different weaving establishments 
showed a strong variation in maintenance outlay per loom. Likewise, most of the plants 
had small in-house repair facilities. 
In Table 6-4 I have grouped weaving plants in three categories. The first category 
subsumes small plants (average loomage 64) using old-fashioned and often very old 
(18-40 years) powerlooms of Japanese make (Suzuki, Sakamoto, Iwama, Hirano) or 
local-made looms produced by Bandung machinery shops (Pang A Wan, Ta Tung) 
during the import restriction period of the early 1960s. Two of these had recently 
invested in new Chinese-made powerlooms, replicas of vintage Japanese models. 
The old machinery in most of the plants in this category could barely be kept 
running. Plant manager-owners attempted to limit maintenance expenditures to the 
extreme: where possible they relied on second-hand spare parts (shuttles, picking sticks) 
obtained via traders from more modem local plants, they stretched the life-time of parts 
to their utmost, and cannibalized looms that were beyond repair. Given the decrepit 
state of most looms it was not worthwhile to order original overseas parts and in some 
cases it was questionable whether this was still possible at all. 
Table 6-4 Spare part expenditure, 15 weaving establishments, Bandung, 1992 
Plant category 
Powerioom 
Auto shuttle 
Shuttle and 
shuttleless 
Total 
N 
6 
5 
4 
15 
Aggregate 
loomage 
386 
1,122 
1,475 
2,983 
Total 
imponed 
pans 
3,000 
459,000 
866,500 
1,328,500 
spare nart consumption (U3$/year) 
local-made total 
parts 
15,000 18,000 
423,000 882,000 
321,500 1,188,000 
759,500 2,088,000 
Consumption 
per loom 
(US$/loom/ 
year) 
46.63 
786.10 
805.42 
699.97 
Source: primary data 
At any rate, all factories in this bottom category used local parts whenever 
possible. Only one plant in the sample purchased $500 worth of new imported shuttles 
per month. Two other plants relied on low-quality local-made shuttles and two other 
establishments purchased second-hand shuttles. This extreme form of break-down 
management is clearly reflected in maintenance expenditures, which were very small 
compared to the other plants. 
Five factories relying on automatic shuttle looms have been grouped under the 
second heading. Plant size in this category was larger (average loomage 224) and 
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average machinery age 15 years. No factory in this category maintained looms over 20 
years old. Capital stock consisted of Picanol, Sulzer, Sakamoto, Toyoda, and other 
high-quality shuttle looms that have gone out of production. The ratio of imported to 
local-made spare parts in this category was fairly balanced: the factories consumed 
$409 worth of imported parts against $377 local parts per loom per year. 
The third category comprises weaving plants that were again somewhat bigger 
(average loomage 369) and used more modem technology. However, even in this 
category shuttle looms still dominated in terms of numbers: total capital stock consisted 
of 1,204 shuttle looms (vintage Picanol, Sakamoto, and Saurer machines) as against 239 
rapier looms (Tsudakoma, Picanol, Ishikawa) and 224 air-jet looms (Picanol and 
Tsudakoma). I have omitted part of the latter from Table 6-4 as the machinery was still 
brand-new and a complete stock of original spares was available. Although total spare 
part consumption is comparable to that of the all-automatic loom plants, this category 
showed a clear preference for imported parts: nearly three times the amount spent on 
local parts ($218 per loom per year) was spent on imported spare parts ($587 per 
loom). 
Shuttle Looms: Intensity of Spare Part Consumption 
Two important reasons why textile machinery makers continue to search for 
technical alternatives to the shuttle loom are 'the inherent problems of pirn-winding for 
shuttle looms and the dynamic problems created by the picking and checking 
mechanisms in these looms' (Marks & Robinson 1976:8). Shuttle looms are known to 
be reliable, but they are also noisy and slow and suffer from fatigue damage caused by 
the shuttle which is impelled across the loom at high speeds: 
In a shuttle loom it is necessary to pass a shuttle, which may weigh 0.5 kg, to insert a length 
of filling which may weigh only a few milligrams. The relatively massive shuttle has to be 
accelerated rapidly, and it must also be decelerated abruptly: it is difficult to do this without 
noise. The system is intrinsically inefficient from a mechanical point of view, and 
considerable amounts of energy are dissipated at the binders (swells), picker and checking 
mechanism generally. The wear life of the picker is strictly limited because of the heavy and 
repeated impacts that it suffers. In fact, the whole mechanism is subject to great wear and 
tear with the consequence that it has to be made rugged and heavy. (Lord & Mohamed 
1973:289) 
These unfavourable mechanical characteristics make the shuttle loom a relatively 
maintenance-intensive piece of machinery. Shuttle looms have many fast-moving parts 
exposed to high stress. Various parts, such as shuttle, picker, picking stick, buffer, and 
reeds, have a limited lifetime. A single unadjusted or worn part can have deleterious 
effects on the quality of weaving: the frequency of warp breakage may increase 
strongly, leading to longer down-time, or the quality of cloth produced may suffer. 
Prolonged operation with maladjusted or worn parts, not uncommon in Indonesian 
weaving plants, may negatively affect other parts of the machinery. In combination 
with the fact that shuttle looms tend to be used for tens of years in Indonesian weaving 
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establishments, the twin features of maintenance intensity and sinking product quality 
over time explain why shuttle loom parts constituted the main market for local spare 
parts makers. 
Maintenance Regimes: Breakdown Maintenance and Planned Maintenance. 
Spare part sourcing strategies are critically determined by in-plant machinery 
maintenance regimes. The principal theoretical distinction is between breakdown and 
planned maintenance systems. A British Textile Institute study has defined breakdown 
maintenance as follows: 
In this system, attention is given to the plant only when it breaks down. It finds favour 
because the direct cost of maintenance is low. The maintenance-department overheads are 
kept at a minimum because the system requires very little paperwork or planning. (Textile 
Institute 1969:388) 
Planned maintenance, on the other hand, services plant and machinery on a planned 
basis 'sufficient to keep it in a condition to meet normal operating requirements' (ibid, 
p. 389). It will be obvious that the difference between the two systems is a matter of 
degree, of looking forward in the longer or shorter run, rather than one of kind, yet the 
distinction is a useful one for the present purposes. 
Planned maintenance in one form or another --concepts such as preventive 
maintenance and scheduled maintenance give more specific indications of the time 
horizon of planning- promises lower machine down-time, better machine performance, 
fewer major repairs, better management of spare parts inventories, and earlier spotting 
of structural weak spots as compared to breakdown maintenance. 
However, not many textile plants anywhere, according to the above study, carry 
planned maintenance to the extreme because of the associated costs: i) introduction of 
planned maintenance requires a substantial initial investment: hundreds or thousands of 
machinery parts must be codified, long maintenance specifications lists need to be 
drawn up, and new maintenance routines must be introduced; ii) additional clerical staff 
must be hired and trained to take care of additional paperwork; iii) only systematic 
introduction of planned maintenance succeeds, half-hearted attempts are doomed to fail; 
iv) positive effects will only become visible in the long run; v) the program can easily 
deteriorate under lax management. 
Why Did Textile Factories Rely on Local-Made Machine Parts? 
The textile factory survey brought to light that the six small weaving 
establishments and one spinning mill relied completely on breakdown maintenance. The 
small weaving plants postponed expenditures for spare parts to the extreme, relying on 
last-minute replacement and poor-quality local-made or second-hand spare parts. The 
spinning mill in question had only just started production at the time of my visit. It was 
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equipped with a hodge-podge of 20 year old machinery recently imported from Taiwan. 
The mill seemed to experience financial difficulties. Reported monthly expenditures on 
spare parts were far below those of other spinning mills. In all these cases breakdown 
maintenance was a function of limited financial means. As regards the small weaving 
establishments, market positioning also played an important role. The weaving plants 
competed in the low-quality segment of the market where price-undercutting is all-
important. Minimizing the short-term cost of capital was obligatory for survival in this 
environment. 
Seventeen textile factories producing higher-quality cloth and yam relied on a 
mixture of breakdown and planned maintenance. Plant maintenance managers attempted 
to minimize capital maintenance cost and at the same time safeguard product quality. 
Insofar as parts were quality-sensitive, that is, influenced the quality of yam or cloth, 
they tended to rely on imported parts. Anecdotal evidence and various observations 
suggest that managers had good grounds for quality-sensitivity discrimination. The 
following case was mentioned by the local representative of a foreign weaving 
machinery maker: 
Recently, for example, at X factory. In section II everything was like it should be, 95 
percent A-grade, export quality, but in section III only 60 to 70 percent. They weave rayon 
there and there were white flakes in the fabric. B-grade, in other words, and that was costing 
them lots of money. So we dismantle our looms and suddenly hit upon a local-made part: a 
rapier inlet funnel made by S jobshop. That is an important part because it regulates the air 
inflow. And it didn't work. Of course everybody pretended not to know where the part came 
from. 
Maintenance managers sourced 'nonvital' machine parts from local jobshops. Apart 
from higher price, long delivery time was considered an important drawback of 
imported parts. Statements of three maintenance managers bear out these points: 
We mostly order cog-wheels and pulleys from local shops. Other parts are cast, in which 
case local parts are more expensive than imported ones. Preventive maintenance only so far 
as imported parts are concerned. Import means you have to wait a long time and prices are 
two or three times as high. Importing takes three months between ordering and delivery, 
local only two weeks. For preventive maintenance we plan one year ahead. 
When the parts are sensitive we go for import, usually high-precision parts. Regular parts we 
order from local shops. The problem with imported parts is, first, long delivery time, and 
second, the price is high. Local parts have weak spots. The material may be the same but 
toughness will vary. 
Generally speaking we import all parts that are related to product quality as 80 percent of 
our yam is exported. Pulleys, shafts, and gears we order from local shops. Local parts are 
about 50 percent cheaper than imported parts; delivery is faster and you don't have to hold a 
stock. When we import the parts arrive here only after about six months. 
Textile Factories: Spare Part Sourcing Strategies 
Summarizing the discussion so far, there are three reasons why Indonesian textile 
factories found it impossible to rely one hundred percent on imported spare parts: 
i) local traders, as was noted in the previous chapter, could not carry a full 
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inventory of spare parts due to the fragmentation of Indonesian textile factory capital 
stock. The absence of concentrated demand, in other words, inhibited the formation of a 
local market for ready-stock imported spare parts; 
ii) textile factory management did not know or care to develop direct lines of 
communication with overseas parts suppliers: they ordered parts via local importers or 
relied on Ъгокеге' who made regular trips to Singapore, Germany, and Japan; neither 
connection could provide the rapid delivery that breakdown maintenance required; 
iii) in-factory control over spare part inventories was typically poor. Therefore 
factory management was unable to anticipate properly on the lengthy delivery period. 
Figure 6-1 Textile factories: spare part sourcing strategies 
Maintenance regime 
Spare part 
procurement 
strategy 
In-house 
production 
Out-house 
acquisition 
Local-made 
parts 
Foreign-made 
parts 
Planned 
maintenance 
Quality-
Sensitive 
Parts 
Breakdown 
maintenance 
Non-
Quality-
Scnsitivc 
Parts 
Figure 6-1 plots the basic spare part sourcing options facing textile factory 
managers in matrix form. The prevalent maintenance regime found in medium and 
large firms was a mixture of breakdown maintenance for nonquality-sensitive spare 
parts, which were replaced by parts made locally in-house and out-house and by 
whatever foreign parts importers happened to have in stock, and planned maintenance 
for quality-sensitive parts. Stated in its most simple form, the maintenance regime 
outlined here was a consequence of limited local technical and managerial capabilities. 
On the one hand, poorly organized spare part inventory systems in textile factories 
compelled maintenance personnel to rely on local-made parts. On the other hand, 
limited technological skills kept local jobshops from taking full advantage of this 
situation and pushing foreign competitors out of the market. 
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Relations with Overseas Machine Part Makers 
A remarkable Finding of the survey was that no textile factory, including those with 
$500,000-plus annual spare parts budgets, appeared to maintain direct connections to 
overseas producers for machinery maintenance purposes. Whereas numerous 
industrialists by-passed local traders to acquire new machinery direct from the 
machinery producer, no such connections were observed in the field of parts 
procurement. 
In theory, a maintenance department might order spare parts by facsimile and have 
them delivered within two days by special messenger service. In practice this did not 
happen. Factory management either relied on local traders for imported parts or ordered 
inferior substitutes from local spare parts makers. Also, they made use of the services 
of independent Tjrokers' travelling to Singapore, Europe, or Japan on regular basis in 
search of spare parts not available in Indonesia. 
Again, poorly developed managerial systems seemed to be responsible for this 
situation. Maintenance personnel as a rule did not possess machinery maintenance 
manuals. These manuals had disappeared, or, in case of machinery acquired second-
hand, had not been supplied along with the machinery. Ordering a machine part without 
the manual was difficult as the supplier needed the factory code number of the part in 
question. For lack of this key code, maintenance managers in Bandung would send out 
an errand boy with a sample of the spare part itself to a local trader. Or they would 
give a broker making an overseas trip the required sample. As one interviewed broker 
commented: 
Yes, often they are careless. They don't have the manual with machinery part codes, they 
lost it or gave it to an employee who has left or forgot where he put it. And they have no 
time to waste. So when they run out of stock they ask me, when I am going to Singapore or 
Germany anyway, to send a box of this or that. I usually ask them a sample of what they 
want. Sometimes they only give me the container that kept the part (shows carton containing 
US-made special bearing). Or look at these seals, straight from the factory in Germany. 
Sometimes I return with my trouserpockets full of special seals and rubber rings. 
Supply of Original Parts for Vintage Japanese, American and European Machinery 
It is important to note here that leading textile machinery exporters took no action 
to exploit the Indonesian textile spare parts market. Although most producers continue 
to supply parts, European, American, and Japanese textile machinery makers competing 
in frontier technology fields find no interest in the continued supply of spare parts for 
obsolete models. From their point of view investing in a maintenance and repair 
network for machine series that they no longer produce is a self-defeating strategy. This 
only bolsters the competitive position of their Obsolete' machinery vis-a-vis the newer 
models they are offering for sale. Evidently, a machinery producer finds it more 
rewarding to maximize the turnover of new machinery embodying frontier technology 
than to maximize sales of spare parts for yesteryear's models. The more so because a 
sizeable share of this spare parts market is in hands of Asian firms producing pirated 
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versions of original parts. 
For this reason leading textile machinery makers tended to provide sluggish after-
sales service for models that had gone out of production. Likewise, they showed no 
interest in relocating spare part production for obsolete machine models to Southeast 
Asia. Occasionally, for instance when the original producer of a formerly popular 
machinery model had gone bankrupt, production of original spare parts would have 
halted altogether. 
Comparative Performance of Local and Imported Spare Parts: the Indonesian Textile 
Machinery Parts Market as a Customer Market 
A moot question remaining is how local-made parts performed in comparison to 
foreign substitutes. In compiling this kind of information, both in this field as well as in 
a concurrent survey of Indonesian machine tool consumption, I had a strong impression 
of being the only person interested in and knowledgeable on price-performance ratio's. 
Traders nor industrialists made systematic comparisons of price, quality, and durability. 
Traders experimented with new parts, but their buying decisions would be based on 
demand only. Textile factory managers, on the other hand, appeared to minimize the 
amount of time they had to spend on spare part acquisition. 
Textile factory maintenance departments would rely on between one and four 
suppliers of local-made parts. If a factory procured only skill-extensive parts, it would 
maintain a customer relationship with one or two local jobshops operating in the price-
undercutting segments of the local textile parts market. If the factory sourced both 
simple and more skill-intensive local parts it would maintain relationships with one or 
two establishments in the cost-cutting and niche monopoly segments.' The customer 
relationship had an important uncertainty-reducing function, because over the years 
textile maintenance personnel would learn what to expect from their suppliers. Also, the 
relationship provided a communication channel along which consumer experience could 
travel to parts producers. 
The customer character of the spare parts market is illustrated by the data presented 
in Table 6-5. The Table tabulates the findings of a small survey of spare part retail 
prices I conducted in Bandung in 1992. Only machine-specific parts were sampled. 
Price data as well as estimates of the average life of parts were obtained from various 
traders. Machine models selected were no longer produced but still widely used in 
Indonesian factories. The sample of parts was randomly chosen. Insofar as possible, 
data were cross-checked with various sources. 
As one would expect given the customer character of this market, no consistent 
pattern of comparative advantage emerges from the data. Original parts were more 
expensive than Southeast Asian or local pirate versions. But original parts did not 
perform consistently better or worse than pirate parts in US$/month terms. It should be 
1
 Refer to chapter 9 for a discussion of market segmentation. 
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added, however, that the data presented in the Table omit a crucial determinant: the 
degree of quality standardization of substitute parts. The quality standard of original 
parts was constant. The quality standard of pirate parts was unpredictable: the quality of 
a pirate version might be better or comparable to original part quality, but it might also 
be lower. Finally, the data suggest that the market for pirated parts was segmented. In 
all but one case there was no overlapping supply of local-made copies and copies made 
in Taiwan or South Korea. 
Table 6-5 Retail price and estimated life of original. Southeast Asian imitation, and 
local-made imitation spinning and weaving machine-specific parts 
Sparepait 
Toyoda RY (nngspuuung) 
separator 
Onginal 
pnce (US$) 
100 
version 
life (months) 
12+ 
Southeast Asia copy 
pnce life (US$) (months) 
Local 
pnce (US$) 
045 
copy 
life (months) 
12+ 
Toyoda FL 6,16 (roughing frame, speed frame) 
lappet 
bobbin hanger 
snail wire 
Toyoda GH 8 (shuttle loom) 
cutters (av ) 
picking cam 
picking stick 1 
picking bowl 
125 
2 25 
070 
2100 
12000 
1000 
3000 
Picanol President (shuttle loom) 
satellite gear 
blade 
gnpper opener 
5000 
22 50 
1000 
24+ 
36+ 
6 
12 
24+ 
3 
24+ 
6 
9 
3 
0 88 
140 
0 35 
8 50 
-
500 
-
-
-
-
24+ 
36+ 
4 
8 
-
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
200 
45 00 
-
12 50 
15 00 
4 50 
400 
-
-
-
3 
6 
-
6 
6 
3 
3 
Source primary data 
Customer Search for Relative Performance of Substitute Parts 
There are three ways in which consumers might gain information on the relative 
merits of substitute textile machinery parts. Through seller signalling devices, via 
independent engineering tests, and by monitoring relative performance and lifetime of 
substitutes m plant. There was no evidence of any such form of quality assessment in 
the Bandung textile industry: 
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i) promotional warranties are an important quality-signalling device.2 Local traders did 
not give warranties with textile spare parts. As one textile equipment importer stated: 
We never sell original spare parts with a guarantee but then our customers never ask for it. 
We only give a one month guarantee if we sell textile machinery and assistance in setting it 
up and training users. 
Traders had good reasons for not providing this service to their customers. Ordinarily, 
they did not know the condition of the machine in which the part would be fitted, and 
that condition in tum determined the useful life of the part. If the machine was in bad 
condition there was an increased chance that the part would not function properly. The 
remarks of one textile factory maintenance manager go to the heart of this problem: 
It may be difficult to give a guarantee. When machine adjustment is not proper, even though 
the part may be good, it will be damaged. Maybe machine specifications no longer meet 
factory standards, maybe our mechanics are not so careful. For example, we buy new six 
Ampere electric motors for our powerlooms. Then install one, try it, and it bums out. We 
have a guarantee so we take it back to the dealer who fixes it. We reinstall it and it bums 
out again. Maybe the fault is not with the electric motor but with our loom which does not 
run smoothly and takes seven or more Amperes to run and that is what causes the motor to 
bum out. 
The one sales unit that did provide a warranty with its parts was a branch office of a 
European machinery manufacturer. However, requests for spare parts by fust-time 
customers were always followed by an inspection tour of the factory in question. Spare 
part orders were only accepted after branch office mechanics had established that the 
machinery was in good condition. In fact, the sales manager of this office reported that 
buyers often reacted quite surprised when they found out about the warranty 
arrangement: 
We give a one year guarantee with our machines, electronic parts included. On spare parts 
six months. But factory people often do not know this nor do they expect it. Not long ago a 
customer came here with a defect part and wanted to pay for the replacement. I told him that 
was not necessary and he did not understand why. Customers hardly ever ask whether we 
give a guarantee. 
ii) textile factory management might determine the price-performance ratio's of 
substitute parts, say of Taiwan-made, Japan-made, and local-made loom shuttles, by 
having a laboratory run a series of standard engineering tests on it. However, in face of 
the great number of parts on the one and the significant cost of testing on the other 
hand, this option would only be viable as a collective undertaking by the textile 
industry. I found no evidence of this kind of collective action. It was unlikely to occur. 
A formal umbrella organization functioning as a forum for textile manufacturers did not 
exist. The chances of successful mediation by some government agency were small as 
relations between private business and government were strained by mutual suspicion 
2
 As Udell and Anderson put it: 'A warranty is an obligation assumed by a seller. It is 
an express or implied statement of responsibility which promises certain services or satisfactions 
to the buyer. ... The purpose of a promotional warranty is to encourage purchases by reducing 
risks for the consumer' (1968:1). 
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and antagonism. 
iii) factory management might also come by this kind of information on its own accord 
by monitoring performance of installed substitute parts in the factory. Again, a 
substantial investment of time and money would be required. Tracking down substitute 
parts on the market would require a serious search effort, and tracking the lifetime and 
performance of hundreds of pairs or trio's of substitute parts passing through the factory 
would demand a substantial administrative investment. None of the investigated 
factories reported any effort in this direction. This is hardly surprising given the poor 
overall quality of maintenance systems. 
Conclusions 
Of 24 textile factories surveyed in the Bandung region in 1992, seven financially 
constrained firms were found to rely completely on breakdown maintenance. Seventeen 
plants relied on planned maintenance for quality-sensitive textile machinery parts and 
on breakdown maintenance for nonquality-sensitive parts. This heavy reliance on 
breakdown maintenance, in combination with poorly developed supply channels of 
foreign-made parts, explains why local jobshops had succeeded in capturing a 30 
percent share of the weaving and spinning machinery parts market. 
Careless machinery maintenance in the textile industry, in other words, was a main 
cause of local comparative advantage in the spare parts market. This does not 
necessarily mean that poor management in the textile industry was the raison d-etre of 
the Bandung textile parts industry. Prevalent maintenance regimes may well have 
constituted an efficient management strategy in the Indonesian context. First, because 
setting up and maintaining a preventive maintenance system required a substantial 
investment of resources. Furthermore, such a system would require a highly disciplined 
and motivated workforce.3 The average Indonesian textile factory did not possess such a 
well-trained workforce: managerial skills were scarce and spread thinly over various 
departments, the crucial middle level of overseers and controllers was largely missing, 
office and floor personnel was badly trained and underpaid, and labour turnover was 
high. On top of all this, the Indonesian business climate was highly volatile. Business 
decisionmakers operated under highly uncertain conditions. These circumstances may 
not have warranted substantial investments in preventive maintenance as the latter 
would only pay off in the long run. 
1
 According to Paul Strassmann 'good preventive maintenance is hard to supervise and 
reward' (1968:202). 
7 Origins of the Indonesian 
Textile Equipment Industry 
The previous chapters have examined the set of circumstances that created a 
demand for local-made textile parts. Now the focus shifts to the local producers of 
textile parts and assemblies. This chapter opens with a brief account of the development 
of Bandung as an industrial region. Then it describes the rise, collapse, and spectacular 
recovery of the Bandung textile equipment industry between 1960 and 1990. The main 
part of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the evolutionary trajectories along which 
firms were propelled into the textile equipment industry. 
In all, 49 textile equipment manufacturing firms were surveyed. Historical 
background data were obtained on 42 establishments. A small number of this subset of 
firms were survivors of the turbulent 1960s. A large majority, however, -33 firms or 
79 percent- consisted of shops established from 1975 onward by entrepreneurs with no 
previous manufacturing experience. Therefore one may say that, after 1974, the textile 
equipment industry emerged as a new branch of manufacturing. 
The evolution of this industry was brought about by cumulative entrepreneurial 
decisions to transfer resources (knowledge and capital) accumulated in other trades to 
the textile equipment industry. These cross-sectoral transfers provoke a number of 
questions. Who made them and why? Did the Bandung powerloom-producing shops 
that had led the 1960s textile equipment boom, their small numbers notwithstanding, 
play a catalyzing role in the resurgence of the textile equipment industry of the 1980s? 
Or did the reemergence of the textile equipment industry signify a spillover of 
engineering capabilities built up in other fields? Were Bandung's textile industrialists in 
any way involved in the resurgence of the textile equipment industry? And were 
entrepreneurs recruited from the booming tertiary sector or did they come from an 
engineering background? 
These questions will be tackled with help of a classificatory scheme derived from 
country case studies describing the evolution of textile equipment making. Four distinct 
evolutionary trajectories emerge from these studies. I will examine the relative 
importance of each of these trajectories in the Indonesian experience and suggest 
tentative explanations for the emerging pattern of industry formation. 
Development of the Bandung Industrial Region 
The development of Bandung as an industrial region goes back to the early 1900s. 
At this time sinking prices depressed the sugarcane-based economy of East Java, 
causing economic activities to gravitate to the western part of Java and Sumatra, where 
land was given to a number of new and promising export commodities, primarily 
rubber and tea. On the north coast of West Java, manufacturing, trade, and services 
concentrated around the capital Batavia (now Jakarta). In the central uplands of West 
Java, Bandung city evolved as the hub of an upland plantation economy. 
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This soon attracted related engineering activities: in the 1910s and 1920s, several 
private engineering shops were established by Dutch and Chinese entrepreneurs. These 
specialized in the servicing and construction of agro-processing machinery in use on the 
estates that surrounded the growing town. An additional boost was given to industrial 
growth when in 1921 the colonial government decided to relocate its army ordnance 
shop from Surabaya to Bandung. These establishments formed the core of the post-
independence Bandung engineering industry, which flourished in the 1950s. In addition 
to agro-processing machinery, private metalworking firms now began to produce parts 
for railway rolling stock, consumer durables (kitchenware, radio's), and supplying their 
services to a developing light industry sector. 
Mechanization in the Textile Industry and Emergence of Textile Equipment Making 
in the Bandung Region Before 1965 
In the latter category, textile weaving and finishing came to preponderate. In the 
1920s the Bandung region had developed into an important centre of textile weaving 
after the Dutch developed and introduced an improved handloom to stimulate 'native 
industry'. The introduction of powerlooms ensued on a modest scale in this emerging 
textile manufacturing centre in the 1930s (Hiroshi 1970). After 1955, the pace of 
mechanization in the Indonesian weaving industry quickened with Bandung taking the 
lead.1 
Under the New Order the Bandung region consolidated its position as the nation's 
foremost center of textile production, especially in the field of weaving, dyeing and 
finishing, with about half of the country's weaving plants and two-third of all dyeing 
and finishing units located here. Significant backward linkages from this expanding 
textile industry to the engineering industry first developed in the Bandung region 
around 1960. When capital goods imports dried up during the economic crisis that 
signalled the end of the Soekamo period, a short-lived boom in textile equipment 
production ensued. The boom was initiated by a private machine shop annex foundry, 
which, upon request of the regional government, took up production of powerlooms in 
1961 (Development Projects Consulting Service 1963:555). 
Several other local shops soon followed suit. All Bandung-made looms were crude 
copies of the then widely used Japanese Suzuki 64 powerloom. Smaller shops produced 
Suzuki copies with wooden frames in small numbers. Between five and ten larger shops 
turned out batches of powerlooms with cast-iron frames. The local-made looms were of 
low quality. On an hourly basis, Bandung-made powerlooms produced roughly half the 
amount of cloth produced by original Suzuki looms. Their lower output was due to the 
1
 The number of installed powerlooms in Indonesia rose from 44 in 1930 to 8,000 in 
1940, to 11,390 in 1950, and stood at 16,896 in 1960. In 1965 their number had increased to 
27,000 03uku Petunjuk Tekstil 1987:18). In 1960, according to Palmer and Castles, 65 percent 
of all Indonesian powerlooms were located in the Bandung region (1971:320). 
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fact that Bandung-made looms missed the feature of automatic break stoppage. Output 
also suffered under excessive vibrations, which were probably due to poor balancing 
(Hiroshi 1970:72). The shortlived textile machinery making boom ended around 1965. 
By this time the Rupiah was losing value so fast that, upon delivery of machinery, a 
machinery makers would find that the cost-plus price agreed upon with the customer at 
the time of contracting was no longer sufficient to cover even material cost. As a 
consequence, the Bandung textile equipment makers had to stop accepting orders. 
Collapse of the Bandung Textile Equipment Industry, 1965-1970 
Around 1965 many machinery shops in Bandung closed their gates, some 
permanently and others temporarily. Those that reopened in 1967 and 1968 found 
themselves up against a flood of foreign imports. Anecdotal evidence illustrates the 
dramatic reversal of the textile equipment industry between 1963 and 1972. 
In 1963, five Bandung-based powerloom producers employed over 800 workers (Surveys 
and Research Corporation 1963). Ten years later, only three of these still existed. Two 
shops, employing 120 and 50 workers respectively in 1963, had disappeared without leaving 
a trace. Together, the remaining three firms now employed less than 150 workers. One shop 
employed 300 workers to produce 30 looms per month in 1963. In 1976, only 70 employees 
remained and the shop subsisted on repairwork Employment in the second surviving shop 
dropped from 75 to 25 personnel. Likewise, it produced only textile spare parts. The third 
shop saw employment precipitate from almost 300 to less than a 100 personnel, and moved 
out of the textile equipment market altogether. 
Table 7-1 Year of commencement production, 49 textile equipment shops, Bandung 
Period 
before 1950 
1951 - 56 
1957 - 62 
1963-68 
1969 - 74 
1975 - 80 
1981 - 86 
1987 - 91 
Number of shops 
3 
3 
1 
5 
-
12 
12 
13 
(N=49) 
Cumulative 
employment 1990 
54 
172 
182 
340 
340 
811 
1,392 
1,735 
Average employment 
per shop 1990 
18 
39 
10 
32 
-
39 
48 
26 
(alM5) 
Source: primary data 
Resurgence of the Textile Equipment Industry, 1975-1991 
By the mid-1970s the Bandung textile equipment industry began to recover from 
the shock caused by the drastic industrial policy reversal put in effect under the New 
Order. The rise, fall, and subsequent reemergence of the Bandung textile equipment 
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industry is illustrated by Table 7-1, which presents the start-up date and 1990 
employment situation of a sample of 49 textile shops. Twelve firms (24 percent) were 
survivors of the pre-1965 period. The majority of these was founded during the import 
substitution boom of the early 1960s. No shop was established between 1969 and 1974. 
Apparently the open door policies of this period attracted capital to textile equipment 
import trade, but made textile equipment manufacturing an unattractive venture. In the 
second half of the 1970s the textile equipment industry showed signs of recovery. At 
this time the government-induced swift expansion of the textile industry was exerting a 
significant derived demand for local repair and servicework. This trend continued 
through the 1980s. 
Textile Equipment Makers' Paths Into the Industry 
This chapter's main task is to examine the origins of the Bandung area textile 
equipment makers. I will tackle this issue with a framework derived from the historical 
development of textile equipment making as reported in various country studies. From 
documentation on these country experiences four distinct evolutionary paths may be 
distilled. Before 1940, according to the sources I compiled textile equipment producing 
firms emerged from one of three distinct routes: i) servicing-to-manufacture: the 
evolution from independent repair shop to textile machinery construction firm; ii) 
vertical disintegration: repair shop annexed to textile factory splitting off and 
developing into textile machinery producer; iii) engineering diversification: established 
machinery building firm entering the market for textile machinery. After the second 
World War a fourth trajectory was added to this list: iv) import trade to manufacturing: 
textile machinery importing firm forced by textile machinery import substitution 
policies to engage in manufacture. 
Qoss-Country Evidence of Textile Equipment Makers' Entry Trajectories 
Jobbing trajectory: servicing to manufacture. In various industrial areas, for 
example the French Loire region in nineteenth century Europe and Shanghai in China 
in the 1930s, small general purpose repair shops specialized in servicing and repairing 
the machinery of a nascent local textile industry, then began making parts and 
constructing simple machines, and eventually evolved into textile machinery making 
firms (Benad-Wagenhoff 1991:286; Landes 1969:184; Rawski 1980). Rawski describes 
how, in Shanghai in the 1930s, the Ta-lung machinery firm launched its textile 
machinery on the market through forward integration, creating a sheltered market by 
acquiring a bankrupt textile plant which it stocked with its own textile machines 
(1980:10). Later six other mills were acquired and equipped with Ta-lung machinery. 
Scattered evidence suggests that other machinery firms also employed such a 'market 
capture' entry strategy to advertise the qualities of their machinery, for example Toyoda 
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in Japan (Rouland 1991). 
Backward linkage trajectory: vertical disintegration. Other textile machinery 
building firms evolved out of a reverse process of 'vertical disintegration'. A textile mill 
would initially produce some or all of its machinery in-house in its own workshop. A 
demand for these machines would develop and the workshop would begin selling 
machinery to other textile firms. Eventually, the factory repair and construction works 
would be set on its own footing as an independent textile machinery producer. The 
United States cotton textile industry supplies some of the best-documented cases of 
vertical disintegration, the Saco-Lowell works being the most famous example (Gibbs 
1950; Silver 1984:56). But a similar pattern occurred in the Swiss and German textile 
industries (Bodmer 1960; Silver 1984). 
Two circumstances underlay the vertical disintegration process. First, in an 
underdeveloped market for textile equipment neophyte textile industrialists were 
compelled to produce their own machinery. Second, a conflict of interest would arise 
when the machinery making department began selling its products to other textile 
manufacturers. Now the machinery making branch of the firm was supplying capital 
stock to the competitors of the textile-producing branch, in fact assisting them and 
bolstering their competitiveness. Sooner or later this conflict would lead to the break-up 
of the textile and textile equipment making divisions. 
Engineering trajectory: engineering diversification. Engineering diversification 
refers to the entry of an established engineering firm in the textile machinery industry. 
Historical evidence of engineering diversification is scant. David Landes suggests that it 
rarely occurred on the European continent because from early on, in contrast to many 
other fields of engineering, textile machinery construction was specialist work 
(1969:183). Whatever the reason, the only case I have come across that fits this pattern 
is that of the Swiss Sulzer company founded in 1834. This firm had already established 
a world-wide reputation in a wide array of engineering fields (steam and later diesel 
engine production, ship propellers, heating and ventilation) when, in the 1930s, it 
decided to start producing weaving machines. Sulzer went on to introduce a 
revolutionary shuttleless loom after World War Two. In the 1970s Sulzer reportedly 
had a 20 percent share in the world shuttleless loom market (UNCTAD 1981:234). 
Trade trajectory: import trade to manufacture. A fourth trajectory led from trade to 
manufacture. This development was provoked by political intervention in the textile 
machinery market. Typically a government attempted to promote textile machinery 
import substitution by imposing trade barriers, either import controls or high tariffs. 
Foreign textile machinery producers as well as their representing agents in these 
markets then found themselves bereft of their market. If demand was sufficiently large, 
foreign machinery textile makers would then attempt to circumvent the trade barriers by 
setting up local assembly facilities. Importing firms, favoured by their longstanding 
contacts with foreign producers and extensive local trade networks, might enter in 
licensing arrangements with foreign machinery builders and set up shop as textile 
machinery assemblers, and, eventually, manufacturers. Alternatively, domestic 
machinery works might evolve into textile machinery manufacturers, either by licensing 
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foreign technologies or by building up in-house technological capacities through a 
lengthy process of trial and error. 
The development of the Indian textile machinery industry provides a case in point. 
Lakshmi Machine Works, now the leading Indian spinning machinery producer, was 
founded in 1962 as a joint venture between an Indian cotton ginning and textile firm 
and a Swiss textile equipment manufacturer, following the imposition of import controls 
in the 1950s (Lall 1987:127). Another Indian textile machinery producer, the Star 
Industrial and Textile Enterprise, evolved from a textile machinery importing company 
set up in 1928 by a family that had built up a position in yarn trading. The Star Textile 
Engineering Works was established in 1942, when imports of foreign machinery dried 
up. In the 1950s it enlisted foreign help to upgrade quality, and now produces textile 
spinning, dyeing and printing machines as well as spare parts (ibid. p. 135). 
The Indonesian Experience: Engineering Trajectory 
How does the Indonesian case fit in this pattern? The first straightforward 
statement that can be made is that the engineering route played no role whatsoever. The 
absence of engineering trajectory firms is a consequence of the underdeveloped state of 
the Indonesian engineering industry. Only a few firms in the country had the all-round 
capacities needed to make a serious effort in textile equipment production. These 
include three large state-owned firms residing under the Strategic Industries umbrella, 
BBI and Barata in Surabaya and PINDAD in Bandung, and perhaps five large Jakarta-
based private-owned engineering firms. None of these moved into textile equipment 
making. 
Production decisions for the three state engineering firms were made at the top 
bureaucratic decisionmaking level in Jakarta, in the Strategic Industries Agency headed 
by Minister for Research and Technology Habibie. The decisions emanating from this 
centre were not guided by profit motives or the market supply and demand situation but 
by the ambitious long-term goal of bringing Indonesia to the leading edge in 
manufacturing technology (cf. Habibie 1982, 1983). 
The evidence I was able to collect suggests that management in the three state-
owned engineering shops appeared to be uninterested in any initiative other than that 
emanating from the Jakarta headquarters.2 The production of textile equipment has not 
figured in the Strategic Industries directives, therefore the state engineering firms have 
taken no interest in this activity. The following case is illustrative. In an interview I 
conducted in July 1992 the manager of a large state-owned integrated textile mill 
recounted how he had attempted to broker a deal involving the Swiss loom maker 
Sulzer and the Strategic Industry member BBI: 
Not long ago I ordered a number of Sulzer projectile looms for my own plant, but I said to 
21 paid several visits to PINDAD as well as to the Strategic Industries headquarters in 
Jakarta. Information on BBI and Barata in Surabaya was provided by informants. 
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the Sulzer people that in return they should place an order with the best engineering shop 
here in Indonesia. And this they did, ordering parts of different shapes and materials. Good, 
so I got this order from Sulzer for weaving projectile machinery parts, and passed it on to 
Boma Bisma Indra. But two years later they still hadn't made any progress. I even took the 
BBI people to Europe to meet textile machinery makers and make them interested. But they 
did nothing. They were given this order, they didn't have to go out and get it, but they didn't 
do anything. 
The large private-owned engineering firms had different reasons for steering clear 
of the textile equipment market. They concentrated on repair and servicing work for 
which a ready market existed. Their main line of business was job-order work: 
combustion engine reconditioning, the repairing and overhauling of diverse factory 
machinery or the construction of simple assemblies to order. I interviewed 
representatives of two large engineering firms. One firm consisted of a machining 
division with 200 operators, equipped with conventional machine tools and a small 
number of CNC machine centers, and a stamping and drawing section with 600 
employees, the latter producing motorcycle parts. The other firm comprised a well-
equipped gear-making plant, a fully equipped machine and construction shop with 300 
operators and an integrated foundry, and a score of smaller machine shops located 
throughout the country. 
Managers with these firms stated that they were uninterested in textile equipment 
production. On the one hand, they thought that they would not be able to compete in 
the jobbing market with the small-scale Bandung textile shops price-wise. As they 
pointed out, their overheads were much higher than those of small and medium-size 
shops. Moreover, the cost of labour in the Jakarta area was twice as high as in 
Bandung. On the other hand, they did not dare to engage in the production of core 
textile machinery which would put them up against foreign competitors. On the whole, 
shop owners appeared hesitant to commit themselves to any form of mass production, 
the only exception being subcontracted production of engine and body parts for the 
heavily protected domestic automotive industry. 
Backward Linkage Trajectory 
I found evidence of three cases of backward linkage evolution. One jobshop owner 
reported that a Bandung-based knitwear producer, a man owning several factories, had 
begun assembling his own knitting machines. This industrialist had recently installed 
two million dollars' worth of machine tools in a secret workshop in one of his knitting 
factories. Because he was making clandestine copies of a Korean-made knitting 
machine the whole operation was carried out behind closed doors. To fabricate the 
pirate copies jacquards were obtained from South Korea. These were fitted onto locally-
made frames. My informant, who acted as a consultant to this undertaking, reported 
that there were problems with the proper balancing of the knitting machine's shafts. The 
knitwear producer had hired (and fired) a string of Korean engineers, but none of these 
had succeeded in solving the problem so far. 
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The second case involved MEDANCO, a textile conglomerate managed by five 
siblings, with plants in Jakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya. MEDANCO launched itself 
into textile machinery production in the 1980s. It started assembling rapier looms in 
1991. A visit to the factory in 1992 yielded the following information. 
The mill accommodated a weaving plant and Berani, the machinery factory, the latter with 
400 personnel Ten million US$ was alleged to have been invested in the Berani venture. 
Loom parts were machined in one section on 20 brand-new large-dimension CNC machine 
tools that had absorbed half of the total capital outlay These ultra-modem machines finished 
roughed low-quality castings supplied by a foundry located in Central Java Most loom parts 
were imported the rapier, drive, lubrication pump and distributor, electric motor, bearings, 
and all electronics Likewise, all parts that were subject to stress were imported According 
to a factory spokesman, local cast steel or forged steel was either not available or not of 
consistent quality The looms were assembled in another section of the plant The Berani 
looms were sold at a pnce of $20,000 and upward So far, 300 looms had been produced. 
These had been bought by a Bangla Deshi textile firm As yet, no other orders had been 
forthcoming The commg year's production —set at 100 looms per month— was destined for 
in-house replacement of obsolete machinery Whether this was a realistic production target I 
do not know At any rate, at the time of my visit there was almost no activity in the plant, 
the reason being, according to one employee, that a consignment of imported machine parts 
was late in arriving 
In a subsequent press conference, one of MEDANCO's owners stated two reasons for the 
Berani undertaking First, because value added in capital goods production was higher than 
in other goods they should be more profitable to produce Second, MEDANCO's 
management did not want to depend on imponed capital stock, presumably because it 
expected government regulation of the hitherto open market for textile machinery These 
were, of course, ostentatious reasons A textile factory manager in the Bandung area, who 
had done business with MEDANCO in the past, provides an alternative explanation 
'The MEDANCO people, they are smart They know how to borrow and not return the 
money What they do is, you supply them yam and they owe you, say, 30 million Rp You 
ask them for your money, they say it is difficult, your bill goes from Jakarta to their plant m 
Surabaya, and then to Central Java, that takes a long time Someone else is still waiting for 
200 million, they say, and he will be paid first, so you better go on supplying us if you want 
to see your money back They have good connections with the government, can easily 
borrow from state banks, just take the bank manager and put him on the board of your 
company When MEDANCO's plant in Central Java was flooded, they just asked the 
government to take it over, and they bought their plant. Then all this money was invested in 
a new plant They have to invest all the üme, make new projects so they can borrow more 
money ' 
If this source is to be believed, the Berani venture was a money-raising ploy. 
MEDANCO's owners did not anticipate profits from machinery sales but used the 
enterprise as bait for subsidized loans. The rent-seeking interpretation of the Berani 
rapier loom project may not be unfounded, as the family allegedly took out a World 
Bank loan, channelled through Bank Indonesia, to finance this venture. It seemed 
highly unlikely, moreover, that the project would be successful. Berani seemed to 
experience difficulties with the supply of imported machinery parts, leading to the 
underutilization of expensive machinery and manpower. Furthermore, as in the case of 
the illegal knitting machines, Berani-made looms did not run smoothly due to vibrations 
caused by improperly balanced shafts. An Industry Department official whom I 
interviewed reported that he had been present when the Department tested one of the 
Berani rapier looms. According to him, the loom had vibrated so much 'that it almost 
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fell apart.' 
A Ping, the third case, owned a large weaving, dyeing and finishing plant in the 
Bandung region. 
I could not have picked a better moment for my visit to the plant for A Ping had just sold a 
Taiwan-made plastic injectie« moulding machine he had bought ten years before. With this 
machine he used to produce weaving shuttles and cones. A Ping stated that he had produced 
the cones and bobbins primarily for own use, but that his products were also in great 
demand: whenever raw materials were available the machine would produce spare parts 
nonstop. Why then had A Ping decided to stop producing these textile parts? He motivated 
his decision as follows. A direct reason was that his own company no longer needed the 
parts as it had recently replaced all its shuttle looms with rapier and air-jet looms. 
Furthermore, A Ping had repeatedly experienced difficulties in securing an adequate supply 
of high-quality plastic pellets, which he used to import in bulk. Third, apart from the 
relatively easy plastic moulding he also had to manufacture the other metal components of 
the shuttle. He found that it took much time to organize this part of shuttle-making. Fourth, 
A Ping thought that in another ten years shuttle looms would be pushed out of the weaving 
market by shuttleless technologies. Finally, he stated that a concentrated effort was required 
to develop spare parts manufacturing into a real business, but that he needed all his time to 
attend to his prospering textile export business. 
Jobbing and Trade Trajectories: Sampling 
For a discussion of the jobbing and trade trajectories I turn to the Bandung textile 
shop sample. I was able to collect business history background information on 42 out 
of 49 textile equipment shops surveyed in the Bandung region. The survey was 
retrospective in character. It represents the business histories of a sample of survivor 
firms looking backward from the period 1991/1992. It therefore includes survivors and 
excludes textile shops that went out of business or exited from the industry before 
1991. Inevitably, this backward-looking perspective causes an underrepresentation of 
failed firms. The magnitude of this survivor bias can only be guessed at. In the course 
of my fieldwork I visited three firms that had exited from the textile equipment 
industry. These at least provide anecdotal evidence of the fate of failing firms. 
Shops 12, 19, and 33 had all produced weaving and spinning equipment during the 
machinery building boom of the early 1960s. 
Shop 12, a state-owned engineering firm, had produced spinning machinery parts for the 
then state-owned spinning industry. Around 1970 it entered in a joint venture with Suzuki of 
Japan for the local assembly of Suzuki powerlooms. However, for unknown reasons Suzuki 
called off this venture. The shop subsequently retreated from the textile equipment industry. 
It later started a joint venture with another Japanese company, producing piston rings for the 
domestic automotive industry. Furthermore it maintained a large jobbing section that catered 
to the needs of diverse state-owned firms. Shops 19 and 33 had produced Suzuki powerloom 
copies in the 1960s. They had both exited from the textile equipment industry in the 1970s. 
Shop 19 turned to handwaterpump production in the 1970s, orders for which were supplied 
by an international donor agency. From the 1980s onward this shop also engaged in the 
construction of watertanks and steel truss factory buildings. Shop 33 tried its luck in the 
agricultural machinery sector. Attempts to profit from the mechanization of rice-growing and 
processing in the 1970s (increasing use of hand tractors, small rice threshers, dryers and 
cleaners) did not meet with success, but shop 33 succeeded in entering the tea-processing 
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machinery industry a few years later. 
Jobbing Trajectory 
Of 42 textile shops, a majority of 25 firms followed the jobbing trajectory. Figure 
7-1 shows the origins and specializations of these firms. Eleven shop owners were 
active in different parts of the jobbing sector before they specialized in textile 
equipment repair and servicing: they either worked as subcontractees for automobile 
manufacturers (three shops) or made rubber parts, simple equipment or castings for 
diverse industries (eight shops). 
Shop 44, for example, was founded in 1982. It was set up by a pensioned railway employee. 
Around 1985, when his son joined the business, the shop began to expand. It supplied metal 
components to the railways, produced parts for handtractors as a subcontractee of United 
Tractors (an Astra holding company), and also made machine parts for the textile industry. 
The shop was hard hit by the 1991 contraction. Capacity utilization dropped from 80 to 60 
percent, and average monthly turnover from 20 to less than 14 million Rupiah. The shop 
was forced to fall back on textile parts making to make up for the loss of most of its 
automotive parts making business as a result of the economy-wide slump. 
The founders of 12 jobbing trajectory shops began their private careers in the 
textile equipment sector. Two shops were founded by textile equipment shop ex-
employees; one by an employee of a large metalworking firm; and seven by ex-civil 
servants. In all but one of these cases the founders had acquired technical skills relevant 
to the textile equipment industry before embarking on this career. 
Shop 55 evolved from a repairshop annexed to a Dutch-owned glass-making factory before 
World War Two. In 1947 the company was acquired by a three-man kongsi. The new 
owners gave up glass manufacturing and concentrated on metalworking. The present 
manager's father, who migrated to Indonesia from Holden in 1938, bought the workshop in 
1963. He participated in the 'powerloom boom' and suffered a severe setback in the 1970s. 
After 1980, shop 55 partially recovered by shining from powerloom parts-making to jobbing 
and construction work for the textile dyeing industry. Its prospects, however, were bleak. In 
1991, the firm resembled a living museum. Most of the installed machinery dated from the 
1920s and '30s. The shopfloor was a cluttered jumble of partly working machinery and metal 
parts of every conceivable shape and size. Several truckloads of worthless cast-iron 
powerloom parts were stored at the back of the shop. The shop manager conceded that all 
machinery should be replaced and that the present premises should be torn down and 
completely rebuilt. But he calculated that the value of the inventory, machinery, and the 
valuable land on which the shop sat —in downtown Bandung— would not suffice to cover 
even one-fifth of the cost of this operation. 
Shops 16 and 25, lastly, were the only two jobbing trajectory Firms to have evolved 
from repair and custom work to batch parts and noncore machinery making. 
Both shops were founded in the early 1960s. They specialized in textile equipment making 
from the tart, gradually evolving from jobbing to pecialized production of technologically 
demanding parts and noncore machinery. Shop 16 was well-equipped with a complete range 
of 40 machine tools including large dimension lathes, gear-hobbing machines, planers, and 
presses. It enjoyed a solid reputation in textile industry circles for the consistent quality of 
its products, which ranged from diverse machine parts to water pretreatment units, inspecting 
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tables, and winding machines. Shop 25 specialized in the production of cog-wheels and had 
invested in eight milling machines. It also produced noncore assemblies to order. 
Figure 7-1 Number, employment size, and specialization of shops following 
jobbing trajectory (N=25) 
Job-order 
work 
for diverse 
industries 
Textile equipment 
repair and service 
11 shops (7.6) ^
o r k > c u s t o m 
parts manu­
facturing 
12 shops (22.7) 
1 shop (40) 
1 shop (35) 
"V 
Manufacture of 
batch parts for 
textile 
Γ
4
 ν machinery 
Noncore 
textile 
machinery 
making 
Figures in parentheses indicate average employment for 1989 and 1991 
Source, primary data 
Trade Trajectory 
Seventeen out of 42 firms in the textile shop sample emerged from the trade 
trajectory. Two patterns can be discerned. Ten entrepreneurs, on the one hand, 
embarked on a career in the textile equipment industry as textile parts brokers. On the 
other hand, the owners of seven shops began as importers of textile and other 
machinery. 
A textile parts broker performed the classic industrial middleman function. He 
canvassed textile factories, obtained job orders from maintenance personnel, and put 
these out to machine shops. Often, when a broker had amassed enough capital he would 
set up shop himself, starting with one second-hand lathe in his living quarters and 
gradually adding machine tools and personnel until he controlled a full-fledged jobshop. 
Shop 37 is an example of an ex-broker's enterprise. The two brothers who managed shop 37 
together with their younger sister worked as employees in a textile factory before starting as 
textile brokers in 1985. For the next five years they cooperated closely with the owner of 
shop 30, to whom they supplied most of their orders. In 1990 they severed this relationship, 
moving into a new larger house where they installed an office and a small workshop. The 
shop was subsequently enlarged to accommodate additional machine tools by tearing down 
the walls separating adjacent rooms from the shop. In 1991 the office and shop occupied 
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nearly all space on the ground floor. The office was white-tiled and clean with batches of 
finished parts lying in every comer. The shop, by contrast, was dark, lacked ventilation, and 
it had a dirt floor. Machines had been hastily installed, and the shop floor was cluttered with 
parts and tools and remnants of walls blocking one's path. Machine operators could hardly 
see what they were doing and worked in cramped quarters. 
Of the firms managed by ex-textile brokers, shops 46 and 47 merit special attention 
because of their employment size. Shop 46 thanked its good fortune to generous state 
bank loans which it was granted as a result of astute networking and impression 
management by its owner. Shop 47 was part of a conglomerate of trade and 
manufacturing activities run by five siblings.3 
Finally, seven shops originated in different branches of machinery trading. These 
can be found on the right-hand side of Figure 7-2. 
Shop 11 (43 employees) was founded by an importer of waterpumps. This trader was 
attracted to manufacturing: he first acquired a tile-making factory and then saw opportunities 
for machinery repair and construction in this sector. In 1989 he decided to build a workshop 
outfitted for the large dimension jobs often required in the ceramics industry. After its start-
up, the predominant source of orders for this jobshop turned out to be the textile industry. 
Shops 36 and 62 (97 and 50 employees) had their origins in machine tool trading and 
motorcycle parts trading, respectively. Both enterprises were expanding swiftly at the time of 
the survey mainly by tapping into the huge Jakarta market. Shop 41 (55 employees) was set 
up by the manager of a local company importing and assembling stationary diesel engines. 
This entrepreneur successfully specialized in the production of shuttleloom weaving reeds4 
from the start of his career in the textile industry. Shop 45 (27 employees) was founded by a 
husband-wife team who started their career in the textile equipment industry as brokers. 
Unlike other brokers, they specialized in the textile spare part import trade before investing 
in a machine shop in 1987. 
Shops four and twenty (126 and 375 employees) were, employment and turnover-wise, 
the largest firms in the Bandung textile equipment industry.5 Shop four evolved as the 
manufacturing branch of one of Indonesia's foremost textile equipment importing firms. It 
undertook regular repairwork but also mass-produced weaving reeds and pirns.6 In 1992, the 
trading firm also opened a foundry in the Bandung region. Shop 20 was founded by a textile 
accessories trader in 1983 who originally peddled industrial lubricants. This highly 
successful firm had branched out into various fields: apart from supplying a range of 
imported accessories for textile and other industries, it also constructed noncore plant 
equipment for various industries. For the textile industry in particular it supplied water 
pretreatment units, climate control machinery (blowers, fans, humidification systems), waste 
heat recovery units, heat-setting and winch machines, and drum dyers. 
3
 For detailed accounts of these shops refer to Appendix D. 
4
 A reed is a closed comb made of flat metal strips. The comb frame can be made of 
wood or metal, the latter version being more accurate but more expensive. The reed holds the 
warp threads at uniform spacing and beats up the newly inserted picks of weft; it also supports 
the shuttle during its traverse of the loom (Marks & Robinson 1976:7). 
5
 See Appendix D for detailed descriptions of these firms. 
6
 Shuttle pirns are made of wood. They contain the weft yam and fit in the shuttle 
(Marks & Robinson 1976:6). 
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Figure 7-2 Number, employment size, and specialization of shops following 
trade trajectory (N=17) 
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Pressures to Shift From Textile Parts Trading and Putting Out to In-House Manufacture 
The foregoing analysis has shown that 17 out of 42 firms in the textile equipment 
industry (40 percent) originated in trade and brokerage activities. What circumstances 
compelled textile brokers and traders to set up shop as manufacturers? Ex-textile 
brokers mentioned problems of coordination and incentives as reasons for transferring 
their assets to manufacturing. Textile job-orders were usually rush jobs, for as we have 
seen the market for local-made spares was driven by the breakdown management 
prevalent in many textile factories. In practice, it was difficult to carry out rush jobs 
through putting out arrangements because the broker's priorities did not run parallel 
with the production schedule and priorities of the jobshop owner contracted to carry out 
the order. Often, the jobshop owner might be unable to carry out the job on short 
notice because he was already booked full with 'deadline' orders from other customers. 
And he might be unwilling to work overtime to complete a rush job. The comments of 
one broker-tumed-manufacturer are illuminating: 
It gave me headaches when I used to carry the material to a shop and they would promise 
me to finish the job in a day, the day would become a week, and the week a month. 
Whenever I had a big order it was always like that. But now (that I have a shop of my own) 
I do the same thing: I accept an order on the cheap, promising to finish it in a week's time. 
All of a sudden there is this big other order, paid in cash to boot, and I get that done first. 
Then the man of the first job comes to collect and I say: Yes, I'm sorry, there was a lot of 
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rain so we couldn't finish it', and he will be in and out all the time. 
A related problem was that the interest of the principal —'product quality must be 
satisfactory and delivery on-time'— ran contrary to the interest of the subcontracted 
agent --'finish the job with a minimum expenditure of effort, time, and material'--. 
Brokers found it necessary to exercise meticulous quality control to ascertain that the 
subcontractee did not cut comers on product dimensions or used substandard material, 
e.g., scrap iron instead of special steel. What has become popular as the 'Japanese 
solution' to these incentive problems in the small industry literature, the building up of 
dyadic relationship with much mutual investment so as to dampen principal-agent 
problems (cf. Watanabe 1983), involves a considerable investment of time and energy 
on the part of the subcontractor. In the Bandung textile equipment industry, brokers 
preferred setting up their own jobshop and processing orders in-house to building up 
such ties. 
Survivors of the 1960s 
Nine shops in the sample were survivors of the 1960s engineering industry shake-
out (see Table 7-2 below). In the introductory section of this chapter the question was 
posed whether these established firms played a key role in the resurgence of textile 
equipment making. This was not the case. Average employment size of these firms 
(34.5 employees) was somewhat below the sample average (38.4). Many survivor firms, 
including the four largest establishments in this category (with 35, 40, 60, 98 
employees respectively), gave an impression of being inward-oriented. Management did 
not actively seek to enlarge markets but relied on the shop's reputation and an existing 
network of customers and was primarily occupied with the engineering aspect of the 
textile equipment business. The shops did not seem to well-known beyond a small 
circle of steady customers. Nor had the old-established shops served as an informal 
training ground for textile equipment manufacturers. None of entrepreneurs in the 42-
firm sample was an ex-employee of any of these establishments. 
Paths Into the Industry: Summary 
Six main conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing examination of textile 
equipment makers' evolutionary trajectories. First, the engineering and backward 
linkage paths did not figure in the formation of the Indonesian textile equipment 
industry. For one, the unimportance of engineering diversification was a consequence of 
the underdeveloped state of the private metalworking industry on the one hand, and the 
peculiar incentive structure prevailing in state engineering enterprises on the other hand. 
For another, the three cases of textile manufacturing backward linkage that I examined 
suggest that textile industrialists considered a head-on entry in the textile equipment 
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industry unattractive compared to other business opportunities. 
Second, all textile equipment shops investigated emerged from the jobbing and 
trade trajectories. 
Table 7-2 Start-up dates jobbing and trade trajectory textile equipment shops 
Period Jobbing trajectory Trade trajectory 
before 1950 2 Ô 
1951 - 56 2 0 
1957 - 62 1 0 
1963 - 68 4 0 
1969 - 74 0 0 
1975 - 80 7 5 
1981-86 4 6 
1987 - 91 6 5 
(N=26) (N=16) 
Source primary data 
Third, although job order work was the avenue along which most textile equipment 
makers entered the industry, the more successful textile equipment makers were traders 
or ex-traders. Comparison of the data presented in Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2 (above) 
shows that the leading firms in the Bandung textile equipment industry -in terms of 
employment size and technological capacities- had emerged from the trade trajectory. 
Trade trajectory shops were much more successful than jobbing trajectory shops in 
terms of growth performance. Average 1990 employment in the former category was 
69.5 workers as against only 17.3 workers for the jobbing route shops. If we discount 
for age the difference is even more marked: where the sample of jobbing route shops 
had added only one new employee in every year of their existence (dividing workforce 
by age gave 1.03 employees), the trade route shops had added 9.15 employees. 
Fourth, jobbing route shops not only tended to be smaller but also were older than 
trade trajectory shops (see Table 7-2). This pattern may be related to the historical 
context of the industry's development. The open door policies of the late 60s and early 
70s spawned a mass of new textile equipment trading and importing businesses. From 
the mid-1970s onward a number of these invested in machine tools and turned to 
jobbing. Jobbing trajectory firms, on the other hand, included older 'survivor' shops who 
managed to adjust to the difficult transition from Old to New Order. Furthermore, a 
new generation of jobbing track firms mushroomed when demand for spare parts 
expanded after 1975. But most of these did not grow beyond home industry size. 
Fifth, as might be expected there was a positive correlation between field of 
specialization and employment size. Twenty five shops relying exclusively on repair 
and service work and custom parts making employed 16 workers on average. Eleven 
shops involved in batch parts production had an average workforce of 45. The six 
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establishments that had advanced to noncore machinery manufacturing employed 35, 
40, 85, 95, 126, and 375 personnel respectively. 
Sixth, young firms founded after 1974 represented the main source of dynamism 
for the industry rather than survivor firms that had been founded under the Old Order. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has traced the historical antecedents of the Indonesian textile 
equipment industry. The evidence marshalled in this chapter shows that after 1975 the 
industry evolved as a spill-over from machinery repair and trading activities. Ex-traders 
were primarily responsible for the phenomenal growth of the industry during the 1980s. 
Surviving Old Order engineering firms were pulled along in the textile equipment boom 
but did not play a catalyzing role. The transfer of technical capabilities from other areas 
of engineering was limited. Bandung's textile industrialists, who certainly had the 
resources at their disposal to make a successful venture into textile equipment making, 
were only marginally involved. 
Resource transfers from the machinery trading business into the textile equipment 
industry therefore constituted the main source of industrial growth. The expansion of 
the industry was driven by entrepreneurs who had accumulated experience and financial 
resources in machinery import and trade in general and trade in textile equipment in 
particular. The latter finding raises the question of why these traders decided to move 
into manufacturing. Organization and monitoring costs emerge as one important 
causative factor in my interview data. Agency problems attendant to putting-out 
relationships appear to have compelled textile part brokers to engage in in-house 
production. More research would be required to substantiate this finding, however. 
8 The Textile Equipment Industry 
in 1991/1992 
The previous chapter examined the historical origins of the Indonesian textile 
equipment makers. This chapter offers a brief introduction to the industry as I 
encountered it in 1991/1992. It provides an estimate of aggregate employment size and 
output of the industry as of 1991 based on consumption estimates of local-made textile 
parts derived from may survey data. It discusses main features of the industry: 
ownership structure, spatial distribution, and size distribution. It sketches differences 
between establishments across the size scale. And it gives information on various forms 
of specialization. 
Estimating Turnover and Employment Size of the Textile Equipment Industry 
How big was the Indonesian textile equipment industry in 1991/1992? Chapter 3 
showed that official manufacturing statistics cannot provide an answer to this question. 
Instead, I have calculated a size estimate on basis of field data on textile parts shops' 
revenues and the maintenance expenditure figures of spinning and weaving plants, 
combined with official data on total spindlage and loomage. As of 1986/1987, 
Indonesian spinning capacity was just over 2.57 million spindles. Installed loomage was 
about 101,000 looms. In my 1992 textile factory survey, discussed in chapter 6,1 found 
that maintenance departments spent $255 per loom per year on average for local-made 
machine parts. The mean outlay per spindle in spinning plants was $1.76. 
I have calculated a bottom-line size estimate as follows. Let us assume that in 1992 
jobshops were only servicing 1987 or earlier equipment. With this assumption, weaving 
plants invested $25.75 million in local-made parts. Spinning mills disbursed $4.52 
million on local parts. Aggregate sales of local-made textile machinery parts stood at 
$30.27 million. An estimate of the output and employment size of the textile equipment 
industry may be deduced from this figure as follows. 
We must deduct mass-produced broad-spectrum machinery parts1 from the above 
turnover estimate to arrive at a total sales figure for textile equipment shops. Assuming 
that such parts accounted for 20 percent of total turnover, the textile equipment industry 
sold $24.21 million worth of parts in 1992. With this figure we can make an estimate 
of the industry's employment size. I found that in 1991/1992, average sales per textile 
part shop worker amounted to $4,507. Dividing the former by the latter figure, we 
arrive at an employment estimate of 5,370 workers for the textile equipment industry. 
This is the most conservative estimate. It only records employment in independent 
job-shops: adding employment in textile factory repair-shops would, according to my 
1
 Defined in chapter 6 as nonindustry-specific machine parts: nuts, bolts, wiring, switches, 
bearings, and so on. 
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rough estimate, add one to two thousand workers.2 If we take account of the 
tremendous increase in textile industry capital stock of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
we can probably add another three thousand workers, arriving at a total employment 
figure of 10,000 workers. 
For instance, with a stock of 150,000 serviceable looms and 4 million spindles, we 
arrive at a cumulative sales figure of $36.23 million and 10,000 independent jobshop 
workers. This estimate still excludes revenue and employment generated in the 
production of machinery and in textile equipment servicing and overhauling in 
independent shops. In view of these considerations, I arrive at the tentative estimate 
that the Indonesian textile equipment industry offered employment to at least 10,000 
workers in 1992, and that output probably exceeded $40 million. 
Patterns of Ownership and Spatial Distribution 
The Indonesian textile equipment industry was private-owned. To my knowledge 
no state-owned firm was engaged in textile equipment production. Indonesian private 
entrepreneurs controlled the industry. So far, foreign influence had been very limited. 
This situation seemed to be changing, however. Indonesia's booming textile export 
industry, expanding textile machinery park, and increased quality-consciousness, made 
it an increasingly attractive market for foreign textile equipment makers. This was 
evidenced by the presence of permanent service centers of overseas textile 
manufacturers, and in the many rumours about foreign joint ventures being undertaken 
in textile spare part-making that circulated in the textile equipment industry in 1991 and 
1992. 
Geographically, the industry was concentrated in the Bandung industrial area. The 
Bandung region was the national center of textile equipment production. Besides the 
Bandung region itself the Bandung shops served a good part of the Jakarta market, 
profiting from the fact that wages were considerably lower than in Jakarta. Demand in 
Jakarta for local-made textile equipment was rather limited in scope, however, due to 
the prominence of large-scale foreign joint ventures in the textile sector. These, as we 
saw in chapter 6, tended to rely on foreign spares. The Bandung textile equipment 
shops also served part of the Central and East Java markets, where they competed with 
textile parts makers in two small industry foundry centers. To some extent the 
relationship with these centers was complementary rather than competitive as the 
Bandung textile equipment makers depended on these centers for supplies of cheap 
castings. Some of the Bandung shops even supplied textile factories as far away as 
Sumatra. 
21 have no data on output per worker in the textile factory shops, because these were not 
recorded by factory management. One would expect output per worker in the factory shops to 
be somewhat lower than worker output in independent shops, the latter having better capacity 
utilization. 
The Textile Equipment Industry in 1991/1992 95 
The Textile Equipment Industry as Part of the Bandung Engineering Industries 
Table 8-1 provides information on the size structure of the Bandung engineering 
subsector (ISIC 38) as recorded by the 1986 Economic Census. The Table indicates 
that, in terms of numbers, small and medium-size establishments dominated the 
engineering subsector. Employment-wise, however, the largest share by far was taken 
Table 8-1 Size distribution of the Bandung engineering industries (ISIC 38) according 
to the 1986 Industrial Census compared with author's survey of textile 
equipment industry 1991/1992 
Bandung region 
Average 
Author's survey 
Average 
est 
16 
2 
Large scale 
(ГО0+) 
empi. 
10,500 
656 
501 
250 
Medium scale 
(20-99) 
est. 
50 
20 
empi 
1,956 
39 
1,010 
50 
Small industry 
(5-19) 
est 
173 
19 
empi. 
1,576 
9 
209 
11 
Household ind. 
(<5) 
est. 
607 
8 
empi. 
1,939 
3 
15 
2 
Sources Sensus Ekonomi (1986) and primary data 
by large establishments (100+ employees). This was due to the inclusion of three giant 
state-owned engineering enterprises, all of which belonged to the Strategic Industries 
Agency. The aircraft factory ΠΤΝ with 6,011 employees, and two electronics factories 
(LEN and INTI) with 1,439 and 1,121 personnel, respectively. A fourth Strategic 
Industries member located in Bandung, the weapons factory PINDAD, was omitted 
from the census for unknown reasons. Excluding these firms, total employment in the 
large industry category drops to 1,929 and the average number of personnel per firm to 
148.4. 
For comparative purposes, I have included data on the sample of survey firms in 
the textile equipment industry. As can be seen, the textile equipment sample differs 
from the census data to the extent that medium and small firms are overrepresented at 
the cost of cottage firms. This was a consequence of the sampling method chosen rather 
than a reflection of the industry's structure. 
Size Structure of the Textile Equipment Industry 
Table 8-2 (below) provides a first impression of the size structure of the textile 
equipment industry. It records employment, 1991 value added, and 1991 assets (current 
value of machinery, transport equipment, land and buildings) for the complete surveyed 
sample of 49 textile equipment manufacturers. The reader should be warned that the 
size distribution recorded here is no faithful reproduction of the industry size structure 
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as such due to the nonrandom sampling method used. In my survey I included all the 
larger firms (50+ employees) in the industry, adding a random sample of small and 
household establishments. This creates an overrepresentation of firms on the large end 
of the size scale. 
Table 8-2 The textile equipment industry: distribution of employment, value added, 
and assets (N=49) 
Employ-
si¿e 
< 5 
5-19 
2CM9 
50-99 
100+ 
total 
Number 
of 
shops 
8 
19 
11 
9 
2 
49 
Em-
ployees 
15 
209 
334 
676 
501 
1,735 
Value 
added . (Rp mi ) 
107 39 
726 00 
400 35 
1,91176 
-
3,145 50 
Assets (Rpim) 
9135 
606 15 
1,556 50 
4,719 00 
-
6,973 00 
employment 
19 
110 
30 4 
75 1 
250 5 
Average 
VA 
13 4 
38 2 
30 4 
212 4 
-
Assets 
114 
319 
1415 
212 4 
-
1
 Exchange rate 1991 Rp 1,905 = $1 
Source primary data 
Personal observations suggest a threefold classification of establishments in cottage 
shops with up to five employees, small shops with a workforce of between five and 25 
personnel, and large shops with 25 or more workers. The 50+ employment category 
differs from the 20-49 category only in that firms in the former class either were 
multilocal, that is, possessed two or more separate production sites, or they formed part 
of a small conglomerate of enterprises. Of 11 firms in the 50+ category, seven were 
part of conglomerates and two possessed two production sites. 
Nearly all cottage shops (0-4 employees) were located in small alleys in densely 
populated neighbourhoods in municipal Bandung, effectively hidden from the scrutiny 
of government survey officers, or, for that matter, internal revenue collectors. Hardly 
any of the premises in this category was accessible by four-wheel transport. The shop 
was always located in or near to the owner's living quarters: sometimes in a room 
inside the house, sometimes in a lean-to made from wooden planks and plaited mats, 
and in some cases in a nearby shed. The workforce invariably consisted of young, 
unmarried men (bujang) most of whom did not have previous experience or formal 
training in metalworking. Often these employees would lodge with their employer, 
receiving part of their pay in the form of meals and lodging. Shop equipment typically 
consisted of a vise, an assortment of hand tools, a column drill, a small device for hand 
grinding, perhaps a cheap power hacksaw or circular sawing machine, plus a small-
dimension (center distance 1 meter or less) engine lathe. Equipment tended to be of low 
quality and/or very old. With it rough castings (made of plastic, cast-iron, wood, 
aluminium, or steel) were made into the various shapes required by textile factories: 
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pulleys, shafts, counterweights, threaded bolts, and so on. 
A minority of shops in the cottage and the 5-25 employee size category were also 
capable of moulding rubber, bakélite and plastic with home-made and manually 
operated moulding devices. An even smaller number would cast rough shapes from 
scrap aluminium in-house. 
Small shops (5-25 employees) differed from cottage shops in a number of respects. 
Although many establishments in this category were still located in the owner's living 
quarters, a number had advanced to the stage where the shop was located in a specially 
designed factory building. In nearly all cases the premises could be accessed by car. 
The boarding arrangements characteristic of cottage shops were largely absent in this 
category, and average age of personnel appeared to be higher. Shops in this category 
carried a larger number of engine lathes, varying between four and ten lathes of 
different dimensions, but otherwise equipment was similar to that in cottage shops. 
Only a few small shops possessed a milling machine, for example. 
Whereas the difference between cottage and small shops was largely one of scale, 
or 'more of the same', the large shops (upward of 25 employees) had an altogether 
different structure, both in terms of management and in respect to technical capabilities. 
For one, the cottage and small shops were single proprietor-managed, with an 
owner/manager functioning as director, bookkeeper, overseer, salesman, and general 
troubleshooter. The large shops were either managed by family teams of 
owner/managers or by salaried management staff. For another, not only was the number 
of machine tools in the 25+ category shops larger, but the range of tools in use was 
also much wider: here one might encounter diverse metalworking machinery such as 
slotting and planing machines, milling machines, bending and shearing apparatus, and 
special purpose tools, such as vertical lathes, capable of handling oversize dimension 
jobs. In none of the shops, however, did I encounter CNC tools. Furthermore, shops in 
this category all operated from factory buildings, often in industrial estates. 
Size and Specialization 
Table 8-3 shows that the textile equipment makers performed a varying 
combination of the five following manufacturing processes: the machining of metals 
(predominantly steel, cast-iron, and aluminium) and nonmetals (plastics), woodworking, 
iron and aluminium casting and extruding, sheet-metal working, and the forming of 
rubber (heating and finishing), plastic and Bakelite (heating and compressing in desired 
shape). As the above description already suggested, (metal) machining was the 
predominant line of business for the majority of shops. Table 8-3 shows that machining 
was the only line of business for 27 out of a total of 49 textile equipment shops, and 
that only one of the remaining 22 shops, a specialized heat treatment shop, did not 
operate in the machining business. Most textile equipment shops, therefore, can be 
described as 'machine shops'. The definition of 'medium simple machine shop' as used 
by the IMG engineering subsector study would apply only to large shops: 
98 Textile Equipment Manufacturing 
A larger basic machine shop able to handle a wider range of parts, but still in small batches 
Major equipment is mainly standard engine lathes, with a few milling machines and a few 
more specialised machme tools (IMG 1985 72) 
Table 8-3 Specialization of textile equipment shops 
Specialization Number of 
shops 
Average 
employment 
Employment 
range 
Machining 
Machining + sheet-
metalworking 
Machining + woodworking 
Machining + metal-casting 
Machining + plastic, 
nibber, Bakelite moulding 
Machining + SMW + WW 
Heat treatment and plating 
Unidentified 
All 
Source primary data 
27 
7 
2 
1 
9 
1 
1 
1 
49 
22 5 
914 
905 
69 0 
142 
85 0 
80 
15 0 
35 4 
0-98 
25-375 
55-126 
5-27 
0-375 
Table 8-3 shows that machine shops also engaging in sheet-metalworking, 
woodworking or metal-casting tended to be relatively large, whereas establishments 
operating in the machining plus plastic, rubber and Bakelite moulding category were, 
on average, much smaller. The former category comprised specialized activities such as 
production of technically demanding textile industry-specific spare parts (pirns, reeds, 
shuttles, and the like) and the production of noncore machinery requiring a combination 
of bending, forming, cutting and welding equipment. Noncore machinery included 
fabric inspection tables, fabric folding and measuring machines, and stainless steel 
containers for dyeing and finishing. Contrariwise, the small machining cum rubber, 
plastic and Bakelite moulding shops produced simple shapes (bobbins, pulleys, 
counterweights, and so on) made from cheap inputs: low-quality castings, scrap iron, 
low-quality plastics, and the like. 
9 Competition and Technical Capabilities 
The finding that small and large manufacturers in developing countries tend to use 
different amounts of capital to produce a given output has been a major of concern in 
the development microeconomics literature, spawning a diverse literature on choice of 
technique and appropriate technology. Two explanations have been proposed for the 
observed higher capital-intensity of large firms. In the first place, they reflect 
government policies that make capital artificially cheap and labour artificially expensive 
for large manufacturers. This may be called the factor market segmentation explanation 
of divergent capital intensity. In the second place, that large and small producers in an 
industry serve different market segments. This may be called the product market 
segmentation explanation of intraindustry variation in capital intensity. 
This chapter will test these hypotheses against evidence from the textile equipment 
industry. First, I will discuss Indonesian empirical evidence on choice of technique in 
manufacturing. Then I examine capital and labour use in the textile equipment industry 
and evidence on factor price distortions and product market segmentation, offering 
illustrations of the various forms it assumed. The ensuing sections discuss causes and 
consequences of quality uncertainty in the textile equipment industry. A final section 
summarizes main conclusions. 
Size and Capital Intensity in Indonesian Manufacturing 
The evidence that capital intensity tends to rise with firm size in developing 
country manufacturing is by now overwhelming (e.g., White 1978). Various authors 
have explained this as a consequence of factor market segmentation. Because large 
producers face lower capital costs (they have better access to formal and often 
subsidized credit and enjoy fiscal benefits such as accelerated depreciation for new 
plant equipment) and higher labour costs (unlike small producers they must comply 
with minimum wage legislation and labour union demands), the argument runs, they 
will choose more capital-intensive methods of production.1 
The Indonesian evidence is in line with the rising capital intensity partem noted 
above. In various industries, industry leaders have introduced a succession of new, 
increasingly capital-intensive techniques. This process has been documented in detail 
for the Indonesian weaving industry. In this industry, powerlooms displaced handlooms 
in the 1970s, the latter moving into small niche markets. In like fashion the dominant 
position of the powerloom is currently being threatened by shuttleless looms (Hardjono 
1990; Hill 1983; Ruwiel 1993). Similar patterns have been reported, among others, for 
the cassava processing, footwear, and tile and brick-making industries (Hardjono & 
Maspiyati 1990; Thamrin 1991; Maspiyati 1991; Sandee & Weijland 1989). 
1
 See White (1978:47 ff.); Bhalla (1985:390); and Berry & Mazumdar (1991:36) 
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There can be no doubt that factor market segmentation has contributed to 'technical 
dualism' in Indonesian manufacturing (cf. Hill 1983). But segmented markets for capital 
and labour seem to be only part of the story. In two recent manufacturing surveys Hal 
Hill has observed that industrial seller concentration under the New Order has been 
pronounced (1990a).2 At the same time small manufacturing firms have prospered. He 
mainly attributes this anomaly to product market segmentation: small labour-intensive 
firms have been able to thrive in industries dominated by large capital-intensive 
producers by serving sheltered niche markets.' 
Focusing on small industries, Braadbaart and Wolters have noted the prevalence of 
price-undercutting competition. A number of rural industry case studies in West Java 
evidenced an extremely rapid diffusion of simple labour-intensive manufacturing 
technologies. This often created entrepreneurial overcrowding and acute oversupply 
problems, in turn leading to the squeezing of wages and input costs (and thereby, 
product quality) by entrepreneurs trying to survive (1992:40,41).4 
The above observations suggest that Indonesian manufacturers use technical 
differentiation as a competitive weapon and that technology-based competition drives a 
process of market segmentation.5 Large firms occupy capital-intensive market niches 
where they are protected by high technological barriers against small competitors. Small 
firms tend to concentrate in niches with low entry barriers (in terms of technological or 
capital requirements) where price-undercutting competition prevails.6 
2
 He calculates that in 1985 the four largest plants had a share in value added of 40 percent 
or more in 56 percent of all industries (1990a:96). 
3
 To quote his comment: '... the most likely explanation for the success of small enterprises 
is their ability to exploit market niches, to concentrate on activities not characterized by scale 
economies as noted above, to serve particular markets not of commercial interest to larger 
firms, and to produce goods not easily adapted to mass production technologies' (1992a:249). 
4
 The term 'imitative competition with neo-classical adjustment' was coined by Byrd in a 
Chinese industrial context to capture the cycle of rapid entry, supply saturation, and shake-out 
that typified innovation diffusion (Byrd 1990). Interestingly, these casual observations concur 
with the pattern of firm exit and entry over time modelled by Gort and Klepper (1982) on basis 
of evidence on 46 product innovations in industrial country manufacturing (see concluding 
chapter). 
5
 In an article on technical change in developing countries Martin Fransman describes the 
process as follows: 'Firms use technical change, improving products and processes, as a major 
weapon in the competitive stmggle, either taking the offensive and introducing innovations, or 
defending their positions by jumping on the bandwagon and imitating their successful rivals' 
(1985:609). The basic idea can be traced to Schumpeter (1950:31,32). 
6
 Note that, conversely, Louis Wells has argued, on basis of evidence from six Indonesian 
industries, that the nature of competition determined choice of technique. Wells found that 
where price competition prevailed factory manageis would opt for cost-minimizing labour-
intensive techniques; where firms had a monopoly position they would invest in more 
sophisticated, automated techniques (1975:85). My argument runs in the opposite direction: 
firms invest in a new sophisticated technique in order to create a niche monopoly. 
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Let us see how the factor market and product market explanations of 'technical 
dualism' apply to the Indonesian textile equipment industry. Below, I will first present 
data on capital and labour use in the industry. Then I will examine the relative 
importance of factor and product market segmentation. 
Labour and Capital in Machine Shops 
This section provides evidence on the relationship between size of firm on the one 
hand, and capital intensity, capital productivity, and labour productivity on the other 
hand. Furthermore, it looks into the relationship of firm size and labour remuneration. 
The evidence consists of 1991 financial profiles I obtained from 32 shops in the 
Bandung region. These data provide information on the issues at hand. Twenty-three 
shops out of the 32-firm sample constituted a homogeneous category of machine 
shops.7 For this subsample I calculated capital intensity as book value of fixed assets 
(machinery, transport equipment, land and buildings) divided by number of employees. 
Capital productivity was defined as value added divided by the book value of fixed 
assets. Labour productivity as value added divided by number of workers (L) or by 
total wage expenditures (WL) in 1991. Profit margin (Ρ"1) as revenue minus direct costs 
and write-offs divided by revenue. Finally, the accounting rate of profit (P1), a different 
measure of economic performance, was calculated as revenue less direct costs and 
write-offs divided by the book value of fixed assets at the end of period.8 
I have distributed sample firms over different size classes on basis of two criteria: 
value of fixed assets (Table 9-1) and employment size (Table 9-2). Table 9-1 presents 
calculations of the indicators listed above for six size classes on basis of fixed asset 
value. The following patterns are discernable. First, there is not much difference in 
capital intensity between firms with assets up to Rp. 100 mi. Beyond the Rp. 100 
million mark capital intensity increases steeply, especially in the largest firms. That 
there exists a high positive correlation between capital intensity and asset size is 
7
 For a definition see chapter 8. Care was taken to assure that the comparative exercise 
would yield meaningful results. The difficulty of making valid inferences about firm-level 
efficiency from a heterogeneous sample of industrial producers was noted three decades ago by 
Staley and Morse: '... there is a danger in identifying small factories, in the aggregate, or on the 
average, with a single trait which disguises the many variations that in fact exist... treating 
small industry as an aggregate mixes the capital-light attribute of a great many products with 
the capital-saving aspect of low-volume techniques for some products. The result is a false 
impression that all small factories are capital-saving ...' (1965:199). This point was recently 
reiterated by Little, Mazumdar & Page (1987) and Berry & Mazumdar (1991). 
8
 See Appendix В for more information on the calculation of these figures. The average 
value added/fixed assets ratio (VA/K) for the 23 shop sample was 0.97. Value added divided by 
the total wage bill (VA/WL) gave an average ratio of 2.98. The average value of capital stock 
per worker (K/L) was 6.69 million Rupiah. Finally, mean value added produced per worker 
(VA/L) was 4.97 mi.Rp. 
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confirmed by a (Pearson) correlation of .86, significant at p<0.001. 
No clear trend emerges from the other measures. As one would expect from the 
Table, pairwise correlations of asset size and capital productivity, labour cost, and 
labour productivity measured as value added per worker do not yield any significant 
results. Only the correlation of asset size and value added divided by the wage bill is 
significant with a value of .42 at the ρ <0.05 level. 
Table 9-1 Average capital intensity, capital and labour productivity, and labour cost 
in six fixed asset size classes, 23 machine shops, 1991' 
Size class (Rp. mi.) 
< 10 
10 < χ < 20 
20 < χ < 50 
50 < χ < 100 
100 < χ < 300 
300+ 
K/L 
4 53 
(4 09) 
4 75 
(2 43) 
3 46 
(2 43) 
5 32 
(1 11) 
8 39 
(3 04) 
16 54 
(7 62) 
VA/K 
187 
(136) 
0 84 
(056) 
0 92 
(0 49) 
103 
(0 35) 
0 86 
(0 53) 
043 
(0 32) 
VA/L 
4 89 
(2 00) 
396 
(2 58) 
3 69 
(4 55) 
5 34 
(132) 
6 28 
(2 89) 
6 73 
(5 35) 
VA/WL 
4 13 
(2 87) 
2 61 
(159) 
2 32 
α i3) 
2 28 
(0 72) 
311 
(157) 
4 12 
(3 67) 
WL/L 
137 
(0 40) 
145 
(0 26) 
137 
(0 47) 
2 39 
(053) 
204 
(0 39) 
177 
(0 24) 
AU financial figures in current Rp million, first size class N=3, second class N=5, third class N=5, fourth 
class N-3, fifth class N~4, sixth class N-3, for definitions see Appendix B, standard deviation added in 
parentheses 
Source primary data 
The patterns in Table 9-1 therefore confirm the oft-noted tendency of capital 
intensity to increase with firm size. But labour cost does not increase with size as the 
factor cost explanation of technological differentiation would predict. 
The finding that the smallest firms make the most productive use of their capital 
stock may be deceptive, however: the fact that employers doubled as managers and 
machine operators distorts labour productivity figures in favour of the household 
industry (assets up to Rp. 10 mi.) category. This bias can be avoided if we use a 
conventional employment size-based classification of the shops and adjust the home 
industry category to include the owner in employment figures, as I have done in Table 
9-2. 
Like Table 9-1, Table 9-2 shows that capital intensity (K/L) rises monotonically 
with firm size, rising steeply upon reaching the 50+ category. Again this finding is 
confirmed by a Pearson correlation of .82 significant at p<0.001. And, again as in 
Table 9-1, none of the capital and labour productivity measures yields a significant 
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relation with employment size. In this Table I have added 'machinery intensity' as a 
separate measure. This is to show that, in large measure, the marked capital intensity of 
the 50+ firms was a consequence of the appreciated value of their premises. Machinery 
had an 81 percent share in the fixed assets of home industry shops, a 76 percent share 
in the small industry category (5-19 workers), a 74 percent share in the medium-size 20 
to 49 worker category, but only a 49 percent share in the 50+ group. 
Table 9-2 Employment size, average capital intensity, capital and labour productivity, 
and labour cost1, 23 machine shops, 1991 
Employment 
size 
<5 
5-19 
2(M9 
50-125 
K/L 
5 46 
(2 82) 
4 87 
(3 21) 
5 69 
(3 28) 
16 55 
(7 62) 
Machinery 
value/L 
2 78 
(122) 
3 63 
(2 05) 
4 23 
(2 27) 
8 
(3 86) 
VA/K 
131 
(109) 
0 91 
(0 48) 
099 
(0 54) 
0 43 
(0 32) 
VA/L 
4 74 
(191) 
4 69 
(3 55) 
4 68 
(3 34) 
6 73 
(5 35) 
VA/WL 
3 48 
(2 07) 
2 62 
(189) 
2 29 
(107) 
4 12 
(3 67) 
WL/L 
147 
(0 33) 
173 
(0 60) 
187 
(0 68) 
177 
(024) 
Owner included in workforce household industry shops (employment less than five), but excluded from 
calculation of labour cost First size category N=7, second category N=9, third category N=4, and fourth 
category N=3 Concepts explained m Appendix B, standard deviation added in parentheses 
Source primary data 
Factor Market Segmentation? 
The evidence presented so far provides only partial support for the idea that factor 
market segmentation was the cause of the observed 'technical dualism'. Large machine 
shops did use more capital-intensive methods of production than small shops, as 
predicted. The factor market explanation would relate this to the fact that large firms 
faced overpriced labour costs and underpriced capital costs. However, I did not find 
evidence of a significant relationship between size of firm and labour cost. In fact, 
wages prevailing in the industry were fairly homogeneous across the size scale. 
Additional evidence of wage homogeneity is provided by a machine shop survey 
carried out by the Textile Industry Directorate, a section of the Industry Department, in 
1989. This similarly fails to show a positive relationship between employment size and 
wage levels (see Table 9-3). On basis of this evidence I conclude that labour market 
distortions fail to explain the observed divergence of capital intensities. 
20-49 
50+ 
all shops 
3 (50%) 
4(44%) 
16 (52%) 
2 (33%) 
4(44%) 
9 (29%) 
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Table 9-3 Machine operator weekly pay, 31 machine shops, 1989 
Employment 20-25,000 Rp. 25-30,000 Rp. 30-35,000 Rp. >35,O00 Rp. N 
size 
5-19 9(56%) 3(19%) 1(5%) 3(19%) 16 
1 (17%) 6 
1 (11%) 9 
1 (3%) 5 (16%) 31 
Source: raw data from joint survey Textile Industry Directorate and Cipta Multi Kreasi PT (1989) 
This leaves us with the question whether a) large shops had easier access to 
external funding, or b) whether large shops faced lower capital costs due to special 
(subsidized) interest rates or special tax deduction schemes. 
As to the first question, large shops did indeed have easier access to the capital 
market. In evaluating loan proposals, bank loan officers looked primarily at the 
collateral a firm could offer and at its reputation. Real estate, the value of which 
appreciated swiftly, figured prominently in the portfolio's of the largest shops. Small 
shops could only offer their often run-down equipment as a meagre security. Even 
application for special small industry schemes would be difficult, for these required 
small shops to gain formal status via a complicated procedure. Furthermore, in order to 
minimize monitoring effort, bank loan officers preferred to work with few large 
borrowers rather than with a horde of small borrowers (cf. McLeod 1991). 
The second issue, that of cost of funds, is complicated. The assumption implicit in 
the cost of funds hypothesis is that interest rates determine whether business 
decisionmakers do or do not make investments. Comparing aggregate data on trends in 
investment and interest rates cannot yield solid evidence on this score as significant 
correlations might be caused by any number of intervening factors or underlying 
common causes. The methodologically sound option would be to examine business 
behaviour. Evidence collected on actual investment decisionmaking does not support 
the thesis that such decisions are led by cost of funds considerations. Nor did I find it 
validated in my research, as I will argue in the following chapter. 
A closer inspection of the investment policies of the three largest machine shops 
illustrates the mixture of motivations underlying investment behaviour. Shop 36 
(Papandayan, 1991 workforce 75 employees), followed a classic rent-seeking route, 
borrowing heavily from a state bank (Bank Rakyat Indonesia) at special interest rates. 
These funds were invested in machinery and real estate. Because it was deeply in the 
red, Papandayan subsequently was unable pay back any of the principal. By contrast, 
the expansion of shop 62 (Milano, 65 employees in 1991) was entirely self-financed. 
Not until 1992 did its owner attempt to procure external funding. Shop 36 (Chrysler, 
125 employees in 1991), finally, was founded more or less by accident when an attempt 
to set up a second-hand machine tool importing and reconditioning business misfired. 
Compétition and Technical Capabilities 105 
When demand for their machinery failed to materialize, the owners found themselves 
saddled with a warehouse full of expensive European-made machine tools. Perforce, 
they started their own jobbing firm with this machinery and soon grew into one of 
Bandung's leading textile parts makers.9 
The argument thus far may be summed up as follows. Segmentation of both 
labour and capital markets seems to offer a weak explanation for the technical 
differentiation observed. For one, wage levels were homogeneous across the size scale 
and did not increase with firm size as the segmentation thesis predicts. For another, 
although easier access to (sometimes subsidized) credit for larger shops was an 
important factor in investment decisionmaking, cost of funds as such did not carry 
much weight in, and therefore could not provide a satisfactory explanation of, 
investment behaviour. 
Shop Size and Product Market Segmentation 
For a complementary explanation I turn to product market segmentation. The 
question I will try to answer is whether small, medium and large job-shops produced 
similar products, or whether they served different parts of the jobbing market with 
different technical capabilities. A first way of tackling this issue is by a direct 
investigation of the relationship between competitive strategy and capital intensity and 
employment size. For this purpose I have divided shops into two classes: firms relying 
on price-undercutting strategies (value 0) and firms relying on quality differentiation 
(value 1). A shop was categorized as price-competitive when it used cheap local-made 
inputs to produce a range of relatively simple products supplied by many other shops. 
Quality-differentiating firms made greater use of imported or at any rate higher-quality 
and relatively expensive raw materials; they produced artifacts of greater dimensional 
and compositional complexity; and they were either oligopolists or monopolists in the 
markets they served. 
Table 9-4 Correlation between competitive strategy (price or quality-based) and 
capital intensity and employment size 
Capital intensity Machinery value/worker Employment size 
Pearson correlation 0.33 0.65 0.42 
Ρ value 0.074 0.000 0.002 
N 29 29 51 
Source: primary data 
9
 Refer to Appendix D for extended discussions of these cases. 
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I have tested the relationship between product-quality specialization and a) capital 
intensity; b) the more narrow indicator 'machinery intensity'; and c) employment size. 
Results are shown in Table 9-4. As can be seen, the correlations with machinery 
intensity and employment size are highly significant (p<0.001). The absence of a 
significant correlation between capital intensity and price-quality specialization is 
caused by 'noise' created by the inclusion of value of land and buildings and transport 
equipment in the former. Machinery value per worker, that is, fixed assets minus real 
estate and transport equipment, is a better indicator of technical abilities and this value 
is strongly and positively correlated with quality differentiation. Employment size 
likewise is strongly and positively related with a firm's tendency to compete on quality 
rather than on price. This evidence provides good support for the hypothesis that the 
positive correlation between capital intensity and firm size was a reflection of product 
market segmentation. 
Table 8-3 (refer to p. 98) provides additional evidence on the relationship between 
size and competitive strategy. This Table showed that 11 large equipment makers 
specialized in machining plus sheet-metalworking, woodworking or metal-casting. Nine 
small shops, contrariwise, were engaged in machining plus plastic, rubber, and Bakelite 
moulding. The former category produced technically demanding textile industry-specific 
spare parts (pirns, reeds, shuttles, and the like) and noncore machinery. The latter 
produced simple shapes made from cheap inputs: low-quality castings, scrap iron, low-
quality plastics, and the like. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in Tables 8-2 and 9-4 indicates that larger 
shops were settled in and monopolized technically demanding market niches. Smaller 
shops tended to cluster in market niches with relatively low technical barriers in which 
price-undercutting played an important role. Larger establishments specialized in niches 
surrounded by high technical barriers. The production of complex parts and assemblies 
required a broader selection of expensive imported machinery than was necessary for 
the simple shapes produced by small shops. This was reflected in different capital 
intensities. 
Price and Quality Competition 
Quality differentiation and price-undercutting competition in the industry assumed 
the following basic forms. Shops relying on quality differentiation maintained niche 
monopolies on basis of a combination of special knowledge and technical capacities 
embodied in special equipment. Knowledge and equipment-based monopolies existed, 
for example, in those areas of metalworking where a special knowledge of metallurgical 
properties of materials was required. The purest equipment-based monopolies could be 
found where required machining tasks fell outside of the ordinary range of machining 
capabilities supplied by shops: circular grinding, the machining of oversize or undersize 
jobs, or high-precision jobs. 
Small shops relying on cost-price cutting strategies used cheap poor-quality raw 
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materials, worked with low-priced and old machinery, they refrained from heavy 
investments in transport means and premises, and, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
shop owners would accept jobs at prices that did not sustain the long-run continuity of 
their enterprise. Below I will present evidence on product quality differentiation in four 
fields: reed-making, metal machining, iron-casting, and plastic moulding. 
A Niche Market: Reed-Making 
Shop 41, with 55 employees, specialized in reed-making for shuttle looms. Briefly, 
reeds are produced as follows. Steel wire is rolled and flattened, then passed through a 
special grinding machine that dulls the sharp sides of the flat wire to prevent it from 
damaging the yam. After being honed, the wire is cut to required length and parallel 
lengths of wire are mounted on a wood or metal frame. Finally, the reeds pass through 
finishing and quality control. Special reed-making equipment is required. Reeds are 
supplied to weaving plants according to customer specifications. 
The owner of shop 41, by origin a machinery trader, had set up shop in 1985. He sent two 
operators to Japan to become familiar with the production process and invested in reed-
making machinery. Low quality steel wire was supplied by Krakatau Steel; carbon steel wire 
was imported from Japan. He had benefited from a customer relationship with a Japanese 
producer of reeds, who supplied his shop with machinery and raw materials. The owner of 
the Japanese reed-making company visited the shop, which was one of his important 
overseas customers, once every three months. 
According to shop 41's owner, the customer relationship with the Japanese supplier had 
greatly facilitated the technology transmission process. Previously, various Indonesian textile 
companies had invested in reed-making machinery but had not been able to master the 
technical difficulties. At the time of the interview only three firms, all specialized textile 
equipment makers (shops 41, 47 (with 85 employees), and 4 (with 126 employees)) were 
able to market local-made reeds. The owner of shop 41 claimed that, together with shop 47, 
his firm held an 80 percent share of the Indonesian market for shuttle reeds. Shop 4 also 
possessed reed-making machinery but was less active in this field. Shop 47 had recently 
invested in production facilities for air-jet loom reeds but this move into an even more 
specialized and technically demanding niche had so far produced only mixed results. Shop 
41 would soon follow suit: it had ordered air-jet reed-making equipment from Japan which 
had already arrived in Jakarta at the time of my interview.10 
Equipment-Based Niche Monopolies in Metal Machining 
A number of oligopolies and monopolies were equipment-based. No more than 
three shops in the Bandung area owned a vertical lathe for large diameter-jobs. Only a 
10
 An interesting example of an equipment-based monopoly came from the combustion 
engine reconditioning industry. On a visit to Singapore, the owner of a machine shop had 
observed a special machine for the regrinding of large dimension crankshafts. Afterwards he 
drew a sketch of the patented device from memory and returned home to successfully build his 
own version. The machine was installed in a secret compartment on the premises. Customers 
and visiting anthropologists were allowed to peep around the comer, too short to really take in 
the details, and then would be quickly hustled out. 
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few shops owned grinding machines, bending machines for oversize bars, long 
horizontal lathes, slotting machines, or shears capable of cutting thick steel sheets. Shop 
11 (43 workers), for example, had originally been established to serve the tile-making 
industry. Later, when the amount of work in this market was found to be disappointing, 
management reoriented to the textile equipment industry where it enjoyed a competitive 
advantage in the large dimension parts niche. 
More in general, only a few shops possessed tools capable of producing parts 
machined to a precision of 0.01 mm. Most shops, especially small establishments, used 
old and wom-out machine tools the dimensional accuracy of which did not extend 
beyond 0.1 mm. Table 9-5 gives some indications of the relationship between shop size 
and technical capability. It compares the number and age of lathes and milling 
machines installed in small (1-19 workers), medium-size (20-49 workers), and large 
(50+ workers) shops. Essentially the Table confirms what the positive relationship 
between capital intensity and establishment size already suggested. Small shops relied 
heavily on obsolete, often second-hand, machine tools. Some of the installed lathes 
were over forty years old. Larger shops would possess obsolete machine tools but were 
always equipped with more recent tools as well. Only half of the small shops possessed 
a milling machine, a tool installed in all larger firms. 
Table 9-5 Average number of lathes and milling machines per shop, by employment 
size and age of machinery, 30 machine shops, 1989 
Machinery 
age 
before 1980 
1980-1984 
1985-1989 
total 
<20 employees (N=16) 
lathes 
10 
09 
07 
26 
milling m 
0 1 
03 
0.2 
06 
20-49 employees 
lathes 
26 
1 1 
25 
62 
milling m. 
07 
05 
06 
18 
50+ 
lathes 
1.8 
18 
6.7 
10 3 
employees (N=6) 
milling m. 
07 
1.2 
0.7 
2.6 
Source raw data from joint survey Textile Industry Directorate and Cipta Multi Kreasi PT (1989) 
Heat Treatment: A Technical Bottleneck in Parts-Making 
Heat treatment refers to '(t)he process of heating an alloy to a selected temperature, 
below its melting point, and then cooling it at some pre-terminated rate so as to obtain 
specially required properties' (Street & Alexander 1968:310). In this case the purpose 
was to toughen gear wheels and shafts for weaving and spinning machines without 
making the material too brittle. Only six establishments in Bandung were equipped with 
the professional ovens required for controlled heat treatment. Four of these were 
installed in state-owned engineering works and therefore not readily accessible to 
private firms. These were the aircraft factory IPTN, the small arms factory PINDAD, 
Competition and Technical Capabilities 109 
the Bandung Technology Institute (an educational institute), and an extension unit of 
the Industry Department. One of the private-owned facilities was operated by a special 
steels-importing firm in Jakarta. Its Bandung branch office accepted parts for treatment, 
but received few orders due to lengthy transport and processing time as well as high 
price. The other private-owned oven was reported to be located in Bandung. I was not 
able to discover its whereabouts, however. 
Shop 62 (50 employees) had developed a side-line activity in the fabrication of pipe cutters 
for Jakarta steel pipe manufacturers. Shop management claimed that their pipe cutters lasted 
longer and carried a lower priced than imported cutteis. The shop was able to develop this 
product because one of its employees was a former heat treatment oven operator, who, by 
trial and error, found a formula that produced the required combination of toughness and 
hardness. The cutters were machined in the shop and then delivered to an independent heat 
treatment shop to be treated according to the special formula. The heat treatment expert 
reported that a Bandung-based competitor had tried to develop his own cutter but failed. 
Quality Differentiation in the Market for Iron Castings 
Quality differentiation was very obvious in the market for iron castings. This 
makret consisted of a high quality and a low quality segment. Machine shops operating 
in the price-undercutting segment depended on low-quality iron castings supplied by 
two small industry clusters in Central Java. One of these was located in Tegal on the 
North coast and the other in Серег, Klaten district, north of Yogyakarta. The Tegal and 
Серег foundry shops produced low-priced iron castings of poor quality in home-
designed ovens. They were able to supply castings to the Bandung industry at a 
competitive price mainly because wage levels in Central Java were much lower than 
those prevailing in urban West Java. 
Ferro-Carbon castings from Central Java cost about Rp. 900 per kilo in the 
Bandung region. Shop 18 in Bandung, an important local source of low quality 
castings, sold its FC castings for Rp. 1200 per kilo. The latter shop, operating a large 
cupola oven, could only survive against the Central Javanese competition by virtue of 
proximity: it delivered quicker and corrected reject orders faster than the Tegal and 
Серег foundries. 
The high quality segment was represented in Bandung by a sister firm of shop 4, 
whose management set up a modem induction furnace-equipped foundry in 1992. This 
foundry sold quality-controlled FC castings (that is, with guaranteed Ferro Carbon 
grade) for 1800 to 2500 Rp./kilo. Jakarta-made castings of similar quality were 
somewhat more expensive, costing Rp. 3000 and upward. The high quality foundries 
monopolized the limited local market for nodular cast iron. 
To sum up, the market for FC castings was segmented, with a price range of Rp. 
900 to 1200 prevailing for uncertain quality FC castings, and a range of Rp. 1800 and 
upward for similar but quality-controlled castings. The market for nodular cast iron was 
monopolized by modem foundries operating in the high quality segment. 
по 
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Quality Differentiation in the Plastic Injection Moulding Industry 
The plastic injection moulding industry offered another example of quality 
differentiation. Three technologies were in use for the production of mould-injected 
plastic parts: manual injection machines, semi-automatic, and automatic plastic injection 
machines. Manual and semi-automatic injection moulding machines produced the same 
range of plastic shapes, but productivity of the semi-automatic machines was higher. 
The main limitation of both manual and semi-automatic machines was that they did not 
produce sufficient pressure to fill moulds upward of about five inches in diameter. 
Automatic plastic injection moulding machines easily passed this dimensional threshold, 
but they were much more expensive. In this manner owners of fully mechanized 
machines were able to operate in a market segment that owners of manual and semi-
manual machines could not penetrate. 
Formation and Dissolution of Niche Oligopolies 
I conclude this discussion of product market segmentation with some observations 
on the dynamics of niche market formation and dissolution. The maintenance of a 'pure' 
knowledge-based monopoly depended on information asymmetries. Therefore the 
monopolist would do his utmost to prevent the information from spreading beyond his 
firm. A machinery-based monopoly depended on the circumstance that most 
competitors could or would not make the substantial outlay necessary to enter such a 
market segment. Smaller shops simply did not have the financial resources. Larger 
competitors would only find the investment worthwhile if a substantial demand existed. 
Labour piracy was a much-used method of getting the know of the special 
technical knowledge that maintained the former type of niche monopolies. Those 
availing of this knowledge took various countermeasures and precautions against its 
dissipation. The owners of some establishments closed off the working environment 
hermetically to curious visitors. 
The owner of shop 15 went to great lengths to prevent the dissipation of his technical 
advantages. He had acquired his know-how during a long stay in Germany where he was 
employed in the metal working industry. He returned to Indonesia when his father fell ill and 
subsequently took over his shop, specializing in jobs posing technical difficulties that other 
textile shops were unable to solve. The following statement expresses his attitude: 
Tou may not visit my workshop. Even my customers aren't allowed to enter my shop. I 
am just like S. (shop 50): a high fence and a small name-plate up front. Everything is 
hidden. My father's car body shop went to pieces only because all the employees he trained 
used to be lured away by the car body factories.' 
The dissipation of a machine-based monopoly would arguably be due to two causes: 
rising demand coupled with low scale economies or a decline in the size of the 
investment necessary to acquire the machine. I recorded no actual case of dissipation 
but I did record a case in which a niche market came into existence when the process 
occurred in reverse with a capital-intensive technique displacing a manual technique. 
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This case concerned the manufacture of s-shaped springs for automobile seats. 
In the 1980s the owner of shop 57, at that time working with his father, had been one of 
many small entrepreneurs producing these springs by hand-twisting methods for various car 
manufacturers. The maximum length of a hand-twisted spring was 1.5 m. Daily output per 
worker was 10 lengths of spring. Springs were supplied made-to-measure by the spring 
manufacturers. 
Shop 57, along with other hand-twisting firms, had been pushed out of the s-spring 
market when Jakarta competitors entered the scene with Taiwan-made zig-zag machines that 
easily outproduced the manual shops. Instead of supplying springs cut to final length the 
automatic process supplied s-springs on large rolls. Automobile assemblers found this a 
more convenient form of supply and adapted their production lines to continuous feed. This 
effectively barred manual technique producers from the market. S. subsequently reoriented to 
the textile equipment industry. He reponed that his father had tried to get a peek at a zig-zag 
machine to see whether the design could be copied but had not yet succeeded. S. was 
unaware of the price of a foreign-made machine. He claimed that so far only one local shop 
had attempted to build its own zig-zag machine. This attempt had failed, however. 
Quality Uncertainty 
The last topic broached in this chapter is that of quality uncertainty. Chapter 6 
established that consumers of local-made textile equipment had to cope with the 
uncertain quality of these products. From the customer viewpoint a main shortcoming 
of the local textile equipment industry was its lack of engineering standards. The 
dimensional and metallurgical properties of a metal machinery part not only varied 
from one shop to another, but also from one shipment to the next supplied by one and 
the same shop, or even between nominally identical parts sent in one and the same 
consignment. This uncertainty was evinced by textile factory managers' complaints 
about the quality of local parts: 
We order all our cog-wheels and shafts from local shops. We don't know to what 
specifications they work. What we do know is that there are problems all the time: the part 
is not strong enough, it breaks, or the fit is bad. Every day we have one or two machines 
down. 
The uncertain quality of local-made products could be attributed to the following 
circumstances: a) customers made vague specifications of their wishes; b) engineering 
standards were lacking in the textile equipment industry; c) price competition led to 
quality comer-cutting. I will consider each in turn.11 
In the first place, textile factory maintenance personnel provided only vague 
specifications of the product they ordered from a shop. Usually shop personnel copied a 
sample supplied by the customer without being informed about the metallurgical 
properties it should have. Customers would often be satisfied with dimensional 
accuracy only. When customers supplied technical drawings these would often be 
incomplete or wrongly specified. 
11
 For discussions of quality control problems in the Indonesian engineering industries see 
Arenasen (1990) and Technonet Asia (1981). 
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In the second place, there was a general unawareness of engineering standards in 
the jobbing industry. No shop used national or international industry quality standards, 
no shop was capable of producing interchangeable machine parts, no shop maintained a 
standard for fits and tolerances, only one shop had a quality control department, and in 
nearly all shops operators were instructed verbally or proceeded on basis of a rough 
sketch or sample. The low awareness of engineering standards was due to the lack of 
training of both management and personnel. Only four textile equipment making firms 
employed engineering graduates. The large majority of job-shop personnel had no 
relevant training and learned the needed skills in-house apprentice-style by assisting, 
watching and, at a later stage, copying the tasks performed by skilled workers. 
In the third place, shops operating in price-undercutting segments of the textile 
equipment market relied on quality comer-cutting to make a competitive product, 
profiting from the leeway given to them by their customers. Production methods would 
include one or more of the following strategies: a) the failure to charge equipment 
depreciation to customers; b) economizing on capital expenditures by working with old 
and second-hand machine tools; c) economizing on raw material cost by using cheap 
sub-standard materials such as cheap castings, often with blow holes, of uncertain 
quality, or scrap iron instead of special steels; and, d) the performance of demanding 
jobs by untrained operators. Two of my observations of work in progress will serve to 
illustrate these points: 
A few minutes later a machine operator enters the overseer's office with a botched job, a 
piece of imported steel cut into a helical gear shape Something went wrong in the milling 
process, however, and the shape of some of the teeth is uneven The operator first tried to 
mend his mistake by welding down the gaps between the deformed teeth and remachirung 
but a second milling attempt also failed His superior decides that the deformed gear is to be 
discarded A worn-out dividing mechanism is the source of trouble in the milling machine in 
question Because the machine lacks precision, the operator must carry out jobs in tnal-and-
error fashion, guided by his feeling and previous experience with the idiosyncrasies of the 
machine Results are unpredictable, however 
In shop 7, a small five worker-establishment, an operator determines whether a rolling 
bearing fits m its hole in a job (a textile machine part) in tnal-and-error fashion. With the 
job mounted in a lathe the operator pushes the bearing halfway in to feel its fit Unsatisfied, 
he cuts away some material from the inside of the bearing hole and tries again Then he 
gives the job its final tolerance by filing out the hole The dimensions of the pin that should 
fit mto the bearing are assessed in similar fashion 
In this context an Indian textile factory maintenance manager's assessment of local 
technical capabilities is also illustrative: 
We import only things not available in Indonesia But ordering high-quality work is a 
problem We tned a big workshop m Jakarta, X, with CNC machines Work was very good 
but much more expensive than import, especially for cams and the like Politeknik Swiss 
(discussed in chapter 14) do a clean job and pnce is quite reasonable but take too much 
time, like one month, two months PINDAD, IPTN -for special aluminum components— the 
same (the latter two are Strategic Industries located in Bandung) When we ask die-casting, 
dies they make locally are very good But the material is a problem Sometimes we ask local 
workshop like Ζ to surface-harden a gear but then they harden the whole thing Then 
afterwards we cannot mount it because the shaft hole is too small We try to bring it to size 
on our lathe, we try diamond bore, we try everything, but it is too tough Sometimes I get 
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tired and just cut my shaft. They make the shaft-hole too small because they are afraid it 
will be too wide after hardening and we cannot use it. That's why I say: give them not only 
gear but also shaft. Then they will do a perfect job. 
Quality comer-cutting had two counter-productive effects for local textile 
equipment producers. First, the cost-cutting imperative forced competing shops to 
ignore the long-run continuity of their enterprise by omitting fixed asset wTite-offs in 
pricing, a matter touched upon in the next chapter. Second, the practice of sacrificing 
quality by cutting comers led to the loss of (potential) customers, as was shown in the 
discussion of textile part consumption in chapter 6. In all cases observed, comer-cutting 
job-shops attempted to hide defects from the eye of their customers. This lemon' effect 
deterred textile factory maintenance managers from substituting local spare parts for 
original parts performing vital functions in spinning and weaving machinery. Rather 
than investing in what might be a lengthy search for a satisfactory local-made substitute 
they relied on the imported part or service. 
Conclusions 
The preceding survey of competitive processes in the Bandung textile equipment 
industry may be summarized as follows. First, analysis of a sample of 23 machine 
showed that capital intensity increased with size defined in terms of both company 
assets and employment. This evidence suggested distortions in factor and/or product 
markets. Factor market segmentation offered an incomplete explanation of the observed 
positive relationship between size and capital intensity. For one, labour remuneration 
was fairly homogeneous throughout the industry, contrary to what the factor market 
segmentation explanation would predict. For another, although larger shops had easier 
access to financial markets, I found no evidence that shops systematically used cheap 
(subsidized) loans to invest in labour-saving equipment. 
Much of the observed variation in capital intensity could be related to product 
market segmentation. Textile jobshops could be divided into two categories. Shops 
limiting themselves to the production of parts requiring rudimentary engineering skills 
and simple equipment; and shops capable of producing parts requiring more 
engineering knowledge and expensive special equipment. The market for simple parts 
was densely populated by small cost-cutting producers. Larger shops tried to recoup 
investments in special equipment in niche monopolies. Monopolies and oligopolies 
were based on knowledge and equipment. They rested on information asymmetries, 
which could dissolve when the competition lured away key personnel from the 
monopolist. They also rested on special technical capabilities embodied in equipment. 
The output of textile equipment making firms was unreliable quality-wise. Vague 
customer specifications were partly responsible for this situation, but textile equipment 
makers were also to blame. They were unaware of or ignored engineering standards and 
resorted to quality comer-cutting in price-undercutting segments. This harmed the 
reputation of local-made parts and equipment. 
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Lastly, although I cannot offer solid evidence on this point, my impression was that 
price-undercutting small competition from small shops forced larger shops to exit from 
technically less demanding niches. Because of larger overheads, large shops could not 
compete against small producers in the price-undercutting segments of the market. 
Unable to compete with small 'kitchen' shops in the market for poor-quality metal parts 
they moved up-market into relatively sheltered but technically more demanding niches: 
noncore machinery production or the manufacture of higher-precision, knowledge-
intensive, or oversize textile machinery parts. Stated differently, the main impetus for 
large firms to keep expanding their technical abilities seemed to come from this 
competitive 'push' rather than from the 'pull' exerted by potential monopoly profits. 
10 Finance: Pricing, Record-Keeping, 
and Investment Decisionmaking 
The number of field studies paying detailed attention to day-to-day Financial 
management in developing country industrial fiims is relatively small. Yet financial 
management is crucial to the firm: for the determination of selling price, the monitoring 
of expenditures made in the process of production, the maintenance of liquidity, and, 
last but not least, for investment decisionmaking. This chapter discusses financial 
management in the jobbing industry. For lack of developing country evidence it draws 
heavily on the extensive literature that has developed around costing, accounting, and 
investment decisionmaking in industrialized country manufacturing enterprises. 
The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part is concerned with firm cost flow 
management. It introduces the universal problem of price fixing in job-order firms and 
discusses the various solutions to this problem observed in the Bandung jobbing 
industry. Then I examine evidence on the use of formal cost recording systems in the 
industry and tackle the question whether such systems were useful for managers of 
small shops. The second part of the chapter presents evidence on investment under the 
boom conditions of 1990 and the disinvestment and distress strategies of jobshop 
managers after the government imposed credit restrictions late in that same year. 
The account presented here is somewhat impressionistic due to the fact that the 
evidence I was able to collect on a number of topics is rather patchy. Not only did 
various entrepreneurs consider financial topics broached during interviews a sensitive 
matter, a good number also seemed to be unaware of the size, origin and direction of 
financial flows in their business. In particular, my evidence on external financing has 
some gaps.1 These reservations notwithstanding, I have decided to give finance a full 
treatment because of its obvious importance. 
The Pricing Debate 
Accountants and economists have made important contributions to the 
understanding of product pricing practices in industry. Field research by economists has 
elucidated product pricing conventions used by industrialized country manufacturers. 
Accountants, on the other hand, have shown how industrial firms have grappled with 
the elusive concept of production cost. In economics the issue of product pricing 
conventions in industry surfaced in the 1930s and triggered a spirited debate. In 1939, 
two researchers published empirical evidence on pricing decisions gleaned from 
interviews with 38 British business managers (Hall & Hitch 1939). They found that a 
majority of 30 managers used a method that became known as 'average cost pricing': 
the managers estimated average cost per unit of product and then added a certain 
1
 McLeod (1991) contains good material on relations between Indonesian businesses 
and the banking sector. 
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(conventional) profit margin to arrive at selling price. The findings of Hall and Hitch 
implied that businessmen did not strive to maximize profits by adjusting to demand and 
supply price signals as postulated by marginalist theory. This set off a debate between 
'marginalists' and Ъепа іоигізіз', the latter attacking and the former defending the profit 
maximizing behaviour hypothesis.2 
Whereas the underlying theoretical issues remained undecided, this debate had the 
important effect of stimulating empirical research on pricing behaviour. The evidence 
that was produced decisively showed that average cost-pricing was the common method 
of price fixing. Hay and Morris, for example, conclude their exhaustive survey of 
empirical work on price fixing in American and British industrial firms with the 
statement that 'the most prevalent method of pricing is that based on average cost' 
(1991:182). Managers, working in an uncertain business environment and making do 
with incomplete information, were found to fix prices in trial and error fashion: they 
used simple rules of thumb and acted on customer responses (ibid. 183). 
Rule of Thumb Pricing in Small Shops 
My observations of pricing practice in smaller shops are in line with the above 
finding. Small owner-managed shops used a variety of rule of thumb pricing methods 
remarkably similar to the 'incredibly rude' pricing methods described by Solomons for 
nineteenth century American and British engineering firms (1952:21). The American 
Beecher drop-forging works, for example, used what was known in industry circles as 
the Oeecher rule': 
This rule was to take the cost of materials (the weight of raw material was being taken as 
one-third more than the weight of the finished work), the flat labour cost, and double the 
total of these items for other costs (ibid.). 
Two other pricing methods used were that of adding a fixed percentage to prime costs 
(raw materials and wages) or adding a percentage to the wage bill (ibid. pp. 22, 23). 
Small jobshops similarly relied on a raw material-plus method of arriving at selling 
price, starting with cost of raw material (bahan baku) and adding labour and overhead 
costs via different formulas. Multiplication of price of raw material by a certain fixed 
factor was practised by, among others, the owner of shop number 31: 
I figure how much the raw material costs. Then for small jobs I calculate three times the 
cost of raw material, for big jobs two times raw material cost. 
The owner of shop 54 likewise based price on raw material but used a different 
calculation. He calculated selling price at four times raw material cost and would allot 
25 percent to wages, 25 percent to additional labour cost (most of his employees were 
contracted on a bed and board basis), and the final 25 percent would be, in his words, 
'for the shop'. A number of jobshop owners met the capacity utilization problems of 
2
 Reviewed by Machlup (1967). 
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job-order work by pursuing an 'order book-based' pricing strategy. They would fix 
prices according to opportunity cost reasoning. When there were sufficient orders to 
have the shop working at full capacity, the manager would only accept additional 
orders at a premium price. When the order book was empty, on the other hand, he 
would accept a job at any price above raw material cost. Thus the statement of the 
manager of shop number 60: 
When I have lots of orders I do not accept all of them. I raise my price somewhat. But when 
my order book is still empty I will accept any order so long as I get enough to cover power, 
taxes, and labour expenses. 
Figure 10-1 Monthly cost flow: machine shop 14 (14 employees), 1991 
U № ^ % Jul .M 
* Labour, raw materials, tools, and implements 
Source: primary data 
Pricing Problems in Jobbing Firms 
The accountancy literature has attacked the pricing issue from a different angle. 
The accountant's objective is to make sure that proper costs are attached to each 
product. The hunt for a method that would adequately identify 'real' manufacturing 
costs started in the late nineteenth century. An early and important realization in the 
accountancy literature was that the difficulties of cost-allocation escalated with an 
increase in customization of production. It was relatively easy to attach real costs to a 
single product that was mass-produced ahead of demand, even though joint costs in 
multiproduct industries could give accountants headaches even in mass manufacturing. 
But accountants found that it was next to impossible to identify real costs in industrial 
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establishments producing a wide range of one-off products made to diverse customer 
specifications. 
The allocation of overheads (the term used here in the sense of costs that cannot be 
traced directly to production) in such job-order firms presented a major problem. Firms 
producing to order were unable to plan or accurately forecast production in a certain 
accounting period (e.g., a week, a month, a trimester) like firms producing to stock, 
because their production was directly dependent on the amount of orders placed by 
customers. Instead, overhead costs were attached to jobs according to experience-based 
turnover estimates. How far the monthly work load would deviate from such a 
hypothetical average month, however, was uncertain. If at the end of the month it was 
found that turnover had fallen short of this target then customers had been charged too 
little overhead; if turnover had been larger than expected then customers had been 
overcharged.3 
Figure 10-2 Monthly revenue and direct cost, shop 46 (95 empi), 
1989/1990 
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D 
* Depreciation on land, buildings and equipment not accounted for in this figure 
Source: primary data 
3
 Solomons (1951) describes how accountants gave up the idea of pinpointing 'real cost' 
at the tum of the twentieth century and then turned in a different direction, shifting from cost 
assessment to in-plant cost control. Costs now were made into a device for in-plant efficiency 
monitoring. Actual costs were compared with sets of 'normal' or 'standard' costs as an early 
warning system for managers controlling a multidivision company from the boardroom. At a 
later stage industry-wide cost standards evolved as a convention-based performance yardstick. 
This use of cost data evolved into what is now known as management accounting (Johnson 
1991). 
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Figures 10-1 and 10-2 (above) provide illustrations of this problem. Figure 10-1 
documents cost flows on a monthly basis in a small machine shop, Figure 10-2 shows 
the ups and downs in the orderbook of a large jobbing firm. As can be seen, these 
jobbing enterprises had to cope with strong fluctuations in capacity utilization. 
An additional problem was caused by the fact that every order required a different 
sequence and range of machine tools, greatly complicating costing. This problem 
manifested itself in larger shops with extensive technical capacities. The actual pricing 
and execution of a complicated job in one of these shops will serve as an illustration. 
The job involves the machining of a precut round piece of steel in the shape of a gear. 
Determinants of price are the following: a) the material used (price in kilograms); b) the 
'module' or spacing between two gear teeth (for a basic module, between 1.25 and 1.50 cm 
400 Rp/tooth, for a module of up to two cm Rp. 600, and so on); c) the 'pitch' or number of 
gear teeth, in other words, the diameter of the cog-wheel; d) the thickness of the gear (if 
over one inch then double price per tooth); e) the profile and shape (straight, helical, spiral) 
of the gear teeth; f) whether heat treatment is required. 
A customer orders a steel cog-wheel with straight teeth, 93 mm diameter and less than 
one inch thickness, a pitch of 60 teeth with a 1.5 cm module, and a central shafthole with a 
slot for a feather key. This job requires the following sequence of operations. First, the piece 
of steel is machined to the proper shape on a lathe, including the shafthole. Then the teeth 
are cut on a milling or gear-hobbing machine. The gear is transferred to a slotting machine 
where the feather key slot is cut away. Finally, it is brought to final dimensions on a 
grinding machine. No heat treatment is necessary because work-hardening steel is used. 
Next, price is calculated as follows. Raw material cost is Rp. 15,000, the price for work-
hardening steel being 7,000 Rp/kilogram. To this is added a jobbing cost of sixty teeth times 
Rp. 400 or Rp. 24,000. The customer is charged Rp. 39,000. 
Use of Cost Flow Recording Systems 
The extent to which jobshops in the Bandung sample relied on written recording 
systems is shown in Figure 10-3. It is clear from the Figure that the likelihood that a 
shop maintained a formalized cost recording system increased with firm size. When 
jobshops expanded, three circumstances induced owners to adopt an accounting system. 
First, they tended to loose sight of goings-on in the expanding company because they 
were forced to delegate more and more tasks to agents (overseers, shop managers, 
office staff, sales personnel, procurement office staff) whose actions they needed to 
monitor. Second, increasing size meant increasing visibility: the enterprise had to be 
formally registered and began paying various retributions. This necessitated a formal 
accounting system. Third, the expanding firm was likely to make use of services 
provided by the formal financial sector (bank loans, insurance, leasing arrangements for 
new machinery) eligibility for which required information on company assets and profit 
and loss statements (cf. McLeod 1991:192). The soundness, relevance, or usefulness of 
the accounting systems that were in use is another matter. Cost monitoring systems in 
even the largest shops seemed to be of doubtful quality. To some extent this may seem 
understandable given the unpredictable, fluctuating character of production. Partly, 
however, shop owners were responsible for the disordered state of their ledgers. Often, 
an owner retained а Ъоте industry* style of doing business long after his undertaking 
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had grown to respectable size. Company funds would be indiscriminately allocated 
among consumptive and business aims. They would circulate in the firm or be 
transferred to consumptive expenditures or to unrelated business ventures such as 
speculative investments in real estate. This fungibility created much confusion in the 
capital-raising department. A living mansion might be put up as security for a bankloan 
providing new machinery for the shop, the shop in turn might be used to secure another 
loan that went into a piece of land, and all these assets in turn might be used to take 
out a loan for a new sedan. 
Figure 10-3 Use of written records by shop employment size category, 
41 shops 
Size categoiy 
[ J 0 A «aployo» (Ν 9) 
Π S 1» employer (Ν 21) 
[ J 2(M9 employe» (N-9) 
[ J №99 employas (Ν β) 
Η 100« employas (N=4) 
\ v< 
A. 
Y 
\ \ 
Source primary dala 
Record-Keeping and Small Firm Expansion 
Many small industry empirical studies have drawn attention to inefficiencies arising 
from poor financial management practices such as have been described here (e.g., 
Anderson 1982). The suggestion is that 'cottage' and 'small' firms (0-19 employees) can 
improve their situation by adopting formal management and accounting methods. This 
reasoning, however, is based on the questionable assumption that, to quote Berry and 
Mazumdar, 'the sort of bookkeeping and accounting which would be considered de 
rigueur in large firms is essential in all small ones' (1991:58). 
What are the uses of financial records? First, owners use them to monitor the 
doings of management, and management can do likewise with firm personnel. Second, 
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management employs them to make short-term adjustments to cost flows. Third, public 
agencies demand recording systems for revenue-collecting purposes. And fourth, 
management can use these records for investment decisionmaking. Applying this 
reasoning to small jobbing firms I find that the first three grounds for the introduction 
of bookkeeping do not apply. Management and ownership are undivided, monitoring 
problems are of minor importance due to the small size of the establishment, and the 
firm is not be officially registered and can easily escape the scrutiny of public agencies. 
It is doubtful whether its usefulness in investment decisionmaking alone would justify 
the considerable effort needed to set up and maintain a record-keeping system.4 
An attempt of a small industry supporting nongovernmental organization to 
introduce formal accounting in small jobbing firms in the Bandung region provides 
evidence on this issue from the viewpoint of record users. Twelve shops participated in 
the bookkeeping course. All shops employed less than ten operators. All participating 
shops were managed single-handedly by their respective owner-managers. Each shop 
sent a representative to a three day training course conducted by the NGO: five owners 
came in person, one sent an employee, and six firms were represented by the owner's 
wife or schoolgoing son or daughter. After the course, all but one of the participants 
were thought to have grasped the principles of double-entry bookkeeping. 
Equipped with this knowledge and a king-size ledger they went back to business. 
After two months, each of the shops was visited and an assessment of the bookkeeping 
system was made. This showed (see Table 10-1) that four shops had not begun keeping 
records after the course. One owner stated that he had been too busy to make entries, 
another that for the past two months he had had no business at all so there were no 
entries to make, the shop owner who had sent his employee reported that the person 
had quit his job, and another owner had dropped out of the program because he was 
uninterested. 
Seven shops had incomplete ledgers. They dutifully registered balance changes but 
did not arrive at the point where they could make a profit and loss statement. Of these, 
two stated that they still incompletely understood the accounting system, and five said 
they had been too busy to keep records. One manager's response was typical: 
I have a bookkeeping system, but it isn't complete. When business is slack I make entries, 
when busy I don't. Then I am too busy buying materials, marketing, taking care of the book 
is too much trouble. 
Another owner commented that when he had no orders to process he had the time to 
make records but nothing to record, but as soon as he had orders to attend to he would 
be too busy to tend to his ledger. Only one shop had a fully developed bookkeeping 
system which was maintained by the owner's son. It is important to note that in five out 
of eight cases, the incomplete (seven) and complete (one) ledgers were attended to by 
4
 McLeod notes that owners of small firms 'are usually capable of storing all of the 
relevant information ... in their heads, and this makes it very difficult for an outsider such as a 
bank to judge the firm's financial condition and its ability to profitably employ additional funds' 
(1991:192). 
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the owner's wife (two cases), schoolgoing daughter (two cases), or a son who had 
recently joined his father in the shop (one case). In other words, members of the 
owner's household performed the cost monitoring function without pay. 
Table 10-1 Two month assessment of bookkeeping systems, 12 shops 
Firm no 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
State of records 
incomplete 
no records 
incomplete 
incomplete 
incomplete 
complete 
mcomplete 
incomplete 
no records 
no records 
mcomplete 
no records 
Reasons cited for failure 
'do not understand" 
'too busy, full order book' 
'do not understand' 
'too bus/ 
'too busy" 
'too busy' 
"too busy* 
'participating employee qua' 
'not interested' 
'too busy* 
'no orders' 
Source primary data 
This and other evidence5 suggests that intervention programs promoting record-
keeping for small firms should take care not to overlook a) the fact that financial 
record-keepmg as a monitoring instrument offers few advantages to small firm owners; 
and, b) the substantial cost involved in cost monitoring itself. 
Investment Decisionmaking: Cost-of-Fund or Demand-Driven 
Investment decisionmaking is the final topic broached in this chapter. In the 1930s 
economists set out to examine industrial investment behaviour with two working 
hypotheses. Investment decisions were thought to hinge on two factors: the cost of 
funds (i.e. interest rates) and the observed demand for a product. By the 1950s, 
extensive questionnaire-based research had shown that a) investments were indeed 
driven by increased demand or expected demand. Katona (1951:253), for example, 
reported that manufacturers were compelled to invest by an increase in demand for 
5
 More evidence is provided by a recent impact study of small industry support 
programs in Central Java In this study, Sandee et al (1994) report that only 20 percent out of a 
sample of 240 small manufacturing firms decided to take the bookkeeping course that was 
offered as part of the program None of these set up a bookkeeping system after completing the 
course (Henry Sandee, personal communicauon). 
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their products or because of increased competition; and that investments were Tiabitual' 
under favourable business conditions; b) the availability of funds played a role in 
investment decisions; and, c) the cost of funds seemed to be unimportant to 
decisionmakers (Hay & Morris 1991:447). My observations of the investment behaviour 
of jobshop managers confirm this demand-driven pattern of investment behaviour. 
Jobshop owners invested in new machinery when they felt optimistic and confident 
about the market they served. Eligibility for a bank loan was a determining factor in the 
case of smaller shops. But the fact that domestic lending rates stood at a high 25 to 30 
percent was taken into consideration by shop owners only after the investment decision 
had been made. In no case was a shop owner deterred from carrying out an investment 
project either by the magnitude of the lending rate or by upward changes in this rate. 
The Macrocontext: the 1991 Austerity Measures 
My field research coincided with a transition from economic boom to bust 
conditions in Indonesia. Up to 1990 there had been an unprecedented rate of business 
investment with new factories mushrooming at astonishing speed in major industrial 
regions.6 The upswing ended in 1991. The 1991 collapse had two causes. For one, the 
outbreak of the Gulf War was a major setback for textile exporters. The loss of the 
Middle Eastern markets and temporary downswing in the market for export 
manufactures reverberated through the industrial sector. The domestic market for 
manufactures was also affected by attempts of overseas exporters to reroute their 
merchandise to Indonesia. Among others, the consumer electronics market experienced 
a strong increase in semilegal and illegal imports. 
A different and more permanent source of investment dampening were the credit 
rationing policies introduced in 1990. Fear that inflation was getting out of hand — 
inflation stopped just short of the magical 'double-digit' 10 percent level in 1990-
prompted a series of austerity measures by the Ministry of Finance. These were the 
withdrawal in 1990 of Central Bank outstanding direct credits and a reduction of 
subsidized priority credits, followed by a withdrawal of $4.2 billion of state enterprise 
deposits from the commercial banking sector in February 1991, which were shifted to 
the Central Bank. Finally, the Central Bank announced a stepwise tightening of capital-
adequacy standards for Indonesian banks (Nasution 1991; Parker 1991). 
The credit tightening policies were somewhat slow in making themselves felt in 
business circles. The crunch only arrived in 1991, when commercial lending rates shot 
up to 30 percent and over, tapering off again to about 27 percent in 1992. Companies 
that were hardest hit by the reduced supply and high price of bank credit were heavy 
borrowers, those who had been late in getting investment projects underway, and 
companies caught in the midst of an investment project and unable to obtain additional 
bank loans to finish and commence production. 
6
 For an eyewitness report see Braadbaart (1992). 
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The Textile Shops and the Credit Crunch 
Virtually all shop owners stated that 1990 had been a record year. The textile shops 
were hard hit by the 1991 economic downturn. In the first place, textile factories 
reduced orders for textile machinery parts and servicing work. Many shop owners 
responded by stepping up their marketing efforts in the Bandung area or by penetrating 
far-away markets in Central and East Java. But because of intense competition many 
only partly succeeded in filling their orderbooks in this manner. 
In the second place, the contraction of bank credits had a strong impact on trade 
credit. Jobshops handled the financial part of their transactions with textile factories 
according to what was referred to as the 'kontra-bon' (counter-receipt) system. First the 
textile factory maintenance department would order a batch of spare parts from a 
jobshop. The jobshop then produced the parts and sent them to the factory to be judged 
and hopefully accepted. Next the factory would send a receipt or kontrabon, normally 
arriving at the jobshop within two weeks after delivery of the parts. Finally, the money 
due was paid into the shop's bank account. Payments for small orders arrived between 
two weeks and one month after receiving the kontrabon, large jobs might take more 
than a month. Assuming that it took a shop about a week to process an order, the 
financial returns would arrive about seven weeks after it had begun investing materials 
and manpower in the job.7 
The 1991 liquidity crisis predictably made itself felt in trade credit flows: all along 
the product chain, customers began postponing payments to their suppliers. Jobshop 
owners, as creditors, were on the receiving end. They complained about how the textile 
factories delayed payments for two months, three months, and in some cases they saw 
their money only six months after receiving the kontrabon. The machine shops could 
not shift this burden onto their own suppliers because they did not buy their raw 
materials in bulk, unwilling as they were to hold large inventories of precious special 
steels. The situation was different for shops working with plastic, Bakelite, and rubber, 
which were bought in bulk. Here various shops built up considerable debts with Jakarta 
suppliers. 
In the third place, the shops felt the credit squeeze in their relations with 
commercial and state banks. Especially firms that had become overconfident in their 
investment policies fell victim to crushing lending rates. 
Real Estate Markets and Business Expansion 
During the preceding investment boom, the real estate market had been a key 
investment sector during the investment boom. The surge in industrial investments led 
to a steep rise in land prices on the Bandung city periphery. Investors who, by design 
7
 Interestingly, shops having liquidity problems used the kontrabon as collateral for 
formal and informal sector money loans. 
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or chance, had acquired tracts of land before the rush for factory land began, suddenly 
found themselves in control of a highly valuable asset. In a survey I carried out in one 
such industrializing rural area in 1990, the value of unirrigated tracts of land increased 
sixfold in eighteen months, from 2,000 Rp./m2 to 12,000 Rp./m2, after the local 
government decided to open it up to industrial development (Braadbaart 1992:23). 
Industrial entrepreneurs could finance new investment projects by taking out large bank 
loans using tracts of appreciated land as collateral. The mechanism involved was 
graphically described by one entrepreneur: 
Many textile manufacturers operate like this. Suppose I own a house. I use the house, valued 
at 500 million, as security. With the loan I buy ten hectares of land on the outskirts of the 
city. I wait. The price of my land goes up. Then, using the land as security, I borrow 
another 10 billion from a government bank. I use 250 or 300 million to bribe bank officers 
from Bandung to Jakarta. Then I build a textile factory: three billion for construction, three 
billion for machinery, and one billion for additional costs. With the remaining money I start 
another speculative game. 
Two cases I recorded illustrate the enormous profits that could be made. 
Late in 1990 C, a civil servant, was offered the chance to broker a deal between a number 
of landowners in a village on the southern periphery of Bandung, and an industrialist on the 
lookout for a plot of land on which she intended to build a factory for the production of 
leather bags. The landowners asked Rp. 8,500 per m2 for a 30 hectare plot of unirrigated 
farmland. С wished to buy four hectares, knowing that the industrialist (unaware of the local 
selling price) was ready to pay him 14,000 Rp./m . The contract between С and the 
industrialist also extended to the necessary paperwork and permits, total costs of which were 
estimated by С at Rp. 37 million, five million of which were to be used as graft. С would 
be able to make a small fortune out of the deal, Rp. 220 million. 
Another case involved a building contractor dabbling in a number of entrepreneurial 
ventures in hobby-like fashion. One of his projects involved the setting up of a small 
galvanizing works in 1990: he hoped to sell galvanized steel structures via his connections in 
the building industry. Whereas the galvanizing project was beset by technical problems, the 
value of the land on which the plant sat increased manyfold, making the owner an overnight 
(Rupiah) billionaire.' 
Timing of Investment Decisionmaking 
The business cycle-determined investment behaviour pattern suggests that timing 
was a crucial factor in investment decisionmaking. The comments of a machine-shop 
owner who opened an automotive parts stamping factory during the boom capture this 
feature of industrial investment: 
Luckily I stopped borrowing from the bank. If I wouldn't have I would be finished now. If I 
had made my investment only six months later than I did I would be wiped out right now. I 
used to have 500 employees. Now I have only 350 left. And I still have the jobbing market: 
manufacturing is down, but job-order work is up. This was the first time I made such a large 
investment, but your timing has to be very precise. Because the Indonesian economy has 
strong ups and downs. So you have to be prepared all the time: when there is an 
opportunity, invest quickly. Latecomers lose. At this very moment I already have another 
Compare the quick rise of the Papandayan shop, described in Appendix D. 
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credit proposal down at my bank, so I can go ahead again whenever I need to.' 
The following survivor principle was at work in Indonesian business. Major investment 
projects (the construction of a new factory, capacity enlargement, or the branching out 
in a new line of business) should coincide with a business cycle upswing. If one started 
too early or too late, the debt burden would not be offset by growing revenue, often 
with disastrous results. Although I cannot present any systematic evidence, a number of 
rags-to-riches-to-rags cases I recorded indicate the importance of timing. 
The one-time owner of a big textile conglomerate in Bandung returned to his former status 
of bicycle-mounted cloth trader when he mistimed a massive investment in state-of-the-art 
Swiss-made weaving machinery and went bankrupt. Four friends set up a synthetic yam 
trading business and moved into manufacturing when they jointly established a small 
spinning mill in 1989. This first, relatively modest, venture was successful. Tliey acquired a 
new tract of land nearby in 1990 on which they started to build a new larger spinning mill. 
Before construction was completed, however, they ran out of funds due to the tight money 
situation. In 1991, the enterprise was put under guardianship and bankruptcy followed not 
long afterwards. 
The owner of another textile conglomerate decided to build an integrated textile plant in 
the same area late in 1989. This project experienced many set-backs: first the small 
commercial bank that furnished the capital refused to provide additional funding; then a fire 
destroyed part of the nearly completed spinning section; the Gulf War put a temporary halt 
on all activity in 1991; on top of all this, tensions between factory management and the 
surrounding population erupted into a storming and partial destruction of the unfinished 
weaving section by local villagers. All this led to a considerable slow-down. As a result, the 
entrepreneur was caught in the credit crunch. By mid-1992 he was bankrupt and negotiating 
with his bank for a postponement of seizure. 
The case histories of four jobbing firms, finally, provide detailed evidence on the 
reactions of owner/managers to distress situations. 
In 1989 the revenue of shop 48 was Rp. 100 million; in 1990, a record revenue of Rp. 112 
million was recorded. Profits, Rp. 31 million in 1990, were saved in a bank account except 
for 12 million used as down payment invested for a new car. In 1991 sales sunk to 60 
million and profits to 3.6 million. Monthly instalments for the pick-up truck totalled 6 
million, however. During my visit, in lanuary 1992, the owner reported that he had taken 
various countermeasures. First, he stretched liquidity by maximum borrowing on the trade 
credit circuit: he stood five million in arrears with his raw materials supplier but pressured 
his own customers to pay up as quickly as possible. Second, he was 13 to 14 million in the 
red on his bank account, which had a IS million ceiling. Third, he had dismissed half of his 
workforce, and now employed only three instead of seven workers. And fourth, he was 
draining his savings account. He had not, however, disposed of his car, which considered the 
mark of his success. At that time he had nine more monthly instalments of Rp. 0.5 mi. left 
to pay. The owner found his bank debt to be the most troublesome aspect of his 
predicament. Yet at the same time he considered taking out another loan for investment in 
additional equipment rather than taking austerity measures. 
Also in January 1992, N., the owner of shop 26, was in the process of moving from the 
city centre to the eastern periphery of Bandung, within easy reach of expanding textile 
industry in this area. The credit crunch caught N. right in the middle of this project. N., who 
had started in 1973 as a textile parts broker, specialized in plastic injection moulding and 
rubber parts making. On the new location, a 1500 m2 tract of land, he had a luxurious house 
and a workshop built. N. owed Rp. 150 million to a commercial bank, 15 million of which 
he used as working capital and the remainder tied up in the newly constructed house and 
workshop. N.'s targeted monthly turnover was Rp. 30 million, but sales had averaged 28 
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million in 1991 and his net monthly return about 4 million. A 25 percent monthly interest on 
the 150 million loan left N. only Rp. 825,000 as monthly return. This was insufficient to 
repay the principal. The obvious solution to this problem was to complete the relocation as 
fast as possible and use the money from the sale of the city residence-c«m-workshop to pay 
back the loan. But N. appeared to dislike the idea of disposing of any physical assets. He 
stated that he had not made proper calculations beforehand. When he had applied for the 
loan, bank loan officers had come to inspect the collateral, but they did not ask for a 
feasibility study nor did they attempt to calculate the financial carrying capacity of N.'s 
undertaking. 
In the above cases shop owners reacted to distress situations by holding on to fixed 
assets at the cost of liquidity. The distress strategy of shop owner 57, contrariwise, was 
to release fixed assets. 
S. made springs for the textile industry. The year 1991 was a string of disasters. In 1990 S. 
had borrowed 10 million from a private bank. Part of these funds he invested in a new 
pickup truck, another part in the workshop of his brother, who made rubber rolls for textile 
machinery; the remainder he used as working capital. But all through 1991 orders had been 
down to a bare minimum. During the last two months orders S. failed to secure a single 
order, the fact notwithstanding that he was on the road visiting textile factories for long 
stretches. In November 1991 S. decided to sell his pickup as well as four small lathes for 
Rp.l million each. The following month he fired five of his nine employees. During the 
interview S. admitted that the 10 million bankloan was like a millstone around his neck: he 
was paying a monthly interest of Rp. 300.000 and had repaid nothing of the principal yet. In 
another month the bank would decide whether to extend his loan or demand repayment. S. 
still had Rp.5 million in savings but did not want to break into these funds. He stated that it 
he would be forced to pay up he would sell more of his machinery. 
Conclusions 
The preceding discussion of financial flow management may be briefly summarized 
as follows. Job-shop owners in the Bandung manufacturing sector tended to be 
uncertain about the magnitude of financial in and out-flows and the profit and loss 
situation of their establishments. In part, this was due to production circumstances 
peculiar to job-order work. Partly, it was also due to a lack of good financial record-
keeping. The prevalence of bookkeeping increased with shop size. Management in 
larger shops adopted formal accounting systems in order to monitor employees, in order 
to comply with fiscal legislation, and in order to get access to the capital market. Small 
firms evaded government regulations and seemed to find the effort needed for financial 
flow recording not worthwhile. From my evidence I draw the tentative conclusion that 
a formal record-keeping system is a precondition for success, i.e. expansion, only 
insofar as it is a qualifying criterion for the formal financial market or government 
support programs. Managerial advantages are limited because of the amount of time 
required for book-keeping. Finally, a discussion of investment decisionmaking gave an 
impression of the marked impact of macrolevel credit rationing policies on microlevel 
business conduct. This part of the chapter stressed the key role of the real estate market 
during the industrial boom as well as the importance of investment timing. 
11 Ethnicity and Enterprise 
The prominent role of Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia's rapid economic 
growth has stimulated much discussion. Chinese-owned family businesses have been 
the backbone of economic growth in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, but also in 
the likes of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where Overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs have been in the forefront of the economic advance. In the latter, 
domination of the economy by Chinese immigrants and their descendants has long been 
considered a threat that successive governments have tried -often in vain- to counter 
with discriminatory policies. 
The success of Chinese entrepreneurs in Asia has given rise to many speculations. 
Somewhat simplifying one can say that observers have approached the issue from two 
directions. On the one hand are those who suspect that there are deeper-lying cultural 
factors at work that create a distinct Chinese style of business management. Work along 
this line attributes a special significance to familism. On the other hand, there are those 
who argue that the present dominant position of Chinese businesses should be seen in 
the light of the concrete historical process whereby immigrant minorities are assimilated 
in host societies (cf. McVey 1992:10). 
It is these issues that this chapter will tackle. The approach taken here differs from 
that used in most other contemporary studies. Whereas most studies focus exclusively 
on Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, the following investigation compares the 
performance of Chinese and 'indigenous' entrepreneurs operating in the same line of 
business. A recent review of ethnic business studies by Aldrich and Waldinger provides 
the theoretical framework for this exercise. This review gives a number of useful 
guidelines for research in the field of contemporary ethnicity and entrepreneurship. Its 
authors admonish researchers to take the utmost care in the use of ethnic labels, to be 
sensitive to the reciprocal relationship between ethnicity and entrepreneurship, they 
propagate the adoption of a research perspective that is explicitly comparative and that 
focuses on business performance over time (1990:131,132). 
I have organized the chapter as follows. It opens with a brief discussion of the 
uncertain position of Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. Then I summarize and critically 
evaluate the culture explanation of Chinese business success and its historical 
counterpart. I subsequently tum to the jobbing industry and compare the performance of 
Chinese-owned and non-Chinese shops. After establishing that Chinese-owned firms 
had indeed outgrown pribumi businesses, I raise a number of questions in order to 
explain this pattern: were Chinese managers more efficient than their pribumi 
counterparts, that is, did they obtain higher returns from the resources at their disposal? 
Did they enjoy an initial advantage in the form of a head start or previously 
accumulated assets? Or did Chinese firms outgrow pribumi shops because they were 
run on a family basis? Findings are summed up in the concluding section. 
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Indonesian Antagonism vis-a-vis Overseas Chinese1 
As traders, mainland Chinese had played an important role in the Indonesian 
archipelago's trade for centuries when, from the 18th century onward, the Dutch 
colonial occupants began enlisting Chinese immigrants as 'an intermediary economic 
force in the process of mercantile extraction', as Robison puts it (1986:19). Chinese 
immigrants came to occupy three economic niches. They performed manual labour in 
the service of the Dutch; they took to private enterprising in trade, distribution, and 
services; and they operated private tax-farming enterprises. Many Chinese entered the 
country on coolie contracts, supplying cheap and reliable labour for various projects 
sponsored by the Dutch. A number of these later set out in trade and commerce. When 
they gained control of the Indies in the 17th century, the Dutch had pushed Chinese 
traders out of the lucrative import and export trade with Java. The Chinese had reacted 
by reorienting to domestic commerce. Fortified by a continuous inflow of new 
immigrants, the Chinese eventually came to dominate Java's internal distribution 
network. The top layer of this stratum of traders and moneylenders was involved in 
various tax-farming activities rented out by the Dutch: they levied tolls on bridges and 
roads, controlled and collected revenue on certain products (e.g., salt), operated public 
markets, and administered Dutch-owned estates. In this manner Chinese immigrants 
came to occupy a middleman position in colonial society in between of the Dutch 
colonial élite and the indigenous population. 
These developments were to have far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, 
they enabled Chinese entrepreneurs to amass capital which they invested in domestic 
commercial activities, trade and moneylending, to a lesser extent in manufacturing, and 
in the expanding 19th century import and export trade. Dutch laws prohibiting the 
acquisition of land by 'foreign Asiatics' channelled Chinese enterprise into trade, 
services, and manufacturing. In this manner Chinese businesses were well set to take 
advantage of the economic opportunities that came along in the 20th century. 
Eventually this springboard launched Chinese firms to a dominant position after 
independence. 
On the other hand, the perceived affiliation of the Chinese with the Dutch colonial 
rulers as well as their highly visible 'extractive' position in the colonial economy gave 
rise to deep-seated anti-Chinese sentiments which came to the fore after Indonesia 
gained its political independence. The Overseas Chinese were a main target of anti-
foreign policies effected as well as violent outbreaks that occurred in the xenophobic 
climate prevailing during the 1950s and 1960s. In the Bandung region such outbreaks 
occurred in 1963 and again in 1973. On the former occasion riots involving the 
pillaging and destruction of Chinese property were instigated by student protests against 
president Sukarno. On the latter occasion an official visit by the Japanese Prime 
1
 This section is based on Braadbaatt & Zevalkink 1986. 
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Minister sparked riots centring on the Chinese-dominated uptown business area.2 
Although such occurrences have been less frequent since the 1970s, the ever-present 
danger of violent outbursts of racism coupled to the discriminatory practices they 
experience in every-day life have maintained the Indonesian Chinese in their position of 
beleaguered minority. 
Explanations for the Economic Prominence of Overseas Chinese 
A number of explanations for the economic prominence of Overseas Chinese in 
contemporary Southeast Asia are put forward in the academic literature. Chinese 
entrepreneurs can allegedly avail of ethnic financial and trade networks spanning the 
region; Chinese familism provides a solid foundation for the pursuit of business goals; 
before independence, Chinese immigrants mediated between the colonial occupants and 
indigenous populations in a number of countries. This broker position both created 
opportunities and set constraints to their social ambitions, steering many into private 
business undertakings. 
A rift running through this literature separates studies emphasizing the historical 
circumstances of Chinese success from studies stressing the role of Chinese culture 
(McVey 1992). Studies focusing on the contemporary Southeast Asian situation tend to 
fall in the latter category. A unique style of group cooperation coupled with business 
familism, both grounded in Chinese cultural values, are alleged to be the key source of 
Chinese competitive advantage (e.g., Hamilton 1991; Redding 1990). The cultural 
explanation is not free from methodological pitfalls and displays some of the 
weaknesses noted in Aldrich and Waldinger's review of ethnic business studies. 
Research tends to be parochial, that is, focused on Chinese businesses only rather than 
on the relative performance of Chinese vis-a-vis non-Chinese enterprise. Much analysis 
rests on an underlying questionable assumption of Chinese cultural homogeneity before 
and after the diaspora. Authors attribute the business performance of Overseas Chinese 
firms to unchanging Chinese values and aspirations but fail to deal satisfactorily with 
the methodological issues raised by this statement. And a special role is claimed for 
Chinese business familism but no evidence provided that familism is more preponderant 
than in other ethnic groups. 
2
 Mackie provides the following description of the 1973 riots: The Bandung riots arose 
after an incident in which an Indonesian horsecart driver was beaten up by the Chinese driver 
of a Volkswagen with which it had had a minor collision. Shortly afterwards an attack on the 
Chinese by Indonesian becak drivers and others from the urban poor quickly snowballed into 
very wide-spread destruction and looting of Chinese (and some Indonesian) property in the 
Jalan Braga shopping area and parts of the Chinese residential quarter. The destruction 
continued from 6.30 p.m. until far into the night. Police and army units were slow to take 
action, but the following day, apparently on orders from Jakarta, security measures were 
intensified in Bandung and other cities, and no further violence occurred (1976:137).' 
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Cultural Explanations: Primordial Values and Their Problems 
Although the current of literature that stresses the unique Chinese style of 
management is somewhat removed from the mainstream debate on the role of state 
intervention and market forces in Asian growth, the ideas propagated here have found 
their way in occasional allusions to 'Chinese business acumen' and other attributed 
values and attitudes by which the Chinese are set apart from other Asians (e.g., 
Borthwick 1992:319). A related factor mentioned is a specifically Chinese style of 
collective action in family businesses and in wider business networks (Hamilton 1991). 
The superior performance of Chinese-owned firms is traced to the fact that Chinese act 
more cohesively in the economic arena than other ethnic groups. The Chinese family is 
an ideal vehicle for business enterprise because its inner structure resembles a model 
business organization (Redding 1990). It allegedly espouses such corporate values as a 
strong identification of self with the organization (that is, the family), a responsible 
attitude towards the collective, obedience towards one's superiors (filial piety), and a 
well-developed sense of hierarchical relationships (Hamilton 1990). 
This family of explanations suffers from a number of conceptual and 
methodological problems. First, primordial value explanations fall prey to what 
anthropologist David Bidney labelled 'culturalistic fallacy7. By this he meant a tendency 
to see culture as a phenomenon independent of actual behaviour and therefore 
impervious to change, 'a reality sui generis, a super-psychic, supersocial entity 
independent of man, individually and collectively' (1967:51).3 
Second, the underlying assumption of Chinese cultural homogeneity is questionable 
(cf. Yinger 1985). In how far may 'Chineseness' be considered a homogeneous 
category? Although I am not competent to judge the cultural homogeneity of mainland 
China, it is an obvious matter of debate in how far third, fourth, or fifth generation 
Filipino, Indonesian, or Thai Chinese still share a common heritage. 
Third, the relationship between actors' statements on their value orientations and 
attitudes and their actual behaviour is highly ambiguous (Deutscher 1973). Because of 
the discrepancy between what people say and what they do, expressed attitudes cannot 
be taken at their face value as reliable indicators of behaviour. Proponents of primordial 
value explanations have paid insufficient attention to this problem (e.g., Redding 1980). 
Fourth, the rapid development of immigrant 'ethnic entrepreneurship' in host 
countries is far from a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. The economic success of 
Overseas Chinese is one case among many, bearing strong resemblance to the 
Lebanese, Indian, Pakistani, Korean and other success stories following their migration 
to a variety of host countries (Bonacich 1973). Cultural explanations fail to account for 
these parallel cases. 
3
 The idea of an immutable cultural core is untenable. Compare the following comment by 
Aldrich and Waldinger: 'for every study that emphasizes an ethnic group's culture as a key 
factor in its economic achievements in business, another exists that emphasizes the often radical 
cultural changes occurring over a few generations' (1990:126). 
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Fifth, the assertion that Overseas Chinese enjoy an advantage by operating in 
family teams likewise requires further qualification. The mobilization of kinship 
networks in the pursuit of economic goals is a commercial strategy that is both time-
honoured and universal. Family businesses dominate in the economies of many 
countries. Boswell found that the boards of nearly two out of three firms (63.5 percent) 
in a sample of 318 small and medium-size British manufacturing enterprises (25-500 
employees) were family-dominated (1973:248); according to a recent estimate, 80 to 90 
percent of all Dutch businesses are family-owned (SER 1989); Pollak reports that 
'family farm products accounted for 67.6 percent of the value of farm products sold in 
the U.S. in 1974' (1985:591, n.23); comparable findings have been reported for rural 
agricultural and industrial enterprises in India (Rutten 1991; Upadhya 1988), and in 
many other empirical studies. There is, in other words, nothing remarkable in the fact 
itself that Chinese tend to operate in family teams. Further specification would be 
necessary to substantiate this point. 
A final criticism was made earlier in this chapter: ethnic management style 
explanations are inherently comparative in nature yet few studies advancing 
explanations along these lines rest on cross-cultural evidence. Most rely solely on 
descriptions of Chinese business behaviour. 
Historical Explanations of Chinese Business Success 
In historical explanations the keyword Opportunities' is substituted for the 'attitudes' 
of management style interpretations. Ethnic business performance is seen in terms of 
opportunity structures and group characteristics. The former refer to market entry 
conditions favouring immigrants. The latter include culture and aspiration levels but 
mainly refer to various ways of resource mobilization through ethnic networks. In the 
historical view the current dominance of Chinese-owned firms in Southeast Asia is the 
outcome of concrete processes of change. On the microlevel, previously accumulated 
assets including capital, business experience, and trade and customer networks provided 
a number of Chinese entrepreneurs with a head start in the postcolonial period. A 
number of immigrant Chinese were able to amass wealth in the middleman position 
allotted to them in colonial society. Overseas Chinese had easier access to regional and 
international markets than indigenous entrepreneurs in host countries because they 
could avail of transnational kinship and ethnic networks. A well-developed informal 
Chinese credit system also gave them easier access to external funding. 
On the macrolevel, discriminatory policies coupled with informal social closure 
mechanisms channelled Chinese aspirations into business rather than into other societal 
fields. Exclusionary policies and widespread discrimination forged cohesion among 
Chinese entrepreneurs, limited the range of career paths open to young Chinese, and 
thereby stimulated business familism. The latter was an important economic asset, 
facilitating the difficult initial growth of newly-founded businesses. 
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Evidence: the Indonesian Jobbing Industry 
Did the Bandung engineering shops display any of the relationships between 
management performance and ethnic identity (Chinese vs. non-Chinese firms) 
postulated in the literature reviewed above? I have classified a sample of 54 job-shops 
in Chinese-owned and pribumi-ovmeä firms on the one hand, and in family-managed 
and single person-managed on the other hand. My lumping together of all Chinese 
firms in one category and all other enterprises in another is admittedly crude but 
follows local usage, both formal and informal, which sets Chinese-owned enterprises 
apart from what are referred to as pribumi (indigenous) enterprises. Chinese firms were 
identified as such by pribumi shop owners in the sample. Typically, when I would 
mention a certain shop to a pribumi interviewee he would immediately point out the 
ethnic background of its owner if in his eyes a non-pribumi shop was concerned. 
Table 11-1 Average employment size of 54 jobshops by ethnic identity of owners 
and management structure 
Mean no. of 
employees 
Stand, dcv. 
Chinese-owned firms 
(N=21) 
Family-managed 
(N=14) 
62.29 
48.64 
Singly managed 
(N-7) 
37.57 
20.90 
pribumi films 
(N=33) 
Family-managed 
(N-5) 
21.40 
18.65 
Singly managed 
(N=28) 
10.21 
10.86 
Source: primary data 
Definitions of the family firm generally focus on management and/or ownership. 
For the present purposes the term family firm refers to a business enterprise in which 
two or more relatives were the key decision makers. Such an enterprise would often 
also be co-owned by family members but I choose not to apply this second criterion 
here because the ownership structure of Indonesian family firms was defined vaguely or 
not at all. 
Table 11-1 charts the relationship between employment size (average employment 
for 1989 and 1991) and ethnicity and familism for 54 jobbing establishments. It 
provides the starting point for an analysis of managerial causes of divergent size. Three 
facts stand out clearly from the Table. First, the amazing overall success, in terms of 
employment size, of Chinese-owned firms compared to non-Chinese owned firms: 21 
Chinese-owned firms in the 54 firm-sample employed 4.5 times as much employees per 
firm (54.05 workers on average) as their 34 non-Chinese counterparts, who employed 
only 11.91 workers. 
Second, most Chinese firms were family-owned and managed (14 out of 21 firms 
or 67 percent), whereas only five out of 33 pribumi shops (15 percent) were of the 
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family fum-type. 
Third, Chinese and non-Chinese family firms performed better than non-family 
managed enterprises overall as well as in their respective categories. Nineteen family-
managed firms employed an average workforce of 51.53 operators against an average 
of 15.69 for the combined Chinese and pribumi non-family managed establishments. 
Not shown in the Table but underlining the importance of family ties in the industry is 
the absence of profit-sharing arrangements involving non-relatives: in only two cases 
was a shop managed in joint venture-form by partners not linked by kinship ties. 
In terms of employment size, then, these data confirm the general Indonesian and 
Southeast Asian pattern of Chinese-owned firms outperforming 'indigenous' 
establishments. Furthermore, they unequivocally show that family firms outperformed 
single-owner shops. The next task is to assess how ethnicity and familism relate to 
management style and environmental factors. I will try to provide answers to the 
following questions. First, what was the historical background of the engineering firms? 
Can the divergent size of Chinese and pribumi shops be attributed to historical micro-
factors? E.g., to the fact that Chinese entrepreneurs were earlier entrants and profited 
from this advantage, or clung more tenaciously to their trade. Second, what evidence is 
there for a distinct Chinese management style? Were Chinese-owned shops more ably 
managed? That is, were they run more efficiently: did they make bigger profits or did 
they make more productive use of the labour and capital at their disposal? Or were 
Chinese managers more sensitive to the markets they served? 
Ethnicity and the Origins of the Industry 
I will commence with a closer examination of ethnicity and establishment age and 
size. There were strong positive correlations between a number of growth and size 
variables and Chinese ethnic identity. These are: Number of employees; Number of 
years that the shop had been in existence; Average number of new employees generated 
by the shop per year during its existence. Furthermore, I found a strong positive 
correlation between Chinese management and size of 1991 revenue.4 
These findings offer a partial explanation for the fact that Chinese shops dominated 
the jobbing industry in terms of establishment size: the correlation between ethnicity 
and firm age is strongly significant. In part, therefore, we may conclude that Chinese 
establishments were larger than pribumi shops in 1991 because they were older. 
Detailed evidence on the head start of Chinese shops is provided by Table 11-2, which 
shows the age distribution of Chinese and non-Chinese firms in the sample. The Table 
clearly shows that most Chinese shops were founded earlier than ргіЬи/ni'-owned 
establishments. Seventeen out of 22 Chinese-owned shops (77 percent) was founded 
4
 Pearson correlatioas for the former three (N=55) were 0.48, 0.50, and 0.42 respectively, 
all significant at p<0.001. Correlation between ethnicity and revenue (N=32), 0.45, was 
significant at p<0.01. 
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before 1980. By contrast, only 30 percent (10 shops) of the pribumi enterprises was 
founded before 1980. 
Table 11-2 Age distribution of 55 engineering firms by ethnic background 
Start-up 
period 
before 1962 
1962 - 67 
1968 - 73 
1974 - 79 
1980 - 85 
1986 - 91 
Chinese firms 
no.' mean 
9 
3 
1 
4 
1 
4 
(N=22) 
empi.2 
52.4 
45 0 
(375 0) 
77.0 
69 0 
33 0 
pnbumi 
no. 
2 
2 
1 
5 
10 
13 
(N=33) 
Tirms 
mean empi. 
8.0 
9.5 
(58.0) 
12.2 
18.4 
4.2 
, Number of establishments 
" Mean employment size 1989-1991 
Source primary data 
Notice, however, that Chinese shops were larger in employment terms throughout 
the age range. This would lead one to think that Chinese businesses enjoyed some 
managerial or other advantage in addition to their firstcomer status. Four possible 
explanations suggest themselves: a) Chinese shops were privileged because they had 
easier access to capital and product markets via ethnic business networks; b) Chinese 
found it easier to expand because of previously accumulated assets such as capital or 
trade experience; c) Chinese managers were more efficient or more sensitive to the 
market; d) Chinese businesses had the advantage of operating in family firm form. 
Below I will examine each of these possibilities. 
Ethnic Business Networks 
The success of Chinese business ventures could be due to ethnic commercial 
networks providing Chinese entrepreneurs with easier access to orders and credit than 
their less fortunate pribumi counterparts. I found no evidence of such ethnic 
commercial networks in the jobbing industry. Ethnic business networks may have been 
important before the 1960s, when a shared language and origin and kinship and 
community ties bound together Chinese entrepreneurs in the trade networks described 
by Willmott (1960), but now no longer so. Some of my pribumi informants vented 
conspiracy theories, alleging that Chinese industrialists channelled orders to Chinese-
owned shops only. However, I doubt whether these accusations were founded on a 
basis of truth. The lack of cohesion of this segment of the Chinese business community 
appeared to be a consequence of high social and geographical mobility. After 1975 the 
Bandung jobbing industry had become a growth industry, attracting Chinese 
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entrepreneurs from different parts of Java. Many of the second-generation Chinese 
family teams had started from scratch in Bandung, building up a sizeable busmess in a 
matter of years. The second language of these entrepreneurs (after Bahasa Indonesia) 
was that of their area of origin rather than one or another variant of Chinese. 
Previously Accumulated Assets 
Previously accumulated financial assets and trade experience did seem to play a 
role in the quick growth of the younger generation of Chinese-owned shops. However, I 
did not find evidence of a relationship with wealth amassed during the colonial period. 
A number of Chinese managers could draw on previous trading experience, a customer 
network, and financial resources when they set up shop. Table 11-3 (below) shows that 
ten out of 19 Chinese managers (53 percent) had previous trading experience against 
only eight out of 30 pribumi managers (27 percent). The case of shop 37 illustrates the 
competitive edge of jobshops founded as a spin-off from trading activities. 
Shop 37 was managed jointly by the two Purwoso brothers and their sister Their parents, of 
Chinese extraction, moved to Bandung from Semarang in 1978 The two brothers worked as 
employees in a textile factory until 1985 when they set up a trade buying and selling 
secondhand textile machinery They also collected orders for textile spare parts which they 
sub-contracted to the pnbumi-ovmed shop number 30 In 1989 they decided to concentrate 
on textile spares production They severed the relationship with shop 30 and set up shop in a 
recently acquired house, part of which they used as living quartets Business expanded 
quickly end 1991 twenty two operators worked in a shop outfitted with seven lathes, four 
milling machines, a gear-hobbing machine, and a planing machine Turnover in 1991 was 
Rp 600 million ($315,000) Sixty percent of orden> were earned out in-house, the remainder 
subcontracted to other jobshops All outhouse activities (visiting texule faetones, arranging 
subcontracted work, etc ) were performed by the two brothers who were aided by one trusted 
salesman Their younger sister waited on customers in the shop, supervised the machine 
operators, and handled incoming calls 
Ethnicity and Management Efficiency 
Was there any relationship between ethnicity and management efficiency? This 
question can be examined with help of three efficiency measures constructed from 1991 
financial profiles collected from 32 job-shops: profitability, capital productivity, and 
labour productivity.5 Statistical analysis produces no support for the notion that Chinese 
shops performed better than pribumi shops because they were more efficiently 
managed. There is no significant relationship between ethnic identity and efficiency as 
defined here. Pearson correlations between ethnicity and profit margin are -0.14; 
between ethnicity and capital productivity -0.28; and between ethnicity and labour 
productivity 0.09. The weak relationship between the latter two variables and 
'Chineseness' is even negative. 
5
 Refer to Appendix В for information on the construction of these variables 
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The presence or absence of financial record-keeping can be taken as another 
indicator of management efficiency. Chinese shops were much more likely to have a 
bookkeeping system than pribumi shops.6 However, rather than signifying a causal 
relationship, this correlation is due to a common underlying factor, that is, 
establishment size. Small shops lacked record-keeping systems because the manager(s) 
were easily able to store all necessary information in their heads. Moreover, small 
shops did not need to maintain a bookkeeping system for fiscal purposes because they 
were not officially registered. Larger shops without exception maintained record-
keeping systems, both for cost monitoring and fiscal purposes. Most of the latter were, 
as we have seen, Chinese-owned and managed. Thus, the presence of bookkeeping is 
an indicator of firm size rather than of managerial excellence. 
Ethnicity and Management Market-Sensitivity 
Market-sensitivity is a different yardstick of managerial excellence. I have 
constructed two variables that capture this feature of enterprising: commercial 
background and market strategy. Commercial background, the first variable, is a binary 
value. It classifies shop owners into those who started their business as a production or 
engineering-oriented undertaking, and those who set out as traders and were strongly 
marketing-oriented. Table 11-3 suggests that such a difference in the commercial 
background of pribumi and Chinese managers existed. The managers of 10 out of 18 
shops (53 percent) had experience in trade when they set up a jobbing firm. Only 9 out 
of 31 pribumi managers were traders by origin. The difference between the two groups 
is nearly statistically significant (chi-square (df 1, N=49) = 3.37, p<0.1). 
Table 11-3 Ethnic identity of management and commercial background (N=49 
establishments) 
Management background 
Engineering Trade 
Pnbumi shops 22 (73 %) 8 (27 %) 
Chinese shops 9 (47 %) 10 (53 %) 
Source: primary data 
The second variable, market strategy, classifies establishments in three groups. The 
first category, passive market strategy, comprises shops with a wait-and-see attitude to 
the market. Shops in this category made no active sales effort: they did not visit 
6
 Correlation between ethnicity and record-keeping was 0.5, statistically significant with a 
p-value smaller than 0.001 (N=47). 
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customers on a regular basis but waited for orders from irregular customers. Shops in 
the second category, joint venture strategy, likewise did not pursue an active marketing 
policy, but they were engaged in one or another long-standing relationship with a select 
number of customers. This group included shops patronized by a small number of 
factories and shops processing jobs for traders or other shops in a putting out or sub-
contracting relationship. In a number of cases, the customer network of shops in this 
category was built up in an earlier phase when the owner used to undertake regular 
marketing trips. The third category, active market strategy, comprises forward-
integrated shops that had their own marketing departments. In the case of small 
establishments the owner often doubled as general manager and salesman. Larger shops 
employed professional sales staff. 
No clear-cut inter-group difference emerges from a comparison of the market 
strategies of Chinese and pribumi firms. In a sample of 32 pribumi shops, nine (28 
percent) pursued a wait-and-see market strategy, ten (31 percent) were connected to the 
market by joint venture-type relationships, and thirteen (41 percent) pursued an active 
market strategy. By contrast, out of twenty Chinese shops eight (40 percent) pursued a 
wait-and-see strategy, only one was engaged in a joint venture relationship, and eleven 
(55 percent) had integrated forward. In other words, a slight majority of pribumi 
managers (59 percent) had a passive attitude toward the market and only a slight 
majority of Chinese managers (55 percent) practised an active market strategy. Chi-
square analysis of passive/active market strategy (excluding the intermediate joint 
venture strategy) for Chinese and pribumi firms produces non-significant results (chi-
square (df 1, N=41) = 0.006, p<.95). 
The conclusion that we may draw from the data presented so far is that Chinese 
proprietors were no more efficient managers than their pribumi counterparts but in all 
likelihood profited from their trading background. In view of the high positive 
correlation between trading background and speed of expansion of firm (Pearson con. 
of 0.6 for N=50, p<0.001), the latter finding is a partial explanation of Chinese success. 
Familism and Agency Problems 
Because jobbing firms did not sell a ready-made product but depended on 
customers' requests, an expansionary strategy hinged on management's ability to attract 
and secure new orders and increase the number of customers. To this end, as we saw in 
the preceding section, ten pribumi shops and one Chinese shop engaged in a joint 
venture-type arrangement with another firm or firms. Seventeen shops, most of these 
managed by owners with an engineering background, were 'passive' jobbers. They 
relied on a customer network built up in an earlier period when they were still active in 
the marketing field as well as on informal advertising. Twentyfour shops, many of 
which had been founded by backward integrating traders, practised an active market 
search strategy. Jobshop owners combining marketing and production and running their 
business singlehandedly seemed to experience management problems arising from the 
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multilocality of their operations. Left without supervision in the shop, machine 
operators would start footdragging, mishandle jobs, produce sub-standard work, 
embezzle material, and take on side jobs. The experience of the owner of shop 60 is 
illuminating. 
Y. set up shop 60 adjacent to his living quarters in 1972. Y. was employed in the nearby 
PINDAD weapons factory, which meant that his 11 machine operators worked without 
supervision until two p.m. when he returned from his work. Y. had serious troubles in 
managing his employees: 'The point is that there is not enough supervision. I am not there 
until two o'clock. The operators accept small orders on the side and pocket the money, 
maybe five thousand or ten thousand Rupiah or whatever, I don't know. Often they do not 
handle their jobs like they should. But then, you look when I'm on two weeks leave, the 
improvement is remarkable.' 
Y. did not dare to solve the problem by giving one of his employees a supervisory task: 
'I'm afraid that when he would be given that authority he would start diverting orders to 
other shops. So when I would make someone overseer this person would only defraud and 
embezzle more, seeing how things are right now. So I just let things run their course like 
they do.' 
Other shop owners, unlike Y., left the shop in the care of a trusted supervisor. But even 
so the burden of multiple management tasks resting on the single owner/manager was 
heavy. He would have to make frequent lengthy factory tours in the Bandung region 
and beyond; see to it that jobs were handled properly and parts delivered in time; keep 
an eye on the stock of raw materials; keep accounts; respond to —frequent— customer 
complaints; chase his debtors and appease his creditors; help in the shop to solve 
technical problems; and entertain visiting customers and suppliers. 
The alternative solution was to appoint one or more salaried salespeople to handle 
the out-house marketing so that the shop owner could remain on the shop premises to 
control the flow of production. But here agency problems were even more marked. 
Discussion of this topic with shop owners yielded a litany of complaints about the 
fraudulent activities of travelling salesmen. Salesmen were usually provided with an 
automobile, a travel expense budget, and a budget to cover representation costs 
(clothing, gifts). They received no salary but a 20 percent cut on the returns of every 
order they brought in. Many a salesman could not resist the temptation of diverting 
orders to shops other than those owned by his principal. Free-riding in this manner was 
very profitable as the salesman could pocket all profits. Owners of small shops fired 
their salesmen when they found out about such fraudulent practice. Management of the 
largest shops, unable to survive without half a dozen salesmen, had learned to live with 
this practice as a necessary evil. Sales staff of one poorly-managed large shop, for 
example, were notorious in business circles for such side-line activities. 
Family firms appeared to have advantage of being quite invulnerable to such 
agency problems. Marketing and shop monitoring tasks could be delegated among 
members of the family team. Family members could be expected to further the interests 
of the enterprise: not only did they have a stake in it as co-owners, but being part of an 
overlapping kinship and business network they would also find it difficult to let private 
interests prevail without this being noticed by their co-owning relatives. 
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Chinese Success Explained by Underlying Familism? 
These observations suggest that success was related to a familistic management 
structure. If we can muster support for this hypothesis, then this would also explain 
why Chinese-owned shops performed better than pribumi establishments. The 
relationship between 'Chineseness' and familism is strongly significant, with a Pearson 
correlation of 0.53 significant at p<0.001 for a sample of 54 firms. Familism was, 
therefore, an integral part of the Chinese management style. 
This finding supports my impression that pribumi shop owners followed a career 
path different from that of Chinese entrepreneurs, pribumi entrepreneurs tended to strike 
out on their own. Even if a young pribumi entrepreneur decided to pursue a career in 
metalworking in imitation of one or more relatives this would not usually lead to the 
formation of a family business. In such a case the younger brother or son usually 
became an apprentice in the firm of an elder brother, uncle or father for some years. 
This apprenticeship was a first stepping-stone on the path of an independent career: 
eventually the apprentice would leave and set up shop for himself elsewhere. In 
Chinese families, by contrast, the apprenticeship system seemed to groom one for a 
career in the family undertaking rather than an independent career. 
All this suggests that by examining ethnicity, as we have done so far, we may have 
been looking at the wrong variable. Maybe the superior Chinese performance was 
caused by the underlying factor of familism. Following this line of reasoning we will 
assess the relationship between familism and management by running the efficiency and 
market-sensitivity tests against this variable. The first test yields no results. None of the 
correlations between familism -a binary value: zero stands for single-person 
management, one for family management— and the efficiency variables used earlier is 
statistically significant.7 
An examination of the two market sensitivity indicators used earlier shows a 
significant difference between family-managed and single proprietor firms in terms of 
management background, with trade experience predominating in family businesses 
(chi-square (df 1, N=48) = 5.11, p<.05). The familism and market strategy test fails to 
produce a significant difference (chi-square (df 1, N=40) = 0.27, P<.70). 
Ethnicity, Familism, and Growth Performance 
Table 11-4, finally, looks at the combined effects of familism and ethnicity on 
employment size and growth performance. As an indicator of the growth rate of 
individual firms I have divided number of employees by age of firm. The assumption 
7
 Pearson correlation with profit margin was 0.03; With capital productivity -0.02; With 
labour productivity 0.18 (N=32). The correlation between bookkeeping and familism was 
strongly positive (0.70 for N=46), but attributable to a common underlying cause, that is, 
establishment size. 
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that firms had a stable or increasing workforce but never laid off personnel may not be 
entirely realistic, but this was the best indicator available given the limited information 
at my disposal. 
Table 11-4 Ethnicity, familism, and age, size, and speed of growth, 54 engineering 
shops 
Mean establ. age (years) 
Mean employment size 
1989/1991 
Average no. of workers 
added per year 
SD 
single (N=7) 
33.57 
37.57 
2.36 
2.98 
family (N=14) 
22.79 
62.29 
6.20 
6.47 
single (N = 28) 
10.43 
10.21 
1.49 
1.94 
family 
(N = 5) 
9.80 
21.4 
2.16 
1.62 
Source: primary data 
The Table clearly demonstrates the mutually reinforcing effect of 'Chineseness' and 
familism on business expansion. As was the case with Chineseness, the relationship 
between familism and speed of growth and firm size was strongly significant (Pearson 
correlation for the former .42, p<0.001, for the latter .50, p<0.001). The Table indicates 
that pribumi single-owner shops were relatively young and small and had not expanded 
at a very fast rate. Pribumi family firms were also young but had expanded at a faster 
rate, comparable to that of Chinese single-owner shops, which, however, were much 
older on average. Chinese family firms, lastly, occupied an intermediate position 
between the other three categories in terms of age, but had been expanding at a much 
faster rate than other firms. 
Conclusions 
This chapter's detailed examination of ethnicity and familism offers a number of 
clues to the divergent size of establishments observed in the Bandung jobbing industry. 
The following main conclusions can be drawn. First, Chinese-owned firms were not 
more efficiently managed than pribumi firms: Chinese managers did not produce more 
output with a given set of inputs, nor were their profit margins higher. Second, the head 
start factor provides a partial explanation for the divergent size of Chinese and pribumi 
establishments. Chinese shops tended to be larger simply because they were older than 
pribumi firms. Third, a number of Chinese managers could profit from assets such as 
previous trade experience, financial resources, and customer networks built up in an 
earlier phase, that facilitated the expansion of their enterprise. The number of pribumi 
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managers enjoying such important advantages was significantly smaller. This different 
commercial background provides another partial explanation of Chinese success. Fourth, 
Chinese shops profited from a distinct family management style. This may have 
allowed them to avoid agency problems faced by single owner/managers. 
Historical circumstances (headstart, trade experience) thus go a long way in 
explaining Chinese success. The analysis presented here does not solve all issues, 
however. One problem is that "historical' or environmental factors on the one hand and 
'cultural' or managerial factors on the other hand were inextricably entwined. Familism, 
for example, was a crucial ingredient of Chinese business success. But did familism 
evolve in reaction to the hostile Indonesian surroundings or was it the expression of 
innate cultural values? I believe the former to be the case. The Indonesian Chinese 
family style of management was a response to the exclusion of Indonesian Chinese 
from many walks of life. Limited career opportunities in other fields directed young 
Chinese onto a career path in the private sector. To join a relative in his or her business 
was an obvious choice. In this manner the foundations were laid for a Chinese 
familistic style of management that proved to be an important asset in the jobbing 
industry. Ironically, this implies that it is precisely the social closure experienced by 
Indonesian Chinese that maintains and reinforces their much-resented dominant position 
in business. 
More research, however, would be needed to resolve this issue. In the first place, 
disentangling the cultural component of Chinese success from its environment would 
seem to require a different research strategy than that pursued so far. In view of the 
discrepancy between the stated values and actual behaviour of informants, questionnaire 
or open interview-type research that collects statements on values and attitudes seems a 
less useful source of evidence. Perhaps home observations of interaction in Chinese and 
non-Chinese households may provide a more solid foundation. In the second place, the 
role of agency problems in business expansion deserves explicit attention. I have 
suggested that family firms enjoyed a managerial advantage in job-order work because 
they were better at coping with multilocality than single-owner businesses. To the 
extent that expansionary strategies in many trades require the dual task of office/factory 
supervision and active marketing, this perspective might extend to other lines of 
business as well. Whether or not owner/managers find solutions to monitoring and 
incentive problems during the critical early growth phase of their undertakings is a key 
issue. An agency perspective can provide a good point of entry. 
12 Factor Analysis of 
Economic Performance 
This final chapter is an attempt to draw together the strands of the argument 
presented in the preceding five chapters. It bundles a number of historical-sociological 
(age of finn, speed of employment growth, commercial background and ethnicity of 
ownership, etc.), managerial (marketing strategy, financial flow recording), and 
efficiency (productivity, profitability) variables in a single analytical framework for a 
^oad-spectrum' analysis of the causes of divergent firm performance in the Bandung 
jobbing industry. A number of these variables have been examined in isolation in the 
foregoing. Now we will examine what patterns emerge when they are placed in a single 
framework. 
The methodological difficulties attendant upon the analysis of business performance 
presented here are many. I mention the following problems. First, my method of 
sampling amounted to the following: I drew a finish line at end 1991 and sampled a 
number of firms passing the line, applying a variety of yardsticks to assess their 
situation. This obviously did not do justice to the unique histories of the different firms. 
The competitors crossing my finish line had entered the race at different stages. In fact 
a number of firms had dropped out of the race at an earlier stage so I was unaware that 
they had ever participated. Second, some entrants had started racing with more 
resources at their disposal than others: some, for example, entered the race endowed 
with ample financial resources, others had none. Third, the time span covered by 
various yardsticks I used to measure performance varied. Efficiency variables were 
based on cost flow data for one year only, data on employment size were based on two 
observations two years apart, and other indicators such as management background had 
been present throughout the existence of the firm. 
I present the factor analysis mindful of these considerations. The following section 
presents the analysis. A final section discusses its implications. 
The Factor Analysis1 
Five families of variables are used in the factor analysis. In the first place, snap-
shot efficiency indicators, that is, capital intensity, capital and labour productivity, and 
profitability. These are based on financial data collected from 32 establishments. In the 
second place, snap-shot size indicators, that is, 1991 total revenue and mean 
employment size for the period 1989 to 1991. In the third place, shop age. From shop 
age and employment size I constructed an indicator that partially captured the dynamics 
of shop growth: the average number of employees generated in every year of a shop's 
1
 Child (1970) is a good introduction to factor analysis. 
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existence.2 In the fourth place, managerial variables: market strategy (passive, joint 
venture-type, or active), and the use of financial record-keeping systems. In the fifth 
place, sociological variables: ethnic identity of ownership, whether the establishment 
was managed by a family team or by a single person, and the commercial background 
of management (trade or engineering). 
These 13 variables were loaded on three factors.3 Results are shown in Table 12-1. 
The three factors explain 63.14 percent of total variance. 
Table 12-1 Varimax rotated factor matrix of determinants of business performance 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Ethnic identity owner(s) 
Mean employment size of firm 
1989-1991 
1991 revenue 
Use of accounting records 
Establishment age 
Family firm/single proprietor 
Capital intensity 1991 
Profit margin 1991 
Capital productivity 1991 
Labour productivity 1991 
Commercial background 
Employee increase per year 
Market strategy 
Eigenvalues 
Percentage variance explained 
factor 1 
established 
Chinese family 
firms 
.82 
.71 
.65 
.59 
.64 
.58 
.60 
.38 
3.33 
25.64 
factor 2 
efficiency 
factor 
-.38 
.88 
.83 
.75 
2.35 
18.08 
factor 3 
market-
sensitive rising 
stars 
.38 
.53 
-.54 
.79 
.74 
.65 
2.52 
19.42 
Factor loadings below .35 omitted; Variables were correlated pairwise. N varies between 32 and 59 (see 
Appendix Q . Calculation with the Burt-Banks formula at five percent significance for a 'worst case', a loading 
in the third Factor with the smallest possible pairwise correlation (N = 30) yields a threshold significance level 
of 0.349 (Child 1970:97). In fact all loadings shown in the Table pass the one percent significance test. 
Source: primary data 
2
 The, to some extent unrealistic, assumption underlying this indicator is that the 
number of employees remained constant or increased but did not decrease throughout the 
period. Ups and downs in workforce size in the intervening period are thus ignored. 
3
 Common factor analysis was used. An attempt with principal component analysis 
yielded similar results. For Pearson correlations, probabilities, and frequencies refer to Appendix 
С 
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It can be seen that seven variables are loaded on the first factor. Positive loadings 
of the size variables revenue and employment size, of bookkeeping, and of 
establishment age suggest a clustering of shops that were large, relatively old, and well-
established. Confirming the previous chapter's findings, two sociological variables are 
loaded on the factor: ethnicity and management structure. The 'established firms' 
captured by this factor were Chinese-owned and family-managed. For this reason I have 
labelled the first factor established Chinese family firms. Only one efficiency variable 
loads on the first factor, namely that of capital intensity. As was seen in chapter 9, high 
capital intensity is also a good indicator of firm size. 
The second factor exhibits high loadings on the three 'efficiency' variables capital 
productivity, labour productivity, and profit margin plus capital intensity. That these are 
related might be expected given the fact that they are derived from a common data 
base. The variable capital intensity has a negative loading on the efficiency factor. As 
may be seen in Table B-2, Appendix B, there is a significant negative correlation 
between capital intensity on the one hand, and profit margin and capital productivity on 
the other hand. This provides empirical support for the argument that labour-intensive 
manufacturing technologies are 'appropriate' for developing countries. For reasons that 
will be obvious I have labelled the second factor efficiency. 
The third factor shows high positive loadings on the variables commercial 
background of management, speed of growth (employees added per year), and market 
strategy. Furthermore, there is a positive loading on 1991 revenue and a negative 
loading on establishment age. This suggests another 1)usiness profile', in this case 
indicating firms that are young (compare the negative loading on establishment age), 
managed by entrepreneurs with a background in trading rather than manufacturing, 
pursuing an active 'aggressive' marketing strategy, collecting large revenues, and rapidly 
expanding their workforce. Accordingly I have named this third factor market-sensitive 
rising stars. Two observations may be made in regard to this factor. For one, none of 
the 'efficiency* variables loads on this third factor, either in a positive or in a negative 
sense. This implies that the 'rising stars' were not particularly efficient (cf. also 
Appendix C). For another, there is no loading of the variables ethnicity and familism 
on this factor, suggesting that Chinese family firms did not play a dominant role in the 
rising star-category. This suggests, interestingly, that the traditional Chinese dominance 
of the industry was waning. Stated differently, the new generation of expanding firms, 
founded after 1975, was led by a mixture of pribumi and Chinese-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs. 
Discussion 
The factor analysis suggests that neither large established first generation shops nor 
second generation rising stars performed very well in terms of profitability or labour 
and capital productivity. Pairwise Pearson correlations between the individual variables 
support this finding. These show that efficiency was correlated neither with absolute 
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revenue or employment size nor with high-speed growth.4 This might lead one to 
conclude that efficiency was no precondition either for survival or for fast expansion. 
However, the absence of such a correlation may be due to the snap-shot nature of the 
financial flow data used. Ideally one would like to test the variables used here against 
profit and loss data covering several years. Such data, however, seem to be practically 
impossible to collect. 
Another surprising finding is the apparent evaporation of traditional Chinese 
dominance in the post-1975 jobbing industry. This might indicate that the effects of 
pribumi enterprise promotion by the state are finally making themselves felt, although I 
personally doubt whether this is the case. A more plausible explanation, to my mind, is 
that the younger generation of aspiring Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs no longer has 
the head start that helped previous generations in gaining a dominant position in 
business. It should be added, however, that established Chinese family firms remain in 
control of the commanding heights of the Indonesian economy. So far, the textile 
equipment industry has not attracted the attention of the Indonesian conglomerates. If in 
the near future textile equipment-making will become a promising venture then these 
may be expected to invade the industry and assume a dominant position. 
Finally, the factor analysis underlines the importance of a trade orientation on the 
part of firm management for rapid ascendancy in the industry, a fact already noted in 
the previous chapters. The relationships between trading orientation of management and 
an active marketing strategy and speed of employment generation were highly and 
positively significant.5 This suggests that it was 'marketing man', rather than economic 
man or engineering man, who led the post-1975 advance of the textile equipment 
industry. 
4
 Appendix С shows that Pearson correlations between labour and capital productivity 
and profitability on the one hand, and the variables employment size, revenue size, and 
workforce expansion rate were not statistically significant, with the exception of the correlation 
between revenue and labour productivity, which was significant at p<0.05. 
4
 Statistically significant at p<0.001, see Appendix С 
13 Summary and Conclusions 
This study has offered an inside view in the ongoing industrial transformation of 
Southeast Asia. It has reported on the recent evolution of textile equipment making in 
rapidly industrializing Indonesia; Examined how a combination of rapid capacity 
expansion and minimal machinery maintenance in the Indonesian textile industry 
created a demand for local-made parts and machinery; Investigated the origins and 
evolutionary trajectories along which entrepreneurs were propelled into the textile 
equipment industry; And looked into the determinants of the evolving size structure of 
this industry. The first part of the study sketched the regulatory environment of 
entrepreneurial behaviour in the Indonesian engineering subsector from a birdseye 
perspective. Moving to the ground level, the second part examined the conduct of 
business decisionmakers on the supply and demand side of an emerging market for 
local-made textile equipment. A number of conclusions and implications may be 
derived from the material presented. 
This chapter summarizes main findings and explores theoretical and practical 
implications. It relates the Indonesian experience in textile equipment making to the 
growing literature on technology acquisition. It evaluates New Order engineering 
industry promotion in the light of technology acquisition theory. It discusses the 
practical issue of what the Indonesian government should do about the nascent textile 
equipment industry. Finally, it considers the prospects of the Indonesian textile 
equipment industry. The chapter is organized as follows. The first three sections 
provide a summary of principal findings. The fourth and fifth sections discuss 
entrepreneurship and competition, respectively. The sixth section relates the case of 
Indonesian textile equipment making to theories of technical change. The seventh 
section evaluates the case for promotion of textile equipment manufacturing in 
Indonesia. A separate section compares the theory and implications of technology 
acquisition research and writing with the aims of Indonesia's Strategic Industry 
program. Two final sections discuss policy implications and prospects of the Indonesian 
textile equipment industry. 
Impact of the Regulatory Environment 
The impact of post-1965 government interventions was as follows. New Order 
industrial planning had a contradictory effect on domestic textile equipment 
manufacturing. Industrial policies retarded and at the same time promoted the evolution 
of domestic textile equipment making. On the one hand, import substitution policies in 
upstream (steel) and downstream (textile) industries had the unintended side effect of 
creating a hostile business climate for domestic textile equipment producers. Up to 
1985, regulatory efforts of the Indonesian government in the upstream steel market 
penalized domestic engineering shops, who paid excessive prices and faced uncertain 
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quality and delivery schedules for steels. Furthermore, import substitution policies 
protecting the textile industry from 1968 onward created an open Indonesian market for 
textile equipment and parts. The Indonesian government encouraged import substitution 
via tariff-free imports of textile machinery and parts. These measures, however, directly 
exposed the nascent domestic textile equipment industry to foreign competition. On the 
other hand, the strong expansion of the textile sector, by creating a large potential 
demand for textile equipment and related services, stimulated the development of local 
textile equipment making. In sum, New Order industrial planning generated a domestic 
demand for textile equipment but at the same time created a hostile business climate for 
local suppliers of textile equipment. 
Demand for Local-Made Textile Equipment 
If the nascent local textile equipment industry could not avail of government 
protection, how then did it succeed in capturing a share in a market dominated by 
experienced foreign competitors? For an answer to this question we must look into 
microlevel business behaviour. The realization of backward linkages from textile 
factories to local suppliers of services, spare parts, and simple machinery can be traced 
to choice of technique and machinery maintenance decisions in textile mills. 
The Indonesian textile machinery park was characterized by a high degree of 
obsolescence and fragmentation. In 1987, half of the installed machinery was over 12 
years old and a substantial share in this category was over 17 years old. Furthermore, a 
wide range of techniques and machinery brands was installed in Indonesian spinning 
and weaving mills. This composition of the machinery park reflected a tendency of 
factory management to postpone machinery replacement decisions and to add rather 
than replace equipment. It also was a reflection of the great variety in price and quality 
mixes produced in different segments of the textile market. 
Importantly, textile factory maintenance managers tended to rely on breakdown 
machinery maintenance strategies for spare parts that had no vital impact on product 
quality. Spinners and weavers operating in price-undercutting markets relied on local 
parts as much as they could. The high degree of fragmentation of the machinery park 
deterred textile equipment importers from maintaining a complete stock of machine-
specific spare parts. Instead, they ordered such parts from overseas suppliers only upon 
request using the inexpensive but time-consuming sea route for metal parts. 
None of the surveyed textile factories secured spare part supplies through direct 
relations with overseas machinery makers. This left them with two options: Rely on 
planned maintenance, requiring one to order parts several months beforehand from a 
local importer. Or, rely on parts produced by local shops. In practice, most factories 
chose the lengthy import route for vital machine parts and the local manufacture option 
for nonvital parts and assemblies. In this way undeveloped communication channels 
with overseas equipment suppliers and a limited reliance on planned maintenance in 
textile mills contributed to the successful emergence of local equipment making. Their 
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being close to the textile mills was a strategic asset to local jobbers. Proximity 
facilitated the ease and speed of communication between domestic buyer and domestic 
supplier, reduced delivery time and transport cost and therefore reduced final price, 
particularly in the case of bulky or heavy but otherwise inexpensive assemblies. The 
combination of breakdown maintenance and proximity, in other words, gave 
domestic textile equipment makers a competitive edge. 
Supply of Entrepreneurship and Structure of the Market 
On the supply side, textile equipment shops were founded by entrepreneurs whose 
business careers had begun either in job-order repair, servicing and small-scale 
metalworking activities or in textile equipment trading. In other words, the textile 
equipment industry evolved out of a spill-over of assets, that is, skills and capital, from 
the jobbing sector on the one hand and the textile trade business on the other hand. 
The entrepreneurial founders of the textile equipment industry did not rely heavily 
on skills and skilled technical personnel from other branches of engineering. Of 42 
textile shop managers 17 had a trading background. Only one of these had previous 
experience in engineering. Fourteen more had began their careers as textile equipment 
makers, only one of which had previous experience in another part of the engineering 
subsector. Eleven remaining managers, following the jobbing route, entered the textile 
equipment industry from various engineering industries. In sum, only 13 managers (30 
percent) had some previous experience in engineering. Moreover, the large majority of 
jobshop personnel had no relevant training and learned the necessary skills in-house 
apprentice-style by assisting, watching and, at a later stage, copying the tasks performed 
by skilled workers. 
As textile equipment making firms grew in size, their operations became 
increasingly capital-intensive. In part, this was due to the fact that larger shops had 
easier access to bank finance. In large measure, however, this reflected the use of 
technology as a competitive weapon. Markets for simple parts requiring rudimentary 
engineering skills and simple equipment were densely populated by small cost-cutting 
producers. Larger shops tended to go up-market, settling in market niches inaccessible 
to smaller producers. They populated niche markets requiring a higher level of 
engineering knowledge and expensive special equipment. 
Finally, why did some textile equipment shops grow much faster than others? My 
evidence suggests, for one, that fast-growing firms were run by managers with relevant 
trade experience and well-developed customer networks. First-hand information on the 
demand situation was an important managerial asset. For another, family-managed firms 
performed better than singly managed firms because they were less vulnerable to the 
employee malfeasance that plagued the latter category. 
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Does the Southeast Asian Entrepreneur Exist? 
The findings of this study, in particular the business trajectory analysis presented in 
chapter 7, have a special relevance for the burgeoning literature on Southeast Asian 
entrepreneurs. Attempts to capture the behavioural dynamics at work in Southeast Asian 
industrial change have so far focused strongly on a thin upper layer of glamorous 
business tycoons (see e.g., Mackie 1989; McVey 1992; Robison 1986; Yoshihara 1988). 
This overrepresentation of highly successful entrepreneurs has created a distorted image 
of Southeast Asian entrepreneurship, highlighting the importance of political 
connections and associated monopolistic practices. The image may be representative of 
business practice at the commanding heights of the economy, and in this sense 
Southeast Asia does not appear to differ much from other regions of the world. But it is 
not at all certain that this is a faithful representation of Southeast Asian 
entrepreneurship in toto. 
In any case, the evidence on the business conduct of the inconspicuous rank and 
file of Southeast Asian industrial entrepreneurs presented in this study does not support 
the rent-seeking image. Moreover, theoretical distinctions that have been made in the 
Southeast Asian context between merchant, crony, rent, or ersatz capitalists1 and 
'genuine' capitalists, whatever the latter may be, appear to be of little help in 
explaining microlevel business behaviour. 1 found no evidence of the psychological 
predilections allegedly steering the business decisions of Southeast Asian entrepreneurs. 
The image is that of a free-flowing traffic of assets between trade, finance, 
manufacturing, and consumption, rather than the rigid sectorally contained investment 
patterns implied by the above dichotomies. A lot more empirical work seems required 
to redress the present imbalance between theoretical conjectures on business 
decisionmaking and actual business behaviour. 
Technology and Competition 
The study yields a number of conclusions on the relationship between size 
structure, competition, and technical change in the Indonesian textile equipment 
industry. First, management of leading Indonesian engineering firms expressed no 
interest in textile equipment making. State-owned engineering firms did not enter core 
textile machinery markets because the thrust of policymaking was directed at different 
areas. Managers of private engineering firms stated that, because of higher labour and 
1
 Fegan (1981) and others have applied the term 'rent capitalism' to the investment 
behaviour of Filipino rural entrepreneurs. Fegan claimed that plantation owners were reluctant 
to invest their capital in productivity-increasing investments in primary and secondary sector 
activities. Rather, they preferred to reserve their resources for speculative investments, 
moneylending, and consumptive expenditures. Economist Yoshihara Kunio (1988) coined the 
term 'ersatz capitalism' to describe a pattern of rent seeking, comprador-like, speculative and 
tertiary sector-oriented behaviour allegedly characteristic of Southeast Asian entrepreneurs. 
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indirect costs, they were unable to compete against smaller shops in noncore segments 
of the textile equipment market. 
Second, the industry itself was divided into two segments. Small shops pursued 
price-undercutting strategies and larger capital-intensive firms abided by quality 
differentiation. Large establishments operating in the textile equipment industry created 
sheltered market niches with the use of equipment or knowledge-based monopolies or 
oligopolies. Small shops, contrariwise, operated in price-undercutting markets for 
capital-extensive and knowledge-extensive products. 
My findings suggest that competition in the textile equipment industry had both 
beneficial and counter-productive effects. On the positive side, large numbers of small 
entrants seemed to force larger firms, at a disadvantage in price-undercutting markets 
because of larger overheads, to abandon technology-extensive markets and go up-
market in search of profitable niches, thereby gradually expanding the pool of local 
technical capacities. Competition, stated differently, appeared to drive an ongoing 
process of technical learning. On the negative side, the multitude of small firms unable 
to exit from price-undercutting segments had to take recourse to extreme cost-cutting to 
survive. Proprietors of smaller shops ignored the long-run continuity of their enterprise 
by accepting orders at prices in which overheads were not properly discounted. 
Another survival technique was the use of substandard materials to cut costs. One 
might also expect to find cost-cutting managers taking recourse to a 'squeezing' of 
labour wages. I found no evidence of this phenomenon, however. Coupled with a lack 
of engineering standards, comer-cutting production methods produced a high degree of 
'quality uncertainty' among (potential) consumers. This unreliability had a counter-
productive effect on the Indonesian textile equipment industry in that it discouraged 
consumers from buying local-made parts and assemblies. 
A number of recent studies have modelled the relationship between competition 
and technology suggested here along parallel lines. Gort and Klepper (1982) designed a 
five-stage market life cycle on basis of 46 new product histories. The first stage began 
with the introduction of a new products by a single or a few innovating firms. The 
second stage saw a sharp increase in number of producers. The third stage was one of a 
rough equilibrium. In the fourth stage producers began to exit from the industry, until 
the number of producers stabilized at a much lower level in stage five. This empirically 
grounded model of an innovation diffusion-based market life cycle corresponds with the 
imitative competition cycle described for Indonesian and Chinese rural industries 
(Braadbaart & Wolters 1991; Byrd & Zhu 1990).2 
2
 Compare the competitive mechanism suggested by the trade economist Krugman in 
the context of competition between industrial country producers and developing country 
manufacturing firms (1979). Kmgman's model assumes an innovative North and a 
noninnovative South. Innovations emerging in the North are imitated by the South with a 
certain lag. Soon after the South masters the new technology and enters the market it ousts the 
North with low-wage competition. To make up for the industrial markets it loses to the South, 
the North has to keep on innovating. Firms in the North can only recoup high overheads (high 
labour cost, high R&D expenditure) by operating at the frontier where they can earn monopoly 
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It would be worthwhile to put this competition-driven model of innovation and 
technology acquisition to the test in the rapidly changing Southeast Asian context. The 
brief discussion of choice of technique in weaving presented in chapter 5, for example, 
prompts a number of intriguing questions as to the market strategies pursued by leading 
loom-makers in Western Europe and Japan and second and third tier followers in 
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and P.R. China. How fast will followers catch 
up with leaders in shuttleless technologies? On what new technologies are leaders 
gambling in their attempts to stay ahead? And is there a future for shuttle looms? 
Lags in the Transmission of Engineering Knowledge 
The main finding of this study underscores an oft-noted tendency in technology 
transfer processes. Many empirical studies have documented that whereas technical 
capacities embodied in capital goods are readily transmitted to developing country 
manufacturers, the transmission of attendant engineering (product design, plant lay-out 
and work flow design, quality and inventory control, product packaging, machinery 
maintenance, etc.) and managerial practices (cost accounting, investment 
decisionmaking, input sourcing and product marketing, employee compensation 
schemes, and so on) follows with a certain lag. This lag in the transfer of 
manufacturing 'software' is a key issue in the technology acquisition literature. In the 
preface to a volume of articles dedicated to transfer of technology to developing 
countries, Howard Pack sums up the viewpoint as follows: 
The "transfer of technology" is seen by almost all the authors as the implanting and 
nurturing of methods of production in which the critical elements are not the physical means 
of production, be they buildings or machinery, but the knowledge of how to operate such 
means effectively, or in one phrase, the achievement of technological mastery. (1981b:7) 
The technology acquisition literature highlights the negative effects of this knowledge 
gap: the inability of developing country manufacturers to produce certain products and 
the waste of effort, machinery, and materials this entails.3 This argument is brought out 
by the following quotation from an article by Sanjaya Lall: 
In a general sense, most developing countries are inept at using industrial technologies... 
This ineptness may take one or more of several forms. Enterprises may import and deploy 
technologies that are not appropriate to their countries' endowments of labour or skills, or to 
profits. As soon as increasing number of entrants forces down profit levels large R&D intensive 
firms must exit, leaving the field to smaller %ackward' firms. 
3
 Leibenstein (1966) popularized this idea in development microeconomics. He argued 
that whereas (neo-classical) economic theory was preoccupied with allocative efficiency 
(choosing the right set of inputs), allocative inefficiency was but one factor among a host of 
other potential sources of inefficiency which he jointly labelled 'X-inefficiency'. The technology 
acquisition literature subsequently developed and empirically elucidated this point. For example, 
Pack (1981a) contains nice examples of bungling in developing country manufacturing 
enterprises. 
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their scale of production. They may not fully assimilate the technologies they have imported, 
(or) may not use them at "best practice' levels of technical efficiency. Individual enterprises 
may, moreover, differ widely in their relative efficiencies... Finally, they may not be able to 
up-grade the technologies they have mastered, or to diversify into new technologies. 
(1993:719,720) 
The case of Indonesian textile equipment making qualifies this negative appraisal of 
lags in knowledge transmission. Bad machinery maintenance was a source of 
inefficiency for the Indonesian textile industry but at the same time opened up 
opportunities for local engineering firms. Were it not for breakdown maintenance 
practices, local jobbers would never have gained a foothold in the textile equipment 
market: what industrial country observers tend to qualify as plant equipment 
mishandling in this case had the beneficial effect of backward linkage formation.4 
This brings out a certain ambiguity in technology acquisition theory: its key 
concepts of efficient production and manufacturing import substitution are difficult to 
reconcile. A disruption of the competitive structure in a manufactures market is both a 
source of inefficiency and a springboard for inexperienced developing country 
newcomers. On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine how inexperienced producers 
could ever gain a foothold in manufacturing markets without a back-door entry in the 
form of a sheltered niche. Governments have often created such niches with trade 
barriers, but engineering knowledge transmission lags, as we have seen, can have the 
same effect. On the other hand, the distortions that create and maintain such niches are 
a source of waste and cause a misallocation of resources. 
Pursuing this line of reasoning, technology acquisition theory accords developing 
country industrial planners the dual task of successively introducing and destroying 
distortions with the goal of creating temporary entry points for local producers while 
minimizing concomitant inefficiencies. This suggests practical guidelines for a selection 
of 'promotable' manufacturing activities. First, industrial planners should create 
temporary niches in line with existent technological capabilities of local producers: 
entry should require a modest stepping up of technological capabilities rather than a 
discrete jump. For if the jump fails the temporary entry point may well become a 
permanent distortion. Second, the introduction of distortions should not lead to gross 
inefficiencies in affiliated industries. Third, any single import substitution campaign 
should not be a drain on government resources. With these guidelines in mind the 
remaining part of this chapter will evaluate New Order engineering goods promotion in 
general and the promotion of textile equipment making in particular. 
41 should emphasize that I do not know whether machinery maintenance practice in the 
Indonesian textile industry was inefficient in the economist's sense of the word. Assessing this 
issue would require data on the availability and opportunity cost of skills necessary to set up 
and run planned maintenance systems. The choice of a time horizon would seem to be a 
complicating factor in this exercise. 
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Textile Equipment Making: the Case for Promotion 
Let us first look more closely at the pros and contras of textile equipment 
manufacturing promotion in Indonesia. I will structure the discussion of this issue after 
a 1981 article by Howard Pack focusing on this question. Pack mentions five 
arguments in favour of import substitution of capital goods production in developing 
countries: 
a) capital goods production is (skilled) labour intensive and a number of 
developing countries have a substantial supply of skilled workers available at 
low wages;5 
b) economies of scale are relatively unimportant in many branches of capital goods 
production therefore lumpy investments are not required; 
c) domestic producers can produce machinery that reflects local resource 
endowments better than equipment imported from industrialized economies; 
d) capital goods industries produce positive externalities because skills generated in 
the engineering subsector are useful in other branches of manufacturing; 
e) exports of engineering goods may become an important future source of foreign 
exchange for developing countries (1981a:227-229). 
How do these arguments apply to the Indonesian textile equipment industry? First, the 
skilled worker argument is probably inapplicable. A recent World Bank study marshals 
evidence to show that in 1987 primary and secondary enrolment in Indonesia was 
above-average in a sample of over 90 countries (1993:43-46). However, this does not 
tell us how Indonesia has performed in terms to engineering industry-specific skill 
formation. The (anecdotal) evidence that is available suggests that in this field 
Indonesia is an underperformer. 
Second, the low economies of scale argument certainly applies to the textile 
equipment industry, as the preceding chapters have shown. 
Third, the contention that local producers are needed to supply appropriate textile 
machinery finds no support. Indonesian capital goods consumers could easily source 
their equipment from developing countries with a more advanced engineering base.6 
Chapter 5 showed how first India and later P.R. China were important suppliers of 
new low-priced vintage powerlooms throughout the 1980s (refer to Figure 5-1). The 
latter country, for that matter, also supplied the cheap, crudely-built, but rugged lathes 
5
 He later qualifies this point by noting that establishment of the required upstream 
intermediate-supplying (forgings and castings) industries may be a bottleneck. Citing evidence 
from India, Korea, and Mexico, he mentions the following problems: high price and erratic 
supply of raw materials (scrap iron, pig iron, chemical additives, steels), internal inefficiency 
and small production runs, and misguided government policies (p. 333-335). 
6
 Early writers on appropriate technology such as Stewart (1977), probably under 
influence of dependency theory, tended to model international trade on a dichotomic developed 
country vs. developing country basis, thus ignoring the possibility of South-South trade of 
'appropriate' plant equipment. In this form appropriate technology thinking bolstered the 
argument for inward-looking and de-linking development strategies. 
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and drills installed in virtually all Indonesian jobshops. 
It is also doubtful whether the fourth argument, that of positive externalities, is 
applicable. Pack suggests that skills generated in the engineering subsector are useful to 
downstream users for various purposes: machinery acquisition, machinery maintenance, 
reinstalling and reconditioning of second-hand plant equipment, and adaptation of 
imported equipment (1981a:229). The Indonesian textile industry shows, however, that 
one does not need to engage in core textile machinery manufacturing to build up a pool 
of skilled workers capable of performing such tasks. Necessary engineering skills were 
built up not only in independent engineering firms but also in the user industry itself. 
As the textile factory survey showed, most spinning and weaving plants had small in-
house repair facilities. 
The strength of the fifth argument, that engineering goods have a good export 
potential, is also debatable as it would seem to apply equally to all manufactures. Pack 
mentions industrialized country import restrictions on labour-intensive consumer goods 
(textiles, footwear) as an argument in favour of engineering goods exports by 
developing economies. But the promotion of engineering goods exports would only be 
one among a range of possible options for evading such trade restrictions. 
In sum, applied to the Indonesian textile equipment industry the case for promotion 
seems quite weak. Of five arguments mentioned only one, that of low scale economies, 
is applicable to the case under scrutiny. 
Indonesia's Technology Drive: Technology Acquisition or Nation-Building? 
The above reasoning would appear to apply a fortiori to the high technology 
engineering drive led by Research and Technology Minister Habibie. In particular its 
costly centrepiece, the aerospace project IPTN, would not be able to pass the cost-
benefit test applied above.7 First, airplane construction and assembly may be labour-
intensive but it is also a very capital-intensive activity. Second, economies of scale are 
an overriding concern in airplane manufacturing. This presents another liability. Third, 
airplane production requires one to import large amounts of expensive equipment and 
raw materials from industrialized economies. Moreover, fourth, many of the skills 
generated (e.g., in aluminium-working and bonding) are not of much use in other parts 
of the Indonesian engineering subsector. Fifth, export prospects are dim given that 
Indonesia is a newcomer lacking in engineering experience and given that even the 
bottom end of the international market is already overcrowded. 
In other words, measured against this cost-benefit yardstick the heavy investments 
already made in the areospace industry do not make much sense. This is paradoxical 
given the parallels between the technology acquisition viewpoint and the philosophy 
7
 Between 1976 and 1987 at least $900 million was pumped into IPTN (McKendrick 
1989:59). Actual figures may be (much) higher. How much higher we do not know as the 
Strategic Industries are discretely funded via extra-budgetary channels. 
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guiding Indonesia's high technology drive in engineering. Both start from the 
assumption that developing countries need to master industrial country technologies. 
Both focus on manufacturing technologies. Both emphasize that learning by doing is the 
only way to achieve this goal." The similarities are more apparent than real, however. 
Earlier in this chapter I noted how the technical change literature stresses the 
importance of informational imperfections in technology transfer processes. Close-up 
investigations of the dynamics of in-house production show that individual firms build 
up stocks of proprietary knowledge that cannot be easily transferred to other 
organizations. The concept of 'tacit knowledge' captures this notion. 
This emphasis on the idiosyncracy or 'product-centredness' of technical skills pulls 
away an important prop from under Indonesia's aerospace project. To an important 
extent, its heavy cost is justified with the positive externalities argument that in this 
manner a pool of engineering skills is created that other companies can dip into 
(Habibie 1982, 1983; Simanjuntak 1988:106). The reasoning behind this argument is 
that when an engineer knows how to build an assembly as complex and demanding as 
an aeroplane, he can build any engineering good. The idea of proprietary skills does 
not square with such an assumption, however, and would favour a more diverse 
training program oriented to a broader range of products. If we also take the 
inefficiency criterium mentioned earlier into consideration, then it becomes clear that 
technology acquisition theory would direct the thrust of Indonesian engineering goods 
promotion in another direction altogether: e.g., towards the acquisition of technical 
skills required to produce a number of relatively simple products with good import 
substitution or export potential (machine components, hand tools, simple machine tools, 
compressors, woodworking machinery, and other light plant equipment). 
The technology acquisition literature and the Strategic Industry program, in other 
words, use different conceptions of and criteria for industrial development. The former 
sees technology transfer as the key to international industrial competitiveness, 
something that should be secured as quickly as possible and at minimum cost. For 
Minister Habibie, however, industrial competitiveness is not the end goal but a means 
of acquiring national self-confidence. There are also overt military-strategic overtones 
in his campaigning for high technology engineering.' His frequent references to 
technology acquisition and his own engineering background notwithstanding, the 
minister's basic message seems to be that Indonesia as a nation needs to bolster its self-
confidence, its international standing, and its political clout by moving to the 
9
 For the technology mastery literature, refer to the references given above. For the 
hands-on philosophy of the Strategies Industries project see Habibie (1982, 1983). 
' That the protected sectors are referred to as strategic industries is no coincidence. One 
rationale for ihe building up of industrial capacity in the transport equipment industry in general 
and the aerospace and shipbuilding industries is particular is their military-strategic value: 
'... given Indonesia's strategic location and her vast reserves of natural resources, there is a 
greater need for a domestic defease industrial capacity' (Habibie 1983:14). 
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technological frontier.10 The Strategic Industries program aims to create prestige and 
self-confidence by mastering frontier technologies. In this version technology mastery 
is, first and foremost, a political asset. But even at the plant level the term carries a 
different meaning. The Habibie philosophy is that confidence matters more than skills. 
When an engineer has built an aeroplane he may not have the immediate skills but he 
will at least be confident enough to tackle any project. The ultimate goal of this 
undertaking is nation-building, something that is very difficult to translate into the cost-
benefit language of technology acquisition theory. 
Practical Implications 
What can or should the Indonesian government do to foster the further growth of 
the textile equipment industry? Three policy options are discussed. First, infant 
industry protection measures for the nascent textile equipment industry. Second, 
indirect promotion via a removal of downstream user-penalizing interventions in the 
steel market. Third, upgrading of technical capabilities and promotion of the key 
forging and casting industry. 
It would be unwise to offer infant industry protection to textile equipment makers. 
For one, the textile equipment industry has managed to develop without protection so 
far. As late as 1992 there were no signs that the process of spontaneous import 
substitution was slowing down. For another, setting up tariff or other barriers around 
the textile machinery industry would impair the competitiveness of both the textile 
equipment industry itself and the downstream textile industry. Textile equipment 
makers might easily become 'lazy' in the sheltered market environment. Protective 
measures would force Indonesian textile manufacturers to rely on local equipment. If 
this local equipment would fail to meet international price and quality standards, the 
infant industry regime would make Indonesian textiles less competitive. This might 
have repercussions on textile exports, which at present play a key role as foreign 
exchange earners in the Indonesian economy. Alternatively one might argue for a 
selective protection of, say, Obsolete' shuttle loom technologies that would have no 
negative impact on textile exports. Such measures, however, might only hasten a 
transition to capital-intensive shuttleless technologies thereby setting off an unwanted 
10
 The following quote from an address delivered by the Minister in Bonn in 1983 
brings out this point: 'The process of industrial transformation in technologically less-developed 
countries can be conceived of as being part of a larger and much more complex process of 
nation-building which ... I understand to be the course through which a people in a particular 
state develop their common identity and philosophy of life, evolve their own characteristic way 
of living and working together and realize their economic, cultural and political potential as a 
distinct national entit/ (1983:2). 
On an earlier occasion in Tokyo the Minister stressed the importance of international 
standing: 'Only through (these kinds of) progressive manufacturing plans can a society develop 
itself into a productive power and hence a credible and respected member of the family of 
nations existing in the world today and in the future' (1982:12). 
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process of labour displacement in Indonesian weaving mills. 
I can be brief about the second policy option. Most of the regulatory barriers to 
engineering industry growth on the input side have already been removed. The onerous 
regulation of special steel imports was much improved and the greater part of the far-
reaching Krakatau Steel monopoly dismantled in the 1980s. 
The third option warrants a longer discussion. Various engineering subsector 
assessment studies have emphasized the need for a promotion of casting and forging 
industries as suppliers of key inputs to Indonesian engineering goods producers (FGU 
Kronberg 1979; IMG 1985). The Indonesian metal-casting industry was growing 
rapidly in the early 1990s, catalyzed by downstream demand from the protected 
automotive industry.11 A domestic forging industry, however, was almost nonexistent 
and showed no signs of developing.12 
Furthermore, all engineering subsector appraisal reports without exception mention 
the imperative of quality upgrading. Regulatory efforts should be directed at skill 
formation and the establishment of product quality standards. Private sector firms were 
unable to provide these public goods. Engineering firms were hesitant to organize or 
partake in on-the-job training programs, fearing that their trainees would be lured away 
by nonparticipating competitors. Collective action problems, that is, the threat of 
shirking firms, similarly precluded the establishment of quality standards.11 
The Indonesian government did not do enough in these areas and what it did was 
largely ineffective. The spread of vocational training programs at all levels was very 
thin. Schools teaching basic engineering skills lacked the facilities and materials to 
provide good training. The Metal Industry Development Centre (MIDC), the national 
Industry Department extension unit for the engineering industries, did not function due 
to chronic financial difficulties and misaligned incentive structures. Few, if any, private 
companies consulted the MIDC when faced with an engineering problem. 
The activities of the Indonesian National Standardization Council, a coordinating 
body responsible for industrial standardization set up in 1984, had no tangible impact 
on the private sector. The council is headed by the Research and Technology Minister, 
the Industry Minister, and the Minister of Trade. The latter stated in a 1990 interview 
that an Indonesian National Standard system would be completed by 1994 (Arendsen 
1991:39). But the services offered by government-run instrument calibration and 
11
 The backward linkage impact of the automotive industry was not limited to casting; I 
found evidence as well of a number of small and medium-size producers providing important 
inputs such as jigs, fixtures, dies, and moulds for auto and motorcycle production. 
12
 The 1985 Engineering Subsector Study reported that '(t)he only high volume forged 
products made in Indonesia are agricultural hoes .... Forged blanks for standard machine 
components are not available and no plans for their manufacture are known. Nor are high 
quality open die forgings for tools and dies or special machine parts readily available' (IMG 
1985:16). This condition had not changed five years later: the 1990 Industrial Statistics recorded 
13 medium and large-scale (employment 20+) metal foundries but only one forging plant. 
13
 See the discussion of labour piracy and quality comer-cutting in chapter 9. 
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materials testing laboratories were hardly used by prívate engineering firms. 
A good but all too rare example of what can be achieved in this field was provided 
by the Bandung-based Politeknik Mekanik Swiss (PMS), an educational institute 
affiliated with the Bandung Technology Institute. Modelled after the Swiss Polytechnic, 
the school offered a three-year hands-on training program in various fields such as 
foundry pattern-making, metal casting, forging, and metal-cutting and forming. The 
PMS also conducted courses for engineering firms and accepts technically demanding 
jobs from prívate firms. I encountered PMS graduates in a number of the larger textile 
equipment shops where they supplied crucial expertise in machining and casting and a 
basic knowledge of engineering standards. Many more of such unglamorous initiatives 
would be necessary to steer the engineering industries in the desired direction. In 
comparison to the amount of funds presently lavished on the aerospace and other 
prestige engineering projects, the investment required would be minimal. Travelling 
along this unobtrusive route towards technology mastery would not only cost less but 
may also be a faster way of travelling. 
The Indonesian Textile Equipment Industry: Prospects 
Will Indonesian engineering firms be able to maintain their foothold in the textile 
equipment market? The prospects are not altogether bright. If no reversal in the present 
trend of trade liberalization occurs and if, as may be expected, the export-oriented 
Indonesian textile industry will become more efficient management-wise, the market 
niche presently occupied by domestic equipment makers is likely to be destroyed. A 
combination of foreign investments in textile equipment making in Indonesia and an 
up-grading of textile factory machinery maintenance regimes could force domestic 
spare part and assembly makers out of business. There are a number of things that 
Indonesia's textile equipment makers can do to survive such a scenario. While still 
somewhat sheltered from international competition, they should do put an effort into 
reaching international standards in product quality and standardization. Two routes lead 
to this goal. It is likely that a number of firms will proceed further along the route of 
trial-and-error-based continued import substitution. In large measure, their success in 
pursuing this strategy will depend on whether the government will increase the supply 
of the public goods mentioned above: skilled technical personnel and international 
engineering norms and quality standards. 
Domestic producers might also move up-market by contracting with foreign parts 
or machinery producers attracted to the growing Indonesian textile equipment market. 
Product licensing agreements for spare parts would be a likely avenue. That foreign 
producers were interested in the Indonesian market was evident. All through 1991 and 
1992 the textile equipment industry was buzzing with rumours of impending foreign 
joint ventures. Foreign producers might even use the Indonesian textile equipment 
industry as a supply source for international production and marketing operations. 
Whether overseas investments will benefit or harm the domestic textile equipment 
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industry will depend on how well individual firms manage to use this source of 
technology to their own advantage.14 These are the options facing Indonesia's textile 
equipment makers in the 1990s. The sum total of their decisions will decide the fate of 
the industry. 
14
 One textile equipment maker, as described in Appendix D, had recently begun 
supplying machine parts as subcontractee to a Singapore-based knitting machinery maker. Parts 
were shipped to Singapore for assembly. Part of the machinery was then (re-)exported to 
Indonesia with the label Made in Singapore. This shop was tied hand and feet to its principal, 
however. Nol only was the knitting machinery producer its single customer, the shop was 
located on a plot owned by the knitting company. 
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Appendix A The Surveyed Jobbing Firms: 
Basic Data 
Table A- l Employment, product specialization, and inclusion in subsample 'financial profile 1991', 
surveyed jobbing firms (N=63) 
Code 
no 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Employment 
1989 
na 
na 
na 
107 
na 
12 
5 
16 
6 
na 
37 
Employment 
1991 
2 
4 
0 
145 
6 
15 
5 
15 
6 
1 
50 
Average 
Employment 
2 
4 
0 
126 
6 
13 
5 
15 
6 
1 
43 
Specialization 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile pans 
Textile parts (nul production of pirns and 
bobbins) and noncore assemblies 
Transformers (for consumer electronics 
products) 
Agro-processing machinery 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts (specializes in oversize parts) 
Financial 
profile 
1991 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
+ 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
33 
na 
10 
na 
25 
62 
63 
na 
14 
19 
35 
10 
75 
na 
33 
14 
15 
35 
18 
69 
63 
20 350 400 375 
Floodgates, agro processing machinery, 
large containers 
Automotive parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts and noncore assemblies 
Textile parts 
Textile parts (iron castings) 
Steel truss structures, containers, water 
pumps 
Textile parts and assemblies, temperature 
and humidity control machinery, control 
panels, ovens, 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
5 
na 
na 
7 
40 
15 
na 
na 
11 
14 
6 
4 
10 
4 
18 
na 
27 
60 
47 
20 
12 
16 
5 
10 
4 
13 
40 
21 
60 
47 
16 
13 
11 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Miscellaneous metal, rubber, plastic 
components 
Textile parts 
Cogwheels for textile machinery, noncore 
assemblies 
Textile parts 
Textile parts (esp large containers) 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
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32 172 163 168 Agro processing, woodworking and other 
machinery, textile parts and assemblies 
agro processing machinery, textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts and noncore assemblies 
Textile parts 
Textile pans 
Textile parts 
Factory design and construction 
Weaving reeds 
Textile parts 
TrasnCormers, sheet metal boxes for 
consumer electronics products 
Textile parts, automotive parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts and noncore assemblies 
Textile parts and noncore assembbes, 
weaving reeds 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Knitting machinery parts 
Textile parts (spinning, weaving, finishing) 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts 
Textile parts (weaving and finishing) 
Textile parts 
Springs Tor mise industries 
Parts for consumer electronics products 
Industrial boilers, div assemblies 
Textile parts (weavmg) 
Textile parts, parts and assemblies for agro-
processing industries 
Textile parts and assemblies, parts for mise 
industries 
Parts for mise industries 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
30 
11 
na 
68 
7 
na 
na 
na 
50 
8 
na 
23 
na 
114 
na 
5 
28 
70 
20 
7 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
200 
na 
na 
35 
na 
30 
18 
3 
125 
22 
1 
2 
12 
60 
na 
58 
27 
27 
75 
85 
4 
na 
125 
20 
7 
2 
21 
27 
8 
9 
5 
200 
11 
67 
65 
9 
30 
14 
3 
97 
15 
1 
2 
12 
55 
8 
58 
25 
27 
95 
85 
5 
28 
98 
20 
7 
2 
21 
27 
8 
9 
5 
200 
11 
67 
50 
9 
Sources pnmaiy data and raw data from joint survey Textile Industry Directorate and Cipta Multi 
Kreasi PT, 1989 
Appendix В Clarification of Concepts 
Revenue 
Gross income from sales over 1991. 
Value added 
Revenue minus maintenance costs machinery and transport equipment, utilities, and raw materials. 
Valuation of fixed assets (K) 
Fixed capital (K) has three components: current market value of installed machinery, of transport 
equipment, and current value of land and buildings. 
Assessments of value of machinery and transport equipment were based on owner statements and my 
own skills as valuer which increased along the way. On several occasions I checked my valuations 
against estimates of second-hand machine traders. 
The valuation of land and buildings gave special difficulties. Shops were classified in three groups: 
shops located in temporary shelters made of wood or plaited mats with zero market value; shops located 
in a building designed as a family residence, or in a section of such a building valued at between 100,000 
and 150,000 Rp./m2 depending on the condition of the building; and shops located in specially-designed 
factory buildings valued at 300,000 Rp./m2. 
Land was classified in four categories. First, plots in the middle of residential areas (kampung) 
inaccessible to four-wheel transport equipment were valued at 50,000 Rp./nr; plots in residential areas 
but accessible by cars were valued at 75,000 Rp./nr; plots sitting alongside permanent official roads were 
valued at 100,000 Rp./nr; and plots located on major traffic arteries were valued at between 150,000 and 
200,000 Rp./m2. I tried to take account of the urban real estate market by allotting higher values to land 
closer to the city center and more suited to property development. In this manner a prize plot on a 
strategic location in the city center would be valued at 600,000 Rp./m2 and upward. 
Depreciation method used 
The following depreciation method was used. Fifteen percent of the estimated current market value of 
installed machinery was written off. I used this straightforward depreciation method rather than a 
conventional lifetime estimate-based rule because installed machinery was often second-hand and its age 
unknown or very old, sometimes dating from as far back as the 1920s. In similar fashion 20 percent of 
the estimated 1991 market value of transport equipment was written off. Finally, buildings and land were 
depreciated at five percent of current market value. The decision to charge a depreciation on land was 
motivated by the probability that in the near future industrial firms will be held hable for environmental 
damage and forced to pay clean-up costs in order to make a plot marketable. 
Profit margin 
The profit margin was computed by subtracting direct costs and depreciation from total revenue. 
Dividing this gross profit figure by revenue gave the profit margin. Direct costs refer to the sum of: the 
1991 wage bill, the total outlay for raw materials, maintenance costs, and utilities. No allowance was 
made for tax payments, these being negligable anyway. Nor did I include the amortization cost of loans: 
often it was not clear to what extent loans had been invested in the shop. Apart from the fungibility 
problem, owners were sometimes unwilling to disclose the embarassing financial details of a debt 
situation. 
Labour 
I used two conventional measures: number of employees (L) and total wage bill for 1991 (WL). 
Capital intensity 
Capital/labour intensity was measured as amount of fixed assets (K) per worker. Bhalla (1985) 
contains a good discussion of the concept. 
Capital and labour productivity 
Capital productivity was defined as the ratio of value added produced in 1991 to fixed assets (VA/K). 
Labour productivity was calculated as the ratio of 1991 value added to the total wage bill (VA/WL), or 
sometimes as value added per worker (VA/L). 
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Basic results for the 32 shop sample 
Table B-l provides basic statistical information on the measures defined above for the complete 
sample of 32 shops 
Table B-l Average capital intensity, capital and labour productivity, 
and profits, 1991, 32 jobbing establishments (in Rp million) 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Range 
SD 
Capital 
intensity 
K/L 
6 7 
0 8 
39 1 
38 4 
7 7 
Capital 
productivity 
VA/K 
12 
-0 4 
34 
38 
0 9 
Labour 
productivity 
VA/WL 
28 
-16 
79 
95 
2 0 
Profit margin 
D)/Rxl00 
16 2 
-85 6 
58 9 
144 5 
33 9 
Ace rate of 
profit 
P*-(R-C-D)/K 
0 7 
-1 1 
29 
3 9 
10 
Source primary data 
Table B-2 shows pairwise Pearson correlations for each of the measures introduced in Table B-l to 
which I have added employment size Capital intensity is positively associated with capital productivity, 
but negatively associated with both proft measures The relationship between capital productivity, labour 
productivity, and both profit measures is, as one would expect, strongly significant Finally, employment 
size is strongly correlated with capital intensity, confirming a pattern found m many choice of technique 
studies 
Table B-2 Pearson correlations and p-values of capital intensity, capital productivity, labour 
productivity, profit, and employment size (N = 32) 
K/L 
VA/K 
VA/WL 
pm 
P" 
Employment 
size 
K/L 
0 46** 
006 
-041* 
-0 29 
0 49** 
VA/K 
0 56** 
0 66*** 
0 95*** 
-0 20 
VA/WL 
0 77*** 
0 70*** 
0 19 
pm 
0 69*** 
-009 
P" 
-010 
* p<005, ** p<0 01, *** p<0 001 
Source primary data 
Appendix С Correlations, Probabilities, 
and Frequencies 
The Tables below present Pearson correlations and p-values (Table C-l) and frequencies (Tabic C-2) 
Гот paired combinations of the thirteen variables used in Chapters 7 to 12. For an explanation of the 
construction of various quantitative variables refer to Appendix B. Two comments should be made about 
the data presented hete In the first place, throughout the study data have been handled pairwise rather 
than hstwise. This would not be a problem if missing data were spread randomly through the spreadsheet. 
However, a number of items apply to the same set of 32 firms on which I collected 1991 financial data. 
That is, missing data are concentrated around the same set of firms. This is a source of bias. In the 
second place, a number of the variables used are binary (bookkeeping, ethnicity, owner's business 
background, ethnicity, management style family/single). Pearson correlations do not tell one much about 
correlations between two binary variables. 
Glossary of Terms 
Bookkeep - firm maintains financial record-keeping system yes/no 
Capinten - capital intensity 
Capprod - capital productivity 
Empno - average number of employees 1989/1991 
Background = management background (engineering/trade) 
Ethnic - management ethnicity (pnfrumi/Indonesian Chinese) 
Family - management structure (single propnetor/family-managed) 
Genempyear = number of employees divided by firm age 
Labprod - labour productivity 
Market - marketing strategy (passive, joint venture, active) 
Profit - 1991 profit margin 
Revenue - 1991 turnover 
Yearexis = age of firm 
Table C-l Pearson correlation matrix with p-values 
cap 
mien 
cap 
prod 
empno 
back 
ground 
ethnic 
family 
gen 
emp 
year 
lab 
prod 
market 
profit 
reve 
nue 
year 
exis 
book 
keep 
0 1 
0 2 
0 4** 
0 4 * 
as*** 
0 7*** 
0 4** 
0 3 
0 3* 
oi 
0 4* 
0 2 
cap 
uiten 
-0 5** 
0 5** 
0 2 
0 6*** 
0 2 
0 2 
0 1 
0 0 
-04* 
0 3* 
0 4 
cap 
prod 
-0 2 
-01 
-03 
-0 0 
-0 2 
0 6** 
0 1 
0 7*** 
0 1 
-0 0 
empno 
0 3* 
0 5*** 
0 5*** 
0 6*** 
0 2 
0 3* 
-0.1 
0 8*** 
0 3* 
back 
ground 
0 3 
0 3* 
0 6*** 
0 2 
0 6*** 
0 1 
0 6*** 
-0 3* 
ethnic 
0.5*** 
0 4** 
0 1 
0 0 
-01 
0 4 * 
0 5*** 
family 
0 4 * * 
0 2 
0 1 
0 0 
0 5** 
0 1 
genem 
pyear 
0 2 
0 5*** 
0 0 
0 6*** 
-0 2 
lab 
prod 
0 3 
0 8*** 
0 4 * 
-0 0 
mar 
ket 
0 2 
0 4* 
-аз 
prof 
It 
0 2 
0 2 
reve 
nue 
0 1 
* p<0 05, ** p<0 01, *** p<0.001 
Source primary data 
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Table C-2 Frequency table 
book cap cap emp back ethnic family genemp lab market proñt revé year 
keep inten prod no ground year prod nue ems 
bookkeep 
ca pinten 
capprod 
empno 
background 
ethnic 
family 
genempyear 
labprod 
market 
profit 
revenue 
yearexis 
49 
32 
32 
4» 
45 
47 
46 
49 
32 
48 
32 
32 
49 
32 
32 
32 
30 
32 
32 
32 
32 
31 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
30 
32 
32 
32 
32 
31 
32 
32 
32 
59 
50 
55 
54 
59 
32 
54 
32 
32 
59 
50 
49 
48 
50 
30 
49 
30 
30 
50 
54 
55 
32 
52 
32 
32 
5S 
54 
54 
32 
51 
32 
32 
54 
59 
32 
54 
32 
32 
59 
32 
31 
32 
32 
32 
54 
31 
31 
54 
32 
32 
32 
32 
17 59 
Source: primary data 
Appendix D Case Descriptions of 
Six Leading Textile Equipment Makers 
Among the textile equipment producers, six companies stood out by virtue of their size and unique 
position in the market. These were: shop four with 126 employees; shop 47 with 85 employees; shop 46 
with 95 workers; shop 36 with 97 employees; and shop 20 with 375 employees. Profiles of these industry 
leaders are presented below. 
Shop 4: Indotex 
Indotex was founded in the 1950s by five business partners as a textile equipment importing firm in 
Jakarta. The trading enterprise grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s, opening branch offices in several 
cities. Afer 1968, profiting from the opening up of trade channels, it temporarily expanded into other 
Fields (gensets, agricultural machinery) but in 1973 the owners decided to concentrate on the textile 
machinery and accessories market. In these years, according to my informant, Indotex held an 80 percent 
share in the Indonesian weaving machinery parts market. 
As early as 1971 the Indotex Bandung branch office began making powerloom parts in-house in its 
own small machine shop. This machine shop was established as a separate company and grew rapidly 
with employment increasing from five operators in 1971 to over 50 at the turn of the 1980s, and passing 
the 100 mark around 1990. In 1992 employment stood at 145 workers. The shop supplied its products 
exclusively to Indotex, which procured all of its local-made shuttleloom parts from this source. Indotex 
had exited from the market for low-precision cast-iron parts a niche in which it was unable to compete 
with smaller producers. Instead it produced mainly weaving reeds and wooden pirns. 
My impression of the Indotex machine shop was that of an enterprise lacking dynamism. 
Management blamed this on the tie-in supply contract with the trading division, complaining that the 
expansion of the shop was hampered by the lax attitude of trade office salesmen in promoting the shop's 
products in the textile industry. Recently,, Jakarta management had attempted to remedy this misaligned 
incentive structure by allowing the Indotex shop to field its own sales staff so that it might 'compete with 
and stimulate the trade office salespeople', as a shop manager put it. 
The most recent venture of Indotex was a medium-size iron foundry equipped with two induction 
furnaces of 500 kilogram capacity. The foundry went onstream in 1992. The original idea was that it 
would supply inputs to Indotex's trade and machining divisions. But non-matching priorities of the 
different divisions were a source of problems here as well. Foundry staff complained that the trading 
division ordered cast-iron parts in uneconomical batches: 'So far, the trade branch has ordered small 
amounts of lightweight parts, sometimes only as much as six pieces, and weighing less than a kilogram. 
The trade branch does not place larger orders so as to minimize funds tied up in stock. We, on the other 
hand, cannot supply a product at a competitive price unless we make larger batches.' 
In part this problem was a consequence of choice of technique: the induction furnaces used were 
much too large for textile parts making. Also, there was little demand for the premium-quality castings 
produced by the Indotex foundry, which cost twice as much as a low-quality local-made casting.' At the 
rime of my visit to the foundry, foundry management was attempting to solve this problem by orienting 
to the market for heavy industrial equipment. 
Shop 47: Reliable 
Reliable is launched in the 1970s as a textile equipment importing firm. Previously, the firm's 
founder had operated as a textile parts broker, procuring part of his supplies from Indotex. Reliable, 
managed jointly by five siblings (of Chinese extraction), develops into Indotex's most formidable 
competitor in the weaving equipment market. A first step in manufacturing is taken in 1978 when the 
owners open a small machine shop in Central Java, where cast-iron shuttleloom parts, supplied by small 
1
 Management claimed that it could produce Ferro Carbon castings as well as nodular cast iron 
(FCD) to a wide range of specifications. As was explained in chapter 9, castings used for textile parts 
produced by small firms with home-made cupola ovens could only produce FC castings of low and 
unreliable quality. 
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foundries nearby, are machined to final dimensions This shop steadily expands until employment reaches 
85 by 1990 By this time heavy competition in the market for simple cast-iron parts is bringing its 
expansion to a halt 
Meanwhile, two new shops have been set up in Bandung in 1980 a sheetmetal shop producing and 
assembling non-core machinery for the weaving industry and a machine shop making skill-intensive 
shuttleloom parts such as reeds, picking sticks, and pickers The two Bandung shops employ 85 personnel 
m 1991 Rehable's management also branches out m other fields In 1990, they set up a weaving factory 
in Bandung equipped with 100 airjet looms acquired at scrap value from a Taiwanese factory that was 
destroyed by fire The looms arc reconditioned and can later perform at 80 percent efficiency At the 
same time they set up a local plant for the assembly of airjet loom reeds, thus making a first move into 
the market for high technology weaving equipment 
A Bubble investor shop 46, Papandayan 
Setiawan migrates from East Java to Bandung m the late 1960s where he becomes an employee in 
shop 19, one of the surviving Old Order metalworking firms and a former producer of powerlooms In 
1973 he sets out to become a trader in second-hand textile looms Two years later Setiawan's brother-in-
law Kusnadi arrives m Bandung and sets himself up as a textile parts broker In 1978 Setiawan founds a 
machine shop, Papandayan Papandayan's mam Ime of business becomes the reconditioning of old 
powerlooms, in particular the joining together of two looms to make double-width looms 
Around 1983 Papandayan is a thirty operator-workshop At this time Kusnadi joins his relative 
Setiawan as a salesman Two years later the shop is incorporated and Kusnadi buys becomes co-owner by 
acquiring part of the company shares Setiawan is not enthousiastic about the further development of the 
textile parts business and decides to leave the shop and concentrate on the second-hand powerloom trade 
With Kusnadi at the helm the shop undergoes a drastic reorganization Kusnadi doubles the number 
of operators to 80 and a introduces a double shift In 1987 he buys Setiawan's remaining shares and 
begins investing m land, building, and equipment on a big scale In this year he initiates a credit 
relationship with the state bank BRI Initially his credit ceiling is set at Rp 150 million because Kusnadi 
applies under the medium-size and small industry scheme (Kredit Menengah Kecil) This loan is invested 
in fixed assets in 1988 Kusnadi erects a new steel truss building Employment swells to over one 
hundred personnel In that same year his credit ceiling is lifted to 500 million and then to Rp 1 billion. 
The ceiling is further extended in 1989, first to three and eventually to Rp 5 billion 
Part of these funds are invested in new machinery (among other things Rp 400 million worth of new 
lathes varying m length between 0 8 to 4 m ), large tracts of land on the outskirts of Bandung, and new 
workshop Why BRI decided to raise Papandayan's credit ceiling from 150 million to five billion Rp ш 
the timespace of two years is not at all clear Although none of the parties involved admits it, it seems 
almost certain that Kusnadi made extensive use of bribes to achieve his ends 
Things take a new him when, with Kusnadi in the midst of yet another expansionary move, the 
central bank announces its tight money policies in 1990 This directive forces BRI to give Papandayan's 
new investment plans a 'pending' status Meanwhile, the machine shop turnover is not enough by far to 
cover the firm's debt-related expenditures Interest payments alone amount to over Rp 100 million per 
month, an amount far m excess of gross monthly revenue, averaging less than Rp 60 million m 1990, let 
alone income BRI, however, does not apply pressure on Papandayan to pay up In part, bank 
management is probably too busy handling the tight money crisis In part, the bankrupcy of Papandayan 
would be embarassing to bank officers involved m the Papandayan loans It might even jeopardize the 
careers of officers who had accepted bribes from Kusnadi 
Kusnadi, undeterred, responds to this crisis by developing an alternative plan In 1991 he attempts to 
borrow on the overseas dollar market He and his co-managers (mostly relatives) concoct a fantastic 
project involving the construction of a $5 million foundry, a $2 5 million machine assembly plant, and an 
extensive upgrading of the workshop The scheme is to be financed with a $10 million loan and is 
expected to enable Papandayan to penetrate the export market with industrial equipment reconditioned 
looms, combustion engines, and so on In the end Kusnadi cs fail to attract these funds, however By this 
tune the rumour of Papandayan's heavy debt has spread through Bandung business circles Already m 
1991 Papandayan's workforce is reduced by a third Supphers refuse to do business with the shop unless 
paid in cash 
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In mid-1992 I pay another visit to Papandayan to ascertain whether the company still survives I first 
visit the site of the planned foundry Two large steel truss buildings have been erected One of these is 
empty, in the other a number of machine tools are stored, still m crate The freight documents attached to 
the crates show that most of these were cleared through Jakarta customs in 1989 and 1990 A row of 
textile dyeing machines sits ш another comer These were made as samples for prospective customers 
some time ago There is no activity whatsoever on the site 
Then I pay a visit to the workshop To my surprise Papandayan has still not succumbed to its 
crushing debt The situation is largely the same as I found it during my earlier visit ш 1990 
Shop 50 Singasan 
In 1966 two brothers inherit a home industry machme shop from their father This enterprise leads an 
inconspicuous existence until 1988 Because its owners tend to concentrate on production rather than 
marketing, they build up a good reputatton for quality but do not expand as fast as traders entering the 
textile equipment industry such as Indotex and Reliable In 1988, however, the Singasan brothers are 
offered a golden opportunity KNITTEX, a Singapore-based sister company of a Japanese textile 
machinery manufacturer offers Singasan the opportunity to become a subcontracted parts supplier 
KNITTEX' proposal seems to be prompted by the difficulties it has m providmg quick service to 
Indonesian users of its knitting machinery, who often have to wait for spare parts that must be shipped m 
from Singapore 
Only one year later Singasan has expanded to a 60-worker machme shop Lack of space forces it to 
move to a new location Their new workshop is built on KNITTEX-owned land directly behind the 
KNITTEX knitting factory in south Bandung After 1990 a foundry is added to the shop, the latter now 
employing 125 personnel The foundry is co-owned by KNITTEX, the Singasan brothers, and a number 
of outside investors The foundry supplies Singasan with parts but also takes outside orders, facmg 
capacity utilization problems similar to those of the Indotex foundry The shop exports over $100,000 
worth of finished parts to the Singapore principal per month Reject rates, which stood at a high 30 
percent, had dropped conspicuously after the recent installation of a quality control department Formally 
all parts made by Singasan should be shipped to KNITTEX Singapore before being sold in Indonesia, an 
administrative arrangement serving to protect KNITTEX's reputation of being a high-quality overseas 
producer In practice, Singasan's parts also find their way directly to Indonesian users of KNITTEX 
knitting machinery via the Bandung service center 
Shop 36 Chrysler 
The history of Chrysler reads like the plot of a soap opera It starts when Ema inhents Milano, a car 
and motorcycle parts import business run by her her parents, m the 1960s Ema, an astute 
businesswoman, subsequently begins reonenting this trading business to combustion engine repair and 
revision In the midst of this process she marnes Buyung, a man with a technical background who 
assumes a managing role in Ema's vigorously expanding repair shop Around 1975 it is decided to move 
the shop from its cramped quarters to a spacier location owned by Buyung's parents Before this 
relocation, Buyung's younger brother had already become a patiner in the shop, solidifying the family ties 
by marrying Ema's younger sister With the transfer of the shop, Buyung's family de facto takes the shop 
out of Ema's hands Only four months later Ema and Buyung separate Ema demands her machinery back 
only to find that the shop's debt-asset ratio has leapt from 5 100 to 100 100, alledgedly due to Buyung's 
imprudent loaning of shop funds to relatives 
Ema decides not to carry the case to court, mainly because her sister is snll mamed to Buyung's 
brother She leaves the shop m Buyung's hands and starts from scratch on her old location with a 
machine shop where she manages to make a remarkable recovery in the 1980s 
Meanwhile, Buyung and his brother, later aided by a third sibling, commue with the engine revision 
shop Around 1980 the shop has expanded to a 40-worker establishment, at which point it stabilizes At 
this point a new investment opportunity offers itself The brothers acquired some of the additional 
equipment for the shop second-hand from England via a friend with overseas connections When this 
fnend offers them a batch of UK-made machme tools for sale, the brothers conceive the plan of buying, 
recondinomng, and reselling the machines The second-hand machines arrive and arc stocked in a 
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warehouse in Bandung Subsequent attempts to recondition the machine tools are not very satisfactory, 
however After delivery, buyers complain about malfunctions, send the revised machines back and 
demand their deposits back. Machine tool sales drop and by 1985 the brothers are saddled with a huge 
collection of machine tools with an estimated value of $1 million At their wits end the brothers then 
decide to set up a machine shop with the machinery from this misfired trade project 
Chrysler, as this machine shop is called, is located in a brandnew building Although speculative 
investments, among other things m real estate, give Chrysler financial ups and downs and even lead to 
occasional seizures of leased new machinery, the establishment expands In 1992, apart from an unknown 
amount of unrelated debts of the brothers, Chrysler is a profitable enterprise with a workforce of 125, a 
yearly turnover of $900,000 and profits m excess of $100,000 In part, the secret of its success lies m an 
extensive use of cheap low-quality castings or scrap iron as raw material these are machined and heat 
treated and sold as high-quality machine parts to unsuspecting customers who only find out when it is too 
late The Bandung textile faetones are important customers for Chrysler Chrysler's owners also use their 
comparative advantage ш low labour costs vis-α vts the Jakarta area to win substantial orders there 
Shop 20 Nugraha 
Nugraha is the largest and most advanced of the Indonesian textde equipment makers The company 
founder, Nugraha, enrolls in the Bandung Textile Technology Institute ш 1959, the very perceptible 
scarcity of clothing drawing him to the textile industry After finishing his studies he sets himself up as 
mobile supplier of textile factory supplies m 1966, peddling machine lubricants and parts to texnle 
faetones on his bicycle He also accepts order for the design and installation of tailor-made steel 
constructions and founds a workshop to carry out the metalworking part of his business By the early 
1970s, he employs about 30 operators 
A big opportunity amves when Nugraha is chosen to represent a reputed German manufacturer of 
industrial lubricants This and other agencies provide the enterprise with a more solid financial basis This 
in tum is used to expand and diversify engineering activities In the metalworking field Nugraha's mam 
activity is m textdc finishing the firm produces winch machines, heat-setting installations, drum dryers, 
and so on Other products mclude water pretrearment installations and blowers and fans for the textile 
industry Later Nugraha also branches out in other fields, relying on its experiences m textile noncore 
machinery production The firm accepts orders for paint spray booths, heatmg and drying machines for 
the timber and agro-processing industries, cooling machines and air-regulating installations 
By 1986 Nugraha employs a staff of 50 skilled engineers and contractors and a workforce of 300 
employees, and has branch offices m Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, and Mcdan Around 1990 the 
workforce has increased to 400 This makes Nugraha the largest firm m the Indonesian textile equipment 
industry Yet Nugraha's company strategy is to persist in noncore machinery production Why did 
Nugraha not attempt to penetrate the core textile machinery marked In an interview I had with the owner 
m 1990 he explicated this market strategy as follows 
Q "Why does your company not take up the production of powerlooms''' 
A 'Impossible Technically it is feasible If you give me a hundred mdhon dollars and tell me to make a 
loom, I can make a loom The problem isn't technology I could also make watches or whatever It is 
even becoming more and more easy now to make advanced products because of computer-guided took 
The thing is, if you ask me 'Can you make it0 ' I say yes, but when your question is 'Can you sell i t r my 
reply is no Because I cannot compete against reputed foreign machinery makers who mass-produce 
looms In the first place, you lack their expenence and you need time to get the bugs out of your product, 
something they did a long time ago In the second place, you need to make heavy investments m the 
product in design, the layout of an assembly line, and so on This forces you to sell a lot of machines to 
reach break-even point But you have no customers, no name 
Such a thing can only be done with government support This is why I choose to operate alongside 
the market for mass-produced industrial machines where you have to supply tador-made designs, where 
after-sales service figures lmportandy, and where bulky or heavy things like storage containers are 
involved Construction work rather than machine-building ' 
Appendix E Samenvatting 
De opkomst van Oost-Azië als industriële macht in de afgelopen drie decennia heeft 
zich even snel als onverwachts voltrokken. Het is mede om deze reden dat de micro-
processen die hieraan ten grondslag lagen slechts onvolledig zijn vastgelegd in 
overheidsdatabestanden en versnipperd veldonderzoek. Er zijn nog veel vraagtekens over 
hoe precies landen als Taiwan, Zuid Korea, en de mini-staatjes Hong Kong en Singapore 
zich zo snel tot industriemogendheden hebben kunnen ontwikkelen. Hoe leidde de 
optelsom van individuele ondememersbeslissingen, genomen binnen een context van snelle 
economische verandering en intensief overheidsingrijpen, tot de snelle opkomst van een 
reeks van nieuwe industrietakken? 
De economische transformatie van deze regio is echter nog altijd in volle gang en 
biedt daarom mogelijkheden om alsnog inzicht te krijgen in deze micro-dynamiek van 
industriële groei. In de jaren '80 hebben zich, na Thailand en Maleisië, ook Indonesië en 
Zuid-China zich als kandidaten op de lijst van Nieuwe Industrialiserende Landen 
aangemeld. Deze studie brengt verslag uit van een veldonderzoek naar de recente opkomst 
van een textielmachine-industrie in Indonesië. De opkomst van deze industrie gaat terug 
tot het midden van de jaren '70. In die tijd ging een groeiend aantal constructie-
werkplaatsen en kleine machine-fabrieken zich toeleggen op het leveren van vervangende 
machine-onderdelen, reparatie- en aanpassingswerk, en eenvoudige machinerie 
(inspectietafels, metalen containers en ander constructiewerk) aan locale spinnerijen en 
weverijen. In het korte bestek van vijftien jaar groeide deze tak van nijverheid uit tot een 
respectabele omvang. Naar mijn schatting bood de Indonesische textielmachine-industrie in 
1991 werk aan tenminste 10.000 personen waarbij er een jaaromzet van 40 miljoen US$ 
gedraaid werd. 
Er zijn belangrijke practische overwegingen om deze industrialiseringsprocessen in 
detail te onderzoeken. Veel overheden hebben tot hun schade ondervonden dat industriële 
groei slechts in beperkte mate beheersbaar is. Waar men, zoals in veel ontwikkelings-
landen, de binnenlandse markt afschermde van de wereldmarkt ontwikkelde een 
binnenlandse industrie zich inderdaad in razendsnel tempo. Tegelijkertijd had het instellen 
van importquota en hoge invoertarieven vaak vervelende neven-effecten. De binnenlandse 
ondernemingen die gedijden in deze kweekvijvers, zowel staats- als privé-bedrijven, 
werkten vaak inefficiënt. Profiterend van een comfortabele monopolie-positie leverden zij 
producten die en duur en kwalitatief slecht waren. De overheden die een dergelijk import 
substitutie-beleid voerden zaten gevangen in een dilemma. Handhaafden ze de protectie 
dan zat men opgescheept met dure en slechte producten. Schafte men deze af dan was er 
het gevaar dat de opgebouwde productiecapaciteit de buitenlandse concurrentie niet zou 
overleven. Des te frustrerender was het dat beleidsmakers regelmatig geheel nieuwe 
industrie-takken spontaan tot bloei zagen komen op onverwachte locaties en momenten. 
Deze ervaringen onderstrepen hoezeer de sturing van ondernemersgedrag door 
overheden tot nog toe een zaak van ЪІМ varen' geweest is. Wil men van industrie-
stimuleringsbeleid meer maken dan een tasten in het duister dan dient men eerst meer te 
weten over de praktijk van het samenspel van industrie-beleid, industriële verandering en 
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ondememersbeslissingen. Het in kaart te brengen van dit samenspel vereist een speciale 
onderzoeksstrategie. Deze studie koppelt een afgebakende industrie-focus aan een 
combinatie van geaggregeerde en micro-data. Ten dele berust dit verslag op gegevens 
ontleend aan de databestanden van de Indonesische overheid. Voornamelijk echter berust 
het op gegevens verzameld in een uitvoerig veldonderzoek uitgevoerd tussen april 1991 en 
juli 1992. Hierin werden 70 machine-fabrieken en constructiewerkplaatsen, 24 weverijen 
en spinnerijen, en een aantal importbedrijven onder de loep genomen. 
De opkomst van de Indonesische textielmachine-industrie illustreert het fenomeen van 
ongeplande en onverwachte industriële groei. Dit gegeven vormt de 'puzzel' die dit 
onderzoek trachtte op te lossen. De voornaamste bevindingen kunnen puntsgewijs als volgt 
opgesomd worden: 
i) het gevoerde industriebeleid van de Indonesische overheid had tegenstrijdige 
effecten op de textielmachine-industrie. Enerzijds had de bescherming van de sectoren 
staal en textiel nadelige gevolgen voor textielmachine en onderdelen-makers. Zo werden ze 
gedwongen te werken met locaal geproduceerd constructie-staal dat duur en van 
onbetrouwbare kwaliteit was, en met onzekere leveringstermijnen. Geïmporteerde speciale 
staal-soorten waren, door hoge importtarieven en afhandelingskosten, bijna 50 procent 
duurder dan in omringende landen. Tegelijkertijd creëerde de overheid, in haar streven de 
locale textielindustrie so snel mogelijk te laten expanderen, een open markt voor 
textielmachines en -onderdelen. Locale textielmachine-producenten, ingeklemd tussen deze 
beschermde sectoren, bevonden zich zo in een weinig benijdenswaardige positie. 
Anderzijds profiteerde de tcxtielmachine-industrie van een door protectionistische 
maatregelen gestimuleerde snelle expansie van gemechaniseerd spinnen en weven in 
Indonesië vanaf 1968. De vraag blijft echter hoe locale textielmachine-makers zich vanaf 
1975 een plaats op de open markt voor machines en machine-onderdelen wist te veroveren 
terwijl ze toch direct concurreerden met ervaren en gereputeerde buitenlandse producenten. 
ii) in belangrijke mate is de groei van een locale textielmachine-industrie te danken 
aan de samenstelling van het spin- en weefmachine-park en aan machineonderhouds-
praktijken in de textielindustrie. Wat het eerste punt betreft: het Indonesische 
textielmachine-park kenmerkt zich door een grote verscheidenheid aan leeftijden, 
technieken, merken, en modellen. In de jaren '80, bijvoorbeeld, betrokken textielfabrieken 
hun spinmachines en weefgetouwen van een veelvoud van machinebouwers gevestigd in 
35 verschillende landen. Deze verscheidenheid heeft tot gevolg dat importeurs van 
textielmachine-onderdelen machine-specieke componenten, vanwege geringe omzettten, 
niet op voorraad kunnen nemen. Metalen onderdelen worden pas op aanvraag besteld en 
zijn gemiddeld enkele maanden per boot onderweg. Daarbij komt dat een groot deel van 
het textielmachine-park oud en versleten is: in 1987 was meer dan de helft van alle 
textielmachines meer dan 12 jaar oud. 
Hier komt het tweede punt in het spel: Indonesische textielfabrieken plegen minimaal 
onderhoud aan hun machinerie. Uitgezonderd vitale onderdelen, d.w.z. onderdelen waarvan 
de kwaliteit directe invloed uitoefent op de kwaliteit van draad of doek, vertrouwen 
onderhoudsmanagers op breakdown machine-onderhoud. Met andere woorden, men laat 
machines draaien tot een onderdeel het begeeft. Omdat het onderdeel niet op voorraad ligt, 
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omdat bestellen bij een locale importeur een wachttijd van maanden met zich meebrengt, 
en omdat men niet bij machte is om onderdelen direct bij de producent in het buitenland 
te bestellen (het boek met onderdelen-codes is kwijt, men weet niet hoe men moet 
bestellen, de originele onderdelen worden niet meer geproduceerd, etc), wendt men zich 
tot een locale constructie-werkplaats. Het gevolgde machine aankoop- en vervangings-
beleid en de gebrekkige onderhoudspraktijken in Indonesische spinnerijen en weverijen, 
met andere woorden, gaven locale ondernemers de kans om in te breken in de 
textielmachine-markt. 
iii) Wie leidden de invasie van Indonesische ondernemers op de textielmachine- en 
machine-onderdelenmarkt? De sleutelfiguren waren enerzijds eigenaars van kleine, op 
reparatie- en constructie-werk gerichte metaalbedrijfjes die zich allengs in textielmachine-
onderdelen gingen specialiseren; en anderzijds handelaars die zich in machine en 
machineonderdelen-fabricage begaven. Deels waren deze handelaars afkomstig uit de 
gelederen van gevestigde machine-importeurs. Deels ook waren het klassieke Verleger die 
als tussenpersoon tussen textielfabrieken en machine-werkplaatsen begonnen en naderhand 
zelf de productie van machines en onderdelen ter hand namen. Het is frappant dat juist ex-
handelaars de leiding hadden van de grotere textielmachine-bedrijven, met vijftig tot 
enkele honderden werknemers. De geobserveerde bereidwilligheid van handelaars om zich 
in de manufactuur te begeven is slecht te rijmen met het beeld van 'de' Zuidoost 
Aziatische ondernemer zoals dat uit de sociaal-wetenschappelijke literatuur naar voren 
komt. Mijn bevindingen staan haaks op de generaliserende uitspraken over risico-
vermijdend, mercantiel of consumptief, korte termijn, en op politieke machinaties 
berustend investeringsgedrag die men hierin aantreft. 
iv) Qua werkgelegenheid varieerden de textielmachine-fabrieken en werkplaatsen in 
grootte van één tot vierhonderd werknemers, qua jaaromzetten van 10.000 tot meer dan 
anderhalf miljoen gulden. De kapitaalsintensiteit (bedrijfsvermogen per werknemer) nam 
sterk toe met een groei in omvang van de onderneming. Ten dele was dit te wijten aan 
investeringen op de vastgoedmarkt (land, bedrijfsgebouwen); ten dele ook aan het feit dat 
grotere bedrijven eerder toegang kregen tot bankleningen en daardoor makkelijker in 
machinerie konden investeren. In voorname mate echter was de positieve correlatie tussen 
kapitaalsintensiteit en bedrijfsgrootte een gevolg van concurrentie in de locale 
textielmachine-industrie. Ondanks het feit dat loonkosten van productie-personeel gelijk 
lagen voor grote en kleine bedrijven, konden grotere ondernemingen niet op prijs 
concurreren met kleine werkplaatsen. Zij hadden namelijk te maken met hogere vaste 
kosten verbonden aan administratief personeel, grond en gebouwen, en betaalden 
vergunningen en belastingen waar kleine werkplaatsen illegaal en 'vanuit de keuken' 
opereerden. 
Om deze reden waren grotere ondernemingen gedwongen in die niche-markten te 
opereren waar kleine bedrijven van uitgesloten waren. Grotere bedrijven creëerden deze 
niches op basis van speciale technische kennis (bv. van warmtebehandelings-technieken) 
maar voornamelijk op basis van de technische mogelijkheden van duurdere speciale 
gereedschapswerktuigen. Zo waren de kleine werkplaatsen, beschikkend over een 
kolomboor, wat handgereedschap en enkele kleine draaibanken van matige kwaliteit, 
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slechts in staat tot het uitvoeren van eenvoudig verspanend werk (draaien van assen, 
pulleys, etc.) met een precisie van hooguit 0.1 mm. Grote bedrijven beschikten over 
materieel waarmee men grote werkstukken aankon (langere horizontale en verticale 
draaibanken), speciale vormen kon produceren (fraismachines, slotting machines), of met 
een veel grotere precisie kon werken. De markt, met andere woorden, was gesegmenteerd. 
De felle concurrentie tussen kleine bedrijven binnen het prijs-concurrerende segment 
had nadelige gevolgen voor individuele bedrijven maar ook voor de industrie als geheel. 
Om te overleven waren kleine bedrijven gedwongen orders te accepteren tegen prijzen 
waarin niet alle vaste kosten doorberekend waren. Daarmee pleegden ze roofbouw op 
zichzelf. Ook namen veel bedrijven het niet al te nauw met product-kwaliteit: zij 
smokkelden met toleranties en gebruikten minderwaardig staal en gietijzer. Aan deze 
praktijken waren klanten mede schuldig aangezien die hun orders doorgaans onvoldoende 
specificeerden. Wisselende kwaliteit en het gebrek aan standaardisering bezorgden de 
locale textielmachine-industrie als geheel een slecht imago dat potentiële klanten afschrok. 
iv) Tenslotte bleken familie-bedrijven sterker gegroeid te zijn dan ondernemingen 
geleid door één enkele eigenaar/manager. Er waren aanwijzingen dat dit te wijten was aan 
agency-problemen. Een expansionistisch beleid vroeg om aggresieve marketing naast de 
gewone productie-activiteiten. De solistische manager, op deze twee fronten tegelijk 
opererend, had veel te kampen met frauderend personeel. Familie-bedrijven, geleid door 
twee tot vijf broers/zussen, waren vrijwel immuun voor dit probleem. 
Resumerend kan gesteld worden dat een onbedoeld effect van overheidsinterventie 
(protectie van textielindustrie), in combinatie met gebrekkig machine-onderhoud in 
textielfabrieken en het strategische concurrentie-voordeel van nabijheid dat locale metaal-
ondernemers genoten, geleid heeft tot de opkomst van een Indonesische textielmachine-
industrie. 
Het ontbreken van kennis over machine-onderhoud en constructie in de Indonesische 
industrie was de sleutel tot dit groeiproces. Tegelijkertijd vormt het een struikelblok voor 
een verdere uitbouw van industriële capaciteiten. De beleidsimplicatie van dit onderzoek is 
dat de Indonesische overheid af dient te zien van protectionistische maatregelen, die deze 
inefficiënties slechts in stand zouden houden. Met name het nut van kostbare door de staat 
gesponsorde prestige-projecten in de machinebouw-sector (o.a. vliegtuig-fabricage) is 
discutabel. De Indonesische industrie als geheel is het meeste gebaat bij overheids-
investeringen in een publiek goed waaraan het tot nog toe vrijwel geheel ontbroken heeft: 
de scholing van technisch personeel op alle niveau's. Een instroom van gekwalificeerd 
personeel zal positieve effecten sorteren in alle takken van industrie. Ook de 
textielmachine-industrie moet in staat zijn om, met een meer solide technische ondergrond, 
haar huidige positie als springplank te gebruiken voor het uitbouwen van haar 
marktpositie. 
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1. De roekeloze haast die de Indonesische overheid ten toon spreidt in haar streven 
om toe te treden tot de rijen der industriële mogendheden is een voornaam 
obstakel voor het bereiken van dat doel. 
2. De industriële ontwikkeling van Indonesië is meer gebaat bij overheids-
investeringen in publieke goederen als onderwijs en normalisatie dan bij 
kostbare prestige-projecten op het gebied van luchtvaart en electrónica. 
3. 'Industriebelijdenis' is een accurate Nederlandse vertaling van het Indonesische 
begrip 'industriebeleid'. 
4. In de praktijk blijkt er een gapend gat te bestaan tussen de intenties en effecten 
van industriebeleid. Dit manco zou te verhelpen zijn ware het niet dat 
beleidsmakers er belang bij hebben het bestaan ervan te ontkennen dan wel te 
bagatelliseren. 
5. De opkomst van een Indonesische textielmachine-industrie na 1975 is voor een 
groot deel te danken aan gebrekkig machine-onderhoud in spinnerijen en 
weverijen. 
6. Het Indonesische machinepark wordt draaiende gehouden door vindingrijke 
monteurs voorzien van slecht gereedschap, engelengeduld, en grote 
hoeveelheden lijm, elastiek en isolatietape. 
7. Hun benarde bestaan hebben kleine textielmachine-producenten in Indonesië te 
danken aan concurrentie van hun kleine soortgenoten en niet aan grotere 
bedrijven in de branche. 
8. Hulp aan kleine industrie in ontwikkelingslanden die bestaat uit het legaliseren 
en voorzien van een boekhouding komt eerder de staatskas ten goede dan die 
van het bedrijf zelf. 
9. Tot dusverTe hebben culturele verklaringen van de economische groei van Oost-
Azië meer verwarring gesticht dan inzicht geschapen. Dit zal niet veranderen 
zolang gebruikers nalaten het begrip cultuur eenduidig te definiëren en 
operationeel te maken. 
10. Interdisciplinair onderzoek wordt als principe door wetenschappers hartelijk 
toegejuicht. In de praktijk doet disciplinair sectarisme de multidisciplinaire 
onderzoeker vaak tussen wal en schip belanden. 


